

## Article

# Approach and Success in the Management of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs): Application to Two Case Studies, The UNMISS and MONUSCO Missions of the UN

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**Abstract:** A Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) of the United Nations (UN) is a complex project whose objective is determined by the mandate, and which seeks to eliminate violence, achieve peace, and consolidate the future of society in conflict zones. For a PKO is important to assess the success or failure of the mission because might have implications for the outcomes of future missions. In this paper, it is proposed a methodology that combines two available tools, on the one hand the tool of PMI to determine the most appropriate approach to manage a PKO and on the other hand the NUPI tool, to measure the success of a PKO. The methodology is applied to two studies cases of fourth generation PKOs, the UNMISS PKO in South Sudan and the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. From the results obtained an adaptive approach enjoys a greater guarantee of success than does a predefined approach.

**Keywords:** project management; complexity; crisis management; peacekeeping operations



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## 1. Introduction

A project is a singular result obtained by applying a series of resources, usually determined progressively, in a finite time. It is called singular, since, from the idea of where the project arises, a unique and differentiable result is achieved. It is labelled progressive since it is developed through simultaneous and/or successive processes. Finally, a project is designated as finite, because it has a beginning and an end.

Project management is the discipline in which the necessary knowledge, skills, and techniques are applied to organize and manage resources in such a way that all the work required in the project can be completed in compliance with the defined requirements, within the present time, and at the agreed cost [1].

A Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) of the United Nations (UN) is also a project. Its singular objective is peace and is carried out progressively through the application of material and human resources, under a finite execution time. Peacekeeping missions are an effective tool to avoid the resumption of civil wars [2], to increase the duration of peace agreements [3] to contribute to the end of the violence [4], to enhance cooperation at the local level [5] and to support post-conflict reconstruction [6].

As a project, a PKO requires management that involves the task of administering multiple resources, taking care of the relationships with innumerable stakeholders, addressing, and resolving risks, and bringing to fruition the set of requirements.

If the most important aspect to launch a project is the contract (in which the definitions are laid out of the requirements, the scope, objectives, the resources with which it must

be carried out, together with the scope, time, and cost parameters that define the success of a project), then the most important element in a PKO is its mandate [7], where the requirements to be met and the resources (troops, police, specialists, and support) available are listed.

A significant first element in project management involves the choice of approach to be utilised for the realisation and monitoring of a project until its conclusion. The use of a certain approach is also related to the complexity of the project, which acts in environments where its elements are highly interconnected through networks that can self-organise; from these networks new initially unforeseen elements may arise, which in turn can generate great risk and uncertainty [8,9].

A second important element in project management, which is also highly relevant to the evaluation and continuity of a project, is the measurement of its success [10,11]. If the project is complex, then the measurement of its success becomes difficult to assess [12]. The creation of new requirements increases the time and cost factors thereof, and the objectives can sometimes remain impossible to achieve [13]. For the management of complex projects are not adequacy conventional management systems [14], some authors advocate for qualitatively qualitative approaches [15,16], others for quantitative approaches [17,18], and other researchers emphasize the complexity assessment systems should be based on existing project management (PM) standards to ensure implementation of recognized competencies and practices in managing complex projects [19,20].

For a PKO is important to assess the success or failure of the mission because might have implications for the outcomes of other missions [21]. Define success in PKO missions is a complex issue, on the one hand could be considered as the absence of hostilities and on the other hand the reduction of civilian suffering [22], so determining success is an important question both for policy-making perspective and for scholarly perspective.

In this paper we have two objectives: the first, to analyze the approach of a PKO, which would allow establishing the most correct approach to PKO management and the second, to find the theoretical method that can provide a measure of the success of a PKO, while considering its approach and the complexity in which it is found. If the approach of the management of a PKO is according to its characteristics the likelihood of its success will increase.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the introduction. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework of the UN peacekeeping missions. Section 3 is divided into three subsections, the first presents the description of the types of approaches for the management of a project, the second subsection describes the management of complex projects and the third presents the literature review about success in peacekeeping missions. Section 4 develops the methodology of the research and in Section 5, the methodology is applied, and discussed, to two studies cases, the UNMISS PKO in South Sudan and the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Section 6 presents the main conclusions of the study.

## 2. UN Peacekeeping Missions

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools at the UN's disposal to help countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace [23].

The Charter of the United Nations is clear in the readiness of said organization to use all the necessary measures to preserve peace. As stated in Article 1, the purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. Furthermore, in Article 2.3, it proclaims that member countries must settle their international disputes by peaceful means [24].

The Security Council, as a key element of the international order, holds the capacity to impose sanctions, call for a peaceful settlement, access other coercive measures, and to use force to preserve peace. Article 33 (peaceful settlement of disputes) is of special interest since all the means of peaceful settlement appear both diplomatic and judicial,

since the parties involved in the dispute enjoy being able to choose the means that they deem appropriate.

From 1948 to the present day, peacekeeping operations have adapted to the evolving requirements. The peace missions can therefore be divided into the following groups:

1. “First-generation missions” are in accordance with Chapter VI on the peaceful settlement of disputes, in which their principal and almost sole task is to interpose between countries in conflict (interstate conflicts), such as those in the Middle East, Kashmir, and Cyprus [25]. With these first missions, the intention is to help eliminate hostilities, to verify that there is no fighting, and to ensure that conflicts are not restarted. These are missions that seek to promote military security, in the hope that negotiations can settle the political conflict that triggered the hostilities. The main characteristics of these missions are the consent of the belligerents, neutrality and impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence [26].
2. “Second-generation missions” mean not only security but also peacekeeping missions. Moreover, no longer are peace missions only sent to interstate conflicts (UNIMOG, observation mission in the Iran-Iraq conflict; UNGOMAP, good offices mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan) but they are also sent to intrastate conflicts (UNTAG to assist in the transition process in Namibia; UNTAC in Cambodia) [27]. In 1992, the UN proposed a new way of viewing peace missions through its report “a program for peace” [28], which eliminated the consent of the parties and divided the action of the missions into a civilian component with humanitarian aid and reconstruction tasks, and the military component, equipped to deter actions against the population and ensure the arrival of humanitarian aid.
3. “Third-generation missions” are based on Chapter VII of the founding charter of the UN with a strong coercive character. This type of mission is complex and multidisciplinary, with division in terms of its implementation, by the components of the security council, and have failed as confirmed in the UNAMIR mission (Rwanda, 1994) and UNPROFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995).
4. “Fourth-generation missions” are missions of great capacity for the adaptation and integration of multiple elements. At the end of the 1990s, as a result of deep reflection, the UN established the new peace missions through the “Brahimi Report” [29] and the “Capstone Doctrine” [30]. These missions were to be carried out with the following conditions: need for consent from the parties; impartiality, not neutrality; and the non-use of force, except in self-defence. Furthermore, interesting integration-oriented aspects were also considered: security cooperation in the theatre of operations; the exchange of information; joint analysis of the situation; improved operational control in missions; integrated security systems, and integrated mission planning.

Subsequent advances in the fourth-generation missions in 2006 with the “New Horizon” program [31] and in 2014 with the “HIPPO report” [32] are especially important in that they present an adaptive approach focused on the stakeholders who benefit or suffer from the conflict, carry out a risk study and an early-warning study, and are sufficiently flexible to adapt to the changes that may occur, with the additional integration of civil organisations and regional alliances.

In 2017, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres launched a new UN peacekeeping initiative called the “A4P” initiative, with eight areas for improvement: Politics; Women, peace and security; Protection; Safety and self-protection of peacekeepers; Performance and accountability; Peacebuilding and sustaining peace; Partnerships; and Directorate of Peace Operations. Although it has received strong support, this initiative remains in the implementation phase [33].

### 3. Literature Review

In project management, there is always a management team with a leader who is the project manager. The latter assumes the ultimate responsibility for the project. Project management applies supervision through three general steps: the establishment of real-

istic, reasonable, and achievable objectives through the necessary processes; the constant evaluation of the achievement of said objectives; and the opportune implementation of appropriate corrective actions to obtain the agreed result [34,35].

There are two types of processes in a project: the production processes that are oriented towards the creation of the product, the service, or the result, which justifies the realisation of the project; and the management processes, which are dedicated to coordinate all the work that the project team must carry out to achieve the final objective of the project. Both types of processes can be sequenced, overlapped, or interacted with each other throughout the active life of the project. This active life of the project is called the project life cycle [1].

It can, therefore, be established that, in a project, two types of control exist: a control over the “how the project is carried out”, in other words, the approach; and another control over the “result of the project”, that addresses the measure of success. Both are vitally important to make this distinction regarding peace missions [36].

### 3.1. Project Management Approach

Predictive projects are those that take advantage of the high certainty in the requirements and/or objectives demanded in the initial phase, since these requirements and/or objectives are usually fixed and are carried out by a stable technically prepared team of experts, who are seldom related to the outside. The processes that compose such a project are carried out only once, and a result is yielded at the end of its life cycle. The main goal of this type of project is to manage costs in order to prevent heavy economic losses being incurred. The processes comprised therein are sequential [1].

From the late 1990s, project management with life cycles that differed from those of the predictive projects began to be widely utilized. These new types of projects were grouped under the heading “adaptive projects”, since these adapted to the changes that were required to be carried out continuously, especially in the early phases, adapted well to the changes produced by risks in the execution, and yielded added value (results) very early in their life cycle. Among these types of projects were the following:

- Iterative projects. These projects aim to improve the result by making prototypes or tests of the elements to be delivered later. Each iteration produces feedback that is presented to stakeholders, thereby enabling them to change their opinions and it also provides new knowledge for the work team.
- Incremental projects. The objective of these projects is to prioritise speed in the delivery of value to stakeholders, and the faster and greater the value, the better. With rapid delivery, the stakeholders can propose changes in a later phase, and the team can also quickly observe the changes, risks, and knowledge acquired.

These two types of projects have given rise to a project type that combines the characteristics of both types to form the Agile project, which responds to the demands of uncertainty and continuous changes in the projects. In this type of project, changes in initial conditions are constant and the project is divided into characteristics (pieces) that are executed in an order determined by the environment [37].

An example of this type of project is given by the Quick Impact Projects (QIP) in the PKOs. These are small-scale, low-cost projects that are implemented over a short period of time. They include activities such as renovating a school in a certain town, digging water wells, and fixing a certain road swept by a storm [38] and the development projects that the UN CPAS is establishing [39].

The Agile project management methodology completely changes the philosophy of projects since not only is greater importance given to teams and the creation of networks, but there is also greater collaboration with project stakeholders, and the main mission involves a fast response to change and a full review of risks on an ongoing basis.

Hitherto, various approaches to project management have been identified which can be classified as either having total certainty with fixed prerequisites (predictive projects), or a set of approaches, encompassed under the premise of uncertainty in the prerequisites, with

certain complexity (called adaptive projects), among which the Agile approach currently stands out.

However, it is not always necessary to use a single type of approach when managing projects. In many cases, certain elements of different life cycles are combined to achieve the result expected by those interested in the project. These are called HYBRID PROJECTS.

Hybrid approaches are more common than they may seem, more than 75% of the projects that have been executed in recent years are hybrids [40].

### 3.2. Management of Complex Projects

A system is a combination of means (whether they be people, materials, equipment, software, facilities, data, etc.) integrated in such a way that they can develop a certain function in response to a specific need [41].

A system can be decomposed into essential units in such a way that, through their analysis and summation, what the system actually does can be ascertained. This is called systems analysis: the methodical process that allows us to comprehend and control systems [42].

A complex system is one that has much more information than each essential unit provides since the links and relationships between them generate new information and properties that cannot be explained from these essential units alone, and hence this type of system has non-linear behaviour. Moreover, if the complex system is dynamic, then this implies that it continuously interacts with the environment that surrounds it, and that it is not predictive in detail, nor is its evolution over time predictive. In general, however, it may appear predictive [8].

Complex projects are characterized by the summation of complex systems to achieve a complex result; the union of dynamic systems that continuously interact with their environment; and the procurement of results with new properties that did not previously exist in the essential units that comprise the complex systems used [43].

The management of complex projects presents different properties to those of the management of predictive projects seen above. Here, stakeholder management is of the utmost importance. Any possible changes that can be perceived in the stakeholders must be continuously scrutinised, and the largest number of interested parties must also be included so that the initial conditions are perfectly ascertained, and any subsequent uncertainties are prevented. For this type of project, it should be considered, that [44]:

- In a complex project, the interpersonal and leadership skills of team members and their director are at the same level or sometimes higher than their technical knowledge. These skills should detect changes before they take effect.
- Leadership should make it easier to take immediate measures to prevent negative events (threats) and to favour positive events (opportunities).
- The stakeholders should be part of the social network of the project.
- The essential units to be executed should be continuously evaluated in such a way that they can be immediately changed to respond to these changes.

### 3.3. Success in PKO Projects

Although the PKO must have coherence between the clear mandate, the strategies, and the resources to achieve the designated objectives, no set of common criteria from the literature consulted can be found to measure the success of a PKO.

Diehl suggests that success is composed by two aspects, the limitation of the armed conflict, i.e., the limit the death and the destruction of actions of war, and the resolution of the disagreements that originated the conflict [45]. For Doyle and Sambanis, success depends on the level of hostility in the area, on the capacities of the population of the area to establish peace, and on international stakeholders [4]. Anderson, define success as the maintenance of a sufficient level of security to maintain governance and the arrival of aid [46]. For Puskhina, success lies in curbing violence, preventing the spread of conflict, and resolving the causes of conflict [47].



Sigri and Basar define the measurement of success depends on meeting variable KPIs in accordance with the mission in the same way as with a project [48]. For Wistuba, success lies in establishing a secure environment that enables the establishment of positive and adaptable peace [49]. Other author as Peter believes that it should be inquired as to whom success is important and that all stakeholders should be included and that they should adapt as much as possible to fit the circumstances [50] and Bardalai, on the other hand, considers that it is very difficult to measure the success of a mission given that so many points are addressed therein that it becomes impossible to achieve a homogeneous value of success [51].

Some researchers have proposed a list of criteria for determining success, for example Diehl and Druckman propose as criteria a factor humanitarian aid, conduction of elections, local governance, rule of law and other factors [52]. Martin-Brulé, after analysing 11 peace missions in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, propose a new conceptual framework which further delineates operational definitions of success or failure based on: failures, partial failures, partial successes or successes [53].

Van der Lijn define success of a PKO depends on nine factors: willingness and sincerity of the conflict parties to implement the peace plan; that sufficient security is provided; that the causes of the conflict are studied; cooperation of conflict parties, regional and international actors; that the PKO is implemented at the right time and for the right period; competent leadership and prepared teams; long-term approach (about 10 years); clear coordination of all stakeholders and that local stakeholders see the PMO as their own [54].

Bratt, after analysis of various PKOs, propose as success criteria: the fulfilment of the mandate, the end of the armed conflict, the peace and security and the conflict resolution [55]. All these aspects are related to peacekeeping but not with the future, so the same author extended the criteria to aspects as governance and fairness, as well the stability with the countries of the region [56].

It is not only important to define the criteria but also to establish the necessary tools to be able to measure it. In this sense, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) [57] has developed an evaluation system based on eight dimensions to analyse peace missions and support the departments involved in PKOs. This system combines comprehensive management, adaptability, and collection of information regarding the terrain.

#### 4. Methodology

The method used in this work is qualitative and is of a multidisciplinary nature that combines technical management and social sciences. For the first objective, to establish the type of approach in an PKO, must be utilised a tool that considers the characteristics of the mission to ascertain which of the three cases being analysed it represents: predictive, agile, or hybrid. The tool of Project Management Institute (PMI®) called “approach suitability filter” [37] has been chosen because it is one of the most widely used tools to determine whether a project has an Agile, hybrid, or predictive life cycle [58,59].

For the second objective, the measurement of success, after reviewing the state of art, the tool developed by NUPI is selected because is a tool that not only defines the assessment dimensions but also establishes guidelines on how to assess each of them. In addition, it could be applied to evaluate progress during the implementation of the PKO, which would allow for feedback to the stakeholders involved in the PKO.

Once the tools have been established, an application is made to two UN PKOs: UN-MISS in South Sudan, and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Both are fourth-generation operations, and both have been working in the field for a sufficiently long period of time for their work to be analysed.

##### 4.1. Determining the Project Approach of a PKO

It would be interesting to have access to a high-level tool capable of indicating the type of life cycle approach of the project in order to ascertain whether it is eminently predictive,

or a hybrid, or pure Agile due to the major uncertainty that it must face. It would also be interesting to have access to this tool to ascertain what a peace mission could look similar to and to be able to channel the forecasts in the right direction.

The “approach suitability filter” of the Project Management Institute (PMI®) is a qualitative tool, where each question must be answered with a score of 1 to 10, depending on the knowledge held on the project, the team, and the type of approach specified.

1. Culture.
  - a. Buy-in to approach. Is there support within the organisation that is going to carry out the project to carry out an Agile approach? (YES = 1/PARTIAL = 5/NO = 10).
  - b. Trust in the team. Is there confidence within the organisation that the team will perform well in the Agile approach, with the support of the organisation? (YES = 1/PROBABLY = 5/NO = 10).
  - c. Decision-making powers of the team. Will the team be given the autonomy to make their own local decisions about whether to undertake work? (YES = 1/PROBABLY = 5/NO = 10).
2. Project.
  - a. Likelihood of change. What percentage of requirements is likely to change or be discovered on a monthly? (HIGH = 1/MEDIUM LEVEL = 5/LOW = 10).
  - b. Criticality of product or service. How important is it for stakeholders that the project fails? (CRITICAL = 1/IMPORTANT = 5/UNIMPORTANT = 10).
  - c. Incremental delivery. Should the project be delivered piece-by-piece and quickly? (YES = 1/SOMETIMES = 5/NO = 10).
3. Team.
  - a. Team size. What is the size of the core team? (1–9 = 1/10–20 = 2/21–30 = 3/31–45 = 4/46–60 = 5/61–80 = 6/81–110 = 7/111–150 = 8/151–200 = 9/201+ = 10).
  - b. Experience levels. Are the main project team members experts in uncertainty environment, change management, and crisis management? (YES = 1/PARTIALLY = 5/NO = 10).
  - c. Access to stakeholders. Does the main project team have open access to stakeholders? (YES = 1/PARTIAL = 5/NO = 10).

#### 4.2. Measurement of the Success of a PKO

The review framework established by the NUPI for the evaluation of the success of a mission is established on eight dimensions where the mission is considered successful if it meets the most of requirements therein [60]. The evaluation of the eight dimensions is qualitative and the eight dimensions are:

1. Primacy of politics and organisation of elections.
2. Protection and stabilisation.
3. Local and international ownership.
4. Regional and international support.
5. Consistency and participation.
6. Legitimacy, impartiality, and credibility.
7. Women, peace, and security.
8. People-centred approach.

In the future, other dimensions of a more innovative nature could be incorporated, such as those regarding the environment, energy, and migration [61].

## 5. Results and Discussion

At this point, the concept of mission approach and the measure of success of a UN peacekeeping mission are applied to two specific examples: the UNMISS PKO in South

Sudan and the MONUSCO mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Finally, a discussion of the results is presented.

## 5.1. South Sudan

### 5.1.1. Background

South Sudan, which belongs to Sudan, achieved independence through a referendum on self-determination in 2011 following nearly fifty years of war between the Arab North and the Christian and Animist South. In that year, the UNMISS mission was set up to help build the new state and promote its governance. However, in 2013, civil war broke out between the tribes comprising the new southern state, and, in 2018, a precarious peace was reached that has been maintained with sporadic fighting. The following references have been employed to provide details on the events between Sudan and South Sudan and on the post-independence period: [62–67] and the reports of the UNMISS mission [68].


### 5.1.2. What Is the Focus of PKO UNMISS?

In order to analyse the data necessary for its application in the tool indicated in Section 4.1, this study is based on the documentation indicated above, thereby obtaining the following qualitative data:

1. Culture:
  - Buy-in to approach: This mission originates from a previous, more versatile mission, UNMIS. The current mission adopts the protection of civilians as its primary objective. Its integrated approach presents predictable and Agile aspects simultaneously (Value: 5).
  - Trust in the team: Team members carry out highly decentralised work but need authorisation from the mission representative. Non-total confidence (Value: 6).
  - Decision-making powers of the team: Civil/military duality. The actions of the civilian team possess no autonomy and depend on the military component (Value: 4).
2. Project (PKO):
  - Probability of change: There is a significant probability of change in the mission (Value: 3).
  - Criticality of product or service: Critical since it contains a highly significant component of violence against civilians. This constitutes the priority objective (Value: 2).
  - Incremental delivery: No immediate termination of the mission is expected (Value: 9).
3. Team:
  - Team size: Management team comprises an average of 80–100 people with decision-making capacity. The documentation indicates more than 400 people. The organisation chart shows higher levels (Value: 6).
  - Experience levels: With strong decentralisation, 10 offices, and new integrated Agile tools from CPAS, their experience is extensive (Value: 6).
  - Access to stakeholders: They have access to local and regional leaders and can hold meetings on issues that may affect the improvement of quality of life (Value: 9).

It can be observed in the Figure 1 that the visual result seems to correspond to a hybrid approach that is close to an Agile approach, which makes this mission appear to be well adapted to changes and uncertainties. The only point that digresses from the others is that of the surrender, and hence, given the level of violence that exists in the region, it appears that the mission cannot end in the next 12 months. It should also be borne in mind that the team is not as agile as it should be for a mission of this style in which the situation indicated in the reports is unstable and changes within short periods of time.





**Figure 1.** UNMISS mission approach.

In general, it can be observed that the diagram is not homogeneous, and therefore it apparently adapts to the circumstances without them being foreseen.

#### 5.1.3. Has the UNMISS PKO Been Successful?

The points proposed for this mission are analysed as indicated at the end of Section 4.2 as can be observed in the Table 1.

**Table 1.** Analysis of the UNMISS mission per dimension study. (Source: authors' own).

Dimension	Success?	Observations
Primacy of politics and organisation of elections	NO	Its main mandate involved the implementation of governance and the holding of elections. This proved impossible to carry out due to erroneous analysis and the fact that no reflection was provided of the greater possibility of a civil war in South Sudan.
Protection and stabilisation	YES	UNMISS protection zones were established to protect more than 200,000 people. Killings were reduced to sporadic episodes only.
Local and international ownership	YES	Management of the mandate was distributed across 10 offices in the country, which provided closeness to the population and their problems.
Regional and international support	NO	Growing disinterest in international and regional actors for the stabilisation of the country.
Coherence and participations	NO	Although the mission remains consistent with the mandate received, it still supports governance and governance that limits the rights of its nationals and the members of the mission themselves.
Legitimacy, impartiality, and credibility	NO	Although the level of violence has decreased and credibility has increased, no supporting inter-tribal community talks to reduce tension are being reflected in the political and social situation. There is a lack of direct communication with the population. There is no legal certainty for nationals.
Women, peace, and security	NO	The numerous sexual abuses committed against women, including in the camps managed by UNMISS, have not been halted by a general action. The lack of governance has eliminated the possibility of prosecution for these acts.
People-centred approach	NO	UNMISS focuses on a "fact-based approach" under strategic guidelines: this has failed to affect the population at ground level.

## 5.2. Democratic Republic of the Congo

### 5.2.1. Background


In the wake of the massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s, there is a destabilisation of neighbouring countries due to migration and situations of violence within their own territories. One of these was the former country of Zaire, where a civil war broke out between tribal communities with regional support that led to a major humanitarian crisis in the country. The MONUC mission for the protection of civilians, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance was established, and, in 2009, the civil war ended and the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC has been renamed MONUSCO, which is a mission of a multidimensional integrated and stabilising nature in the area. The numerous rebel uprisings in the east of the country have prevented the establishment of governance and of progress in political and social stability. The following references provide detailed accounts of the events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [69–72] as do the reports of the MONUSCO mission [73].

### 5.2.2. What Is the Focus of the MONUSCO PKO?

In order to analyse the data necessary for its application in the tool indicated in subSection 4.1, this study is based on the aforementioned documentation, for which the following qualitative data is obtained:

1. Culture:
  - Buy-in to approach: This mission began in 2010 and it is unlikely that its conception was intended to have an Agile approach (Value: 7).
  - Trust in the team: The team applies the integral mission as a sequential set of activities with certain feedback (Value: 8).
  - Decision-making powers of the team: Strong mission hierarchy and submission of the civilian component to the military (Value: 7).
2. Project (PKO):
  - Probability of change: No major changes are expected (Value: 6).
  - Criticality of product or service: Not critical. No change (Value: 7).
  - Delivery: If suitable conditions are put in place in the governance and control of the eastern part, the mission may end within the next 12 months (Value: 6).
3. Team:
  - Team size: From the documentation consulted, there are more than 200 people in the team for the mission (Value: 9).
  - Experience levels: Great centralisation, with no autonomy in the headquarters of the mission (Value: 7).
  - Access to stakeholders: According to the data, the team does not have guaranteed access to all or a large part of the stakeholders (Value: 8).

It can be observed in the Figure 2 that the visual result seems to correspond to a hybrid approach that is close to a predictive approach; this is an aspect that is characteristic of projects. In this case, large missions resolve issues as they are produced. This is not a mission that is well adapted to rapid changes; it can even be stated that this mission has a hard time adapting. The outline is strongly homogeneous and has no singular points that would enable any defect in its operation to be detected.



**Figure 2.** MONUSCO mission approach.

### 5.2.3. Has the MONUSCO PKO Been Successful?

The points proposed for this mission are analysed as indicated at the end of Section 4.2. as can be observed in the Table 2.

**Table 2.** Analysis of the success of the MONUSCO mission per dimension analysis. (Source: authors' own).

Dimension	Success?	Observations
Primacy of politics and organisation of elections	YES	Its main mandate involved the implementation of governance and the holding of elections. This is endorsed by the numerous elections held and the establishment of governance.
Protection and stabilisation	YES	The signing of numerous intranational and regional agreements with violent groups has diminished the stability of the whole country, with precariousness remaining in Goma, in the eastern part of the country.
Local and international ownership	NO	The reforms proposed by the mission in the protection of nationals and their rights have been curtailed by the action of the government and its militias.
Regional and international support	YES	Stabilisation of the country is increased with the signing of agreements with neighbouring countries.
Coherence and participations	NO	The low effectiveness in the mission staff's relationships with Congolese civil society is further encouraged by their government. There is little participation in social and cultural actions.
Legitimacy, impartiality, and credibility	YES	The mission's actions in controlling Ebola, the decrease in violence despite the lack of collaboration by the Congolese government, the stabilisation of the eastern zone, and the creation of security zones have lent legitimacy and credibility to the mission in the eyes of the population.
Women, peace, and security	YES	The mission has succeeded in promoting women within Congolese society, as well as in encouraging campaigns to prevent sexual abuse. Integration of NGOs into the mission has been fundamental in improving the safety of women.
People-centred approach	NO	The civil aspect of the mission in terms of approaching the population from a social point of view has not been accompanied by the development of society in general. There is a lack of means focusing the mission more on stabilization.

In general, subsequent to the analysis of these eight dimensions, the mission can be considered a success largely due to several factors: it has contributed towards the nondismemberment of the country; it has reduced the regional and national impact of violence; it has contributed towards promoting electoral processes and improving governance; and finally, it has improved the living conditions of women and children, having collaborated in the emergence of civic activism in Congolese society.

### 5.3. Discussion

The application of the PMI tool to determine the focus of PKO projects, as seen in the case studies, is feasible, both prior to the start of the project, in order to analyse how to approach project management and during the development of the project.

From the observation of the suitability diagram of the UNMISS mission approach, it can be concluded that the PKO, despite its hybrid approach, is close to possessing a more Agile approach in the section dedicated to project characteristics, mission, and culture of use of mission technology, and to a less Agile approach in the team section. This could be due to the fact that it was initially carried out under an Agile approach in terms of mission characteristics, and yet the team was unable to achieve any development of the technique, either owing to inexperience or to radical changes in the requirements. In fact, the UNMISS mission was oriented towards creating a governance that would enable it to tackle the risk of a possible confrontation between South Sudan and Sudan, and the reality was that they plunged into civil war.

In the case of MONUSCO, the approach suitability diagram indicates that the mission has a purely hybrid approach, since it is homogeneous in all three categories: project, team, and culture.

Regarding the tool chosen to ascertain whether a PKO can be considered a success, the trend analysis with respect to the eight dimensions chosen appears to meet the expectations perfectly, since it combines the prerequisites, through the analysis of the mandate, with the strategic dimensions (primacy of the policy, protection and stabilisation, impartiality and credibility) and with the operational dimensions of the mission (people-centred approach, women, peace and security, and legitimacy, impartiality and credibility).

The UNMISS mission can be regarded as a failure due to an erroneous risk analysis of the mission. It presented itself as a stabilising mission to South Sudan and an aid to its governance, but within a short period of time it found itself in the midst of a civil war that demanded unexpected and unprepared-for changes. Moreover, as indicated in the section analysing the success of this mission, the stabilisation of a country that exercises systematic violence against its own nationals cannot be developed. Perhaps a mission more similar to those of the second or third generation with a strong military component would have helped to stabilise the country, and, subsequently, its construction could have been enhanced.

With regard to the MONUSCO mission, it can be seen that this mission has been a success in that it contributed, first, towards the non-dismemberment of the country and, secondly, towards reducing political violence; all this through assistance and support in the electoral processes that contributed to a substantial improvement in governability, despite the violent outbreaks that remain in the east of the country.

If the mission approach is related to the success obtained, it can be deduced, despite the modesty of the proposed cases, that the MONUSCO mission with a totally hybrid approach is able to overcome all the difficulties involved thanks to its ability to adapt to real circumstances. However, UNMISS, with a focus closer to agility, has yet to achieve many of its objectives.

From the application of the methodology to the two case studies it can be concluded that if the project management approach is not the most appropriate to the characteristics of the PKO it will lead to a failure to achieve the objectives of the mission mandate in some of its dimensions, which could lead to considering the PKO as unsuccessful.

## 6. Conclusions

In a PKO, as in any complex project, it is necessary to have a management approach to create, develop, and deliver the outcome of the project, in this case determined in the mandate of the PKO. The approach allows the necessary resources to be established, the appropriate governance to be in place and the facility to be able to make the appropriate change depending on the uncertainty of the project.

The current methodologies for measuring the success of a PKO are qualitative in nature and focus primarily on the assessment of possible scenarios for the elimination of violence against the population, rather than on sustainable peacebuilding in a society affected by a political or social crisis.

Following the analysis of the two missions UNMISS and MONUSCO, a hybrid approach to the management of peace missions seems to be the most appropriate as it is more adaptable to the possible changing situations that may arise.

Limitations of this study are on the one hand the methodology has only been applied to two case studies and on the other hand the qualitative character of the tools. Thus, we can establish future lines of research. First, establish a comparison with a larger number of PKOs and thus be able to obtain more results to establish rules for the selection of the appropriate approaches of project management depending on the characteristics of PKO. Second, analyze the approach of the PKO and its relationship with adaptability in situations of uncertainty; and the third would be to develop a series of evaluable and quantitative criteria for a definition of when to consider a peace mission successful.

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