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Picornell, M.; Pellicer, E.; Torres-Machí, C.; Sutrisna, M. (2017). Implementation of Earned Value Management in Unit-Price Payment Contracts. *Journal of Management in Engineering*. 33(3):06016001-1-06016001-7. [https://doi.org/10.1061/\(ASCE\)ME.1943-5479.0000500](https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000500)



The final publication is available at

[http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/\(ASCE\)ME.1943-5479.0000500](http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000500)

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Additional Information

1 **IMPLEMENTATION OF EARNED VALUE MANAGEMENT IN UNIT-PRICE PAYMENT**  
2 **CONTRACTS**

3

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5

6 **ABSTRACT**

7 The Earned Value Management (EVM) method is considered an international standard  
8 tool in the project management field, enabling professionals to plan and control cost-  
9 and-schedule in an integrated manner. However, evidence indicates that EVM is not  
10 typically implemented by contractors when the payment agreement is based on unit-  
11 prices. In this payment approach, the owner pays the quantities actually executed  
12 according to the pre-agreed rate established in the contract for each unit or task; the  
13 income received by the contractor from the owner (generally named production) is  
14 neither proportional to costs nor fixed a priori, as in cost-reimbursable and lump sum  
15 contracts, respectively. Therefore, contractors have to control not only cost but also

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16 production. The current formulation of EVM does not allow controlling production; an  
17 additional baseline is needed. In response, this paper presents a proposal for adapting  
18 EVM to contractors when using the unit-prices payment agreement. Using a case study  
19 to illustrate, an additional baseline to account for production and profitability, as well as  
20 new indicators, are applied to allow contractors using EVM with this payment approach;  
21 this is the contribution of this paper to the body of knowledge. The proposed EVM  
22 formulation provides information not only in terms of cost (as traditional EVM approach)  
23 but also in terms of production.

24

25 **KEYWORDS:** Contractor; Control; Cost; Earned Value; Production; Unit-Price

26

## 27 **INTRODUCTION**

28

### 29 **Contract Payment Approaches**

30

31 In any contract, the party (owner or contractor) taking more risks will be understandably  
32 the one more interested on the best ways of planning and controlling the project; these  
33 risks depend highly on the contractual payment approach (Fleming and Koppelman  
34 1997, 2010; Christensen-Day 2010). The most common contract payment approaches  
35 are cost-reimbursable, lump-sum, and unit prices (Ibbs et al. 2003, PMI 2013). Cost-  
36 reimbursement requires that a contractor be paid by the owner for all legitimate actual  
37 costs incurred plus an additional payment fee (PMI 2013). In this case, the party who  
38 takes more risks is the owner. All the actual costs incurred by the contractor are paid by

39 the owner. Therefore, the owner needs to control the actuals costs regarding its planned  
40 cost. For the contractor, the profit is going to be the fee, or part of this fee if the  
41 overhead is also included in the fee; therefore, this profit is either proportional to the  
42 cost or fixed (or any combination of both), but always easy to compute by the  
43 contractor. With this open-book approach, the contractor may not look at cost control as  
44 an essential part of the management of the project.

45

46 Lump-sum or fixed-price approaches are those in which the contractor is paid a pre-set  
47 price by the owner in spite of the actual expenses incurred (PMI 2013). On this  
48 occasion, the party that has more at stake is the contractor, who will likely be the one  
49 more interested on planning and controlling the project (Fleming and Koppelman 2002;  
50 Christensen-Day 2010; Hanna 2012). The total price of the project is fixed and it will not  
51 vary from the contractual budget (unless the contract is modified). Therefore, the  
52 contractor will be interested on planning the costs as accurately as possible, and  
53 controlling the deviation of planned costs versus actual costs as best as possible. Any  
54 additional cost overrun decreases the profitability of the contractor, because the  
55 contractual price (lump sum) is fixed. The profit is computed easily by the contractor as  
56 the fixed price minus the actual costs.

57

58 Finally, unit-price is a contract payment agreement where the owner pays periodically to  
59 the contractor according to preset (contractual) unit rates that are applied to the actual  
60 measured quantities. These unit rates include, in addition to the estimated cost of the  
61 product/service, the overhead and profit. This is a hybrid payment approach that

62 encompasses features of lump-sum and cost-reimbursable approaches (PMI 2013). In  
63 the unit-price approach the risk is more balanced between both parties; the quantities  
64 may vary during the development of the contract depending on the actual work (PMI  
65 2013), but the unit price rates are fixed from the start. In this type of contract, both  
66 parties have some risks at stake; therefore, both contractor and owner can benefit from  
67 applying planning and control procedures (Valderrama and Guadalupe 2010). From the  
68 point of view of the owner, the contractual budget is the one bid by the contractor and  
69 awarded by the owner, distributed in periodic payments throughout the project life.  
70 However, this budget is not a constant figure, as in the fixed-price agreement, and it can  
71 vary depending on the measurement of the actual quantities (Missbauer and Hauber  
72 2006); for the owner, the difference between the planned cost and the actual payment  
73 made to the contractor will provide the deviation in costs.

74

75 From the point of view of the contractor, two concepts have to be considered. Firstly,  
76 the contractor needs to control the actual costs against the planned costs, as in lump-  
77 sum contracts. Secondly, the contractor needs to forecast the payment or income  
78 received from the owner due to the execution of the tasks according to contract terms;  
79 this is generally acknowledged as “production” (Missbauer and Hauber 2006). Both cost  
80 control and production control are different concepts in unit-price contracts from the  
81 point of view of the contractor, because the owner pays the quantities actually executed  
82 (if they conform to the specifications and plans), according to the pre-agreed rate  
83 (established in the contract for each unit or task). The ratio between preset (contractual)  
84 rate and actual cost can vary for each unit or task, as well as the actual quantities;

85 therefore, an overall ratio for the entire project cannot be computed (as in cost-  
86 reimbursement approaches) until completion of the project. Therefore, the income  
87 received by the contractor from the owner (production) is neither proportional to costs  
88 nor fixed a priori, as in cost-reimbursable and lump sum contracts, respectively.

89

## 90 **Earned Value Management**

91

92 Earned Value Management (EVM henceforth) has long been used as a planning and  
93 control tool (Fleming and Koppelman 1997; PMI 2013). EVM is considered one of the  
94 most appropriate methodologies to simultaneously control project cost and time while  
95 providing early warning signals of potential problems, leading to an effective  
96 management of the project (McConnell 1985; Fleming and Koppelman 2010; Ponz-  
97 Tienda et al. 2012; Chen 2016).

98

99 Depending on the payment agreement between the owner of the project and the  
100 contractor, not only the manner EVM is applied can significantly vary, but also the  
101 parties who use it. EVM was first designed for, and applied in, cost-reimbursable  
102 payment approaches (Fleming and Koppelman 1997; Anbari 2003); public agencies  
103 also recommended its use for this type of contracts (DoD 2003; Kwak and Anbari 2012;  
104 NASA 2013; DoD 2015). Further research demonstrated its usefulness in lump-sum  
105 contracts too (Fleming and Koppelman 2002; Christensen-Day 2010; Hanna 2012). For  
106 cost-reimbursable and lump-sum approaches, EVM formulation can be considered  
107 straightforward (Fleming and Koppelman 2002, 2010).

108

109 However, formulation and application of EVM in unit-prices contracts is basically  
110 overlooked by the scientific literature (Fleming and Koppelman 1997, 2002, 2010) as  
111 well as by the official procedures (DoD 2003; NASA 2013). Kim and Ballard (2010)  
112 pointed out that EVM is not properly adapted to the variability and uncertainty of some  
113 projects, such as those in construction. De Marco and Narbaev (2013) recognized the  
114 difficulties of applying EVM to unit-price approaches without proposing any specific  
115 solutions. Xu (2009) and Valderrama and Guadalupe (2010) presented partial attempts  
116 to apply EVM to unit-prices contracts using the standard formulation; however, they  
117 failed to consider the contractor's need to control production independently from costs  
118 (Missbauer and Hauber 2006). This scarcity of contributions highlight the room for  
119 research in this topic, considering that unit-price approaches are widely used either in  
120 public or private procurement all over the world (Ewerhart and Fieseler 2003; Oviedo-  
121 Haito et al. 2014) and in different kind of industries, including in construction (Kim and  
122 Ballard 2010; Kim et al. 2016), defense (Fleming and Koppelman 2010), design (Chang  
123 2001), publishing (Ewerhart and Fieseler 2003), and timber (Athey and Levin 2001),  
124 among many others.

125

## 126 **Research Question**

127

128 Given this knowledge gap, the research question is stated as follows: How can be the  
129 current EVM formulation enhanced so it can be effectively implemented by contractors  
130 in unit-price contracts? After introducing the basics of EVM in the second section, the

131 third section of the paper aims to provide an answer to this question, where some  
132 additional indicators regarding production are proposed to enhance the current EVM  
133 formulation. To follow up, a case study highlights the differences of this proposal with  
134 the traditional approach whilst demonstrating its implementation. Finally, conclusions  
135 are drawn highlighting the potential advantages of the proposal, but also acknowledging  
136 the limitation of the research.

137

## 138 **EVM INDICATORS**

139

140 EVM defines three main indicators to evaluate project performance (PMI 2013; Kim  
141 2015; Chen 2016): Planned Value (*PV*), Actual Cost (*AC*), and Earned Value (*EV*). The  
142 *PV* is the authorized budget planned for accomplishing an activity, which is determined  
143 during the planning phase of the project; the cumulative *PV* at the scheduled end  
144 represents the Budget at Completion (*BAC*). The *AC* is the total cost actually incurred  
145 and recorded in accomplishing an activity; it is measured during work execution. These  
146 two indicators (*PV* and *AC*) are the ones typically considered in traditional cost  
147 management (Fleming and Koppelman 1997, 2010; PMI 2013). In order to take into  
148 account the amount of work accomplished, EVM introduces the *EV* indicator, which  
149 measures the work performed during execution expressed in terms of the approved  
150 budget for that work (Fleming and Koppelman 1997, 2010; PMI 2013; Chen 2016). The  
151 relationship of *EV* with the traditional *PV* and *AC* allows, not only for cost control, but  
152 also for time control, using a set of integrated metrics (Anbari 2003; Fleming and  
153 Koppelman 2010; PMI 2013). Nevertheless, EVM schedule indicators use monetary



154 values as the proxy of time and, therefore, they are not perceived as reliable as the cost  
155 indicators by practitioners (Pajares and López-Paredes 2011; de Marco and Narbaev  
156 2013; Kim 2015); due to the limitations of EVM schedule indicators, which are not  
157 considered in the last version of the PMBOK either (PMI 2013), this research is only  
158 focused on cost related indicators, as displayed in Table 1.

159

160 <TABLE 1 HERE>

161

162 Regarding the implementation to cost reimbursable contracts, EVM is very  
163 straightforward: *PV* is defined as the planned costs prepared and approved by the  
164 owner before the contract started; *AC* is the actual cost incurred by the contractor; and  
165 *EV* the expected cost according to the work performed. In lump-sum contracts, *PV* is  
166 defined as the planned costs forecasted by the contractor at the beginning of the  
167 project; providing the final actual cost (*AC*) is lower than the fixed-price, the contractor  
168 will make a profit. For cost-reimbursable and lump-sum the three EVM indicators and  
169 the metrics obtained from them work perfectly well for the party with more risk at stake,  
170 and they have thoroughly been analyzed in the literature previously cited. Finally, for  
171 unit-price contracts, the cost control dimension can be computed as in lump-sum  
172 contracts; however, there is no way to control production without introducing an  
173 additional dimension and indicators in the formulation, as it will be detailed in the next  
174 section.

175

176

177 **PROPOSED EVM FOR CONTRACTORS IN UNIT PRICES APPROACHES**

178

179 Some modifications in EVM formulation are necessary in order to meet the contractor's  
180 requirements and improve the communication between owner and contractor. The  
181 proposal presented henceforth aims to keep EVM formulation as close as possible to  
182 standard EVM but adding new indicators responding to contractor's needs. As stated  
183 previously, regarding cost control, the classical indicators *PV*, *EV* and *AC* are used (PMI  
184 2013; Kim 2015; Chen 2016); they are described as follows. *PV* is defined as the sum of  
185 the multiplication of the planned quantities of the units to execute (*pq*) and the unit rate  
186 agreed with the owner (also known as budgeted unit price, DoD 2015) (*up*). The  
187 cumulative *PV* at the scheduled end represents the budget at completion (*BAC*). *AC* is  
188 defined as the sum of the multiplication of the actual quantities executed (*aq*) and the  
189 unit actual cost (*ac*). The cumulative value of *AC* at the end of the project corresponds  
190 to the actual cost at completion (*ACAC*). And finally, *EV* is defined as the sum of the  
191 multiplication of the actual quantities executed (*aq*) and the agreed unit rate (*up*).

192

193 In order to monitor production, two main indicators are proposed: *PP* (planned  
194 production) and *AP* (actual production). The *PP* is defined as the sum of the  
195 multiplication of the planned quantities (*pq*) and the contractor's planned rate (*pc*). From  
196 the contractor point of view, the cumulative *PP* at the end of the project represents the  
197 planned production at completion (*PPAC*). Actual production (*AP*) is defined as the sum  
198 of the multiplication of the actual quantities (*aq*) and the contractor's planned rate (*pc*).  
199 Combining these new indicators with the standard EVM indicators, additional

200 information related to contractor profitability can be generated. Thus, three new  
201 indicators are proposed: *PB* (planned profitability), *AB* (actual profitability) and *PPI*  
202 (production performance indicator). *PB* provides the planned economic benefit as the  
203 difference between *PV* and *PP*. *AB* is the economic benefit calculated as the difference  
204 between *AP* and *AC*, and finally, *PPI* is calculated as the *AC* divided by *AP*. Regarding  
205 the standard EVM variance and performance indicators, those related with cost (i.e. *CV*  
206 and *CPI*) are consider appropriate. Table 2 summarizes all the indicators proposed.

207

208 <TABLE 2 HERE>

209

## 210 **CASE STUDY**

211

### 212 **Definition and scenarios**

213

214 In order to analyze the capability of the proposed EVM approach, a case study is used  
215 to implement the proposal. This case study is a simplification of a real project, involving  
216 the construction of a concrete retaining wall. Figure 1 shows the work units with their  
217 corresponding unit price and quantity. Additionally, information about the Gantt diagram  
218 and scheduled quantities to be executed each month is also provided in Figure 1. From  
219 the contractor point of view and considering the formulation proposed in Table 2, the  
220 planned production at completion (*PPAC*) is €1,117,100.

221

222 <FIGURE 1 HERE>

223

224 Scenario simulations are often used in project management research to check the  
225 feasibility of a proposal (Kim and Ballard 2010; Pajares and López-Paredes 2011; Kim  
226 2016; Kim et al. 2016). In this paper, this simplified project is used as a case study  
227 where a set of scenarios is analyzed. These scenarios simulated different performances  
228 of the project during its execution, accounting for possible scenarios faced by the  
229 contractor. Table 3 contains the definition of these scenarios, in which different  
230 combinations between planned and real unit cost and quantities are explored. In order  
231 to better explain the characteristics of these scenarios, Table 3 shows the relation  
232 between the unit rate agreed with the owner and actual unit cost ( $up$  versus  $ac$ ) and  
233 quantities ( $pq$  versus  $aq$ ) considered in each scenario.

234

235 <TABLE 3 HERE>

236

237 Scenario 0 reflects a project performance in which actual costs and quantities equal  
238 values agreed with the owner ( $up = ac$  and  $pq = aq$ ). Similarly, Scenario 1 accounts for  
239 a scenario in which actual costs equal values agreed with the owner ( $up = ac$ ) but there  
240 are differences between planned and actual quantities ( $pq \neq aq$ ). Two variants of this  
241 scenario are explored (scenario 1A and 1B). In the first variant (1A), the actual cost at  
242 completion is lower than the planned cost at completion ( $BAC > ACAC$ ), resulting in a  
243 profitable project to the contractor. The second variant (1B) represents a non-profitable  
244 project to the contractor because  $ACAC$  is higher than  $BAC$ . Scenarios 2 and 3, each of  
245 them with its variants (2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B), cover the rest of possible combinations of  
246 unit cost and quantities.

247

## 248 **Results and discussion**

249

250 This section shows the results obtained applying the proposed formulation to the case  
251 study. Due to the space limitation, only one of these scenarios is described in detail.  
252 The scenario chosen for the detailed analysis is Scenario 3, as it reflects the general  
253 scenario in which all the possible deviations (both in terms of unit cost and quantities)  
254 affect project performance. Specifically, variant 3B (where *ACAC* is higher than *BAC*)  
255 will be analyzed, as it is the most unfavorable scenario for the contractor.

256

257 As described in Table 3, Scenario 3B has deviations in both unit costs and quantities.  
258 For instance, the actual earth volume to be removed is 73,500 m<sup>3</sup>, which is higher than  
259 the originally estimated (70,000 m<sup>3</sup>). In terms of cost, the actual cost (4.73 €/m<sup>3</sup>) also  
260 exceeds its planned value (4.50 €/m<sup>3</sup>). Similar deviations have been simulated for the  
261 other tasks, considering a variance of ±10%. In addition to deviations between planned  
262 and actual costs and/or quantities, deviations between planned costs and unit prices  
263 may also exist. In this regard, this case study considers units in which the contractor's  
264 planned rate (*pc* in Figure 1) differs from the unit rate agreed with the owner (*up* in  
265 Figure 2). From the contractor point of view, these deviations may be both positive (e.g.  
266 steel unit in Figures 1 and 2) or negative (concrete unit in Figures 1 and 2), reflecting  
267 the competitiveness of the company in the production of the tasks. In global terms the  
268 planned profitability of the project, from the contractor point of view, will be determined  
269 by the difference between planned production and budget at completion (*PPAC* and

270 *BAC*). Similarly, the actual profitability of the project will be provided by the difference  
271 between actual cost at completion and budget at completion (*ACAC* and *BAC*).

272

273 <FIGURE 2 HERE>

274

275 Overall, deviations considered in this case study lead to an unfavorable scenario for the  
276 contractor because the *ACAC* is higher than *BAC*. A detailed description of contractor  
277 planning and actual performance and progress in scenario 3B is described in Figure 2.  
278 It is important to note that the existing deviation in quantities in Scenario 3B does not  
279 lead to variations in the project duration, as both the planned and actual project duration  
280 is five months (Figures 1 and 2, respectively). The project is completed on time and,  
281 because of the reasons stated at the end of section 2, schedule control will not be  
282 analyzed in this paper.

283

284 <FIGURE 3 HERE>

285

286 Considering traditional EVM indicators (*PV*, *AC* and *EV*) it could be concluded that  
287 scenario 3B corresponds to a good performance of the project in terms of cost: earned  
288 value is higher than actual cost ( $EV > AC$  in Figure 3) and, therefore, the cost  
289 performance is higher than planned ( $CPI > 1$  in Figure 4). With respect to Figure 3, it is  
290 important to note that *PV* and *EV* at the end of the project have not the same value, as it  
291 would be expected in a typical application of EVM in a project like this without any  
292 delay. This difference between *PV* and *EV* is explained by the variations of quantities in

293 some work units ( $pq \neq aq$ ), which is usually the case in unit-prices approaches, but not  
294 considered in traditional EVM approach. By solely relying on traditional EVM indicators,  
295 the contractor would thus conclude that project performance in terms of cost is good  
296 while, as it will be explained later, this is not the case in this project.

297

298 <FIGURE 4 HERE>

299

300 There is some additional information for the contractor that traditional EVM is not  
301 processing. Indeed, although  $EV$  is higher than  $AC$ , the contractor needs to know  
302 whether this project is profitable or not and whether the actual profitability is higher or  
303 lower than the planned profitability. In order to cover this gap, the proposed EVM  
304 formulation provides information not only in terms of cost (as traditional EVM approach  
305 do), but also in terms of production and profitability. Indeed, information related to  
306 production and profitability is the cornerstone for the contractor in dealing with the  
307 project as a business enterprise.

308

309 As stated before, traditional EVM does not alert the contractor because the project cost  
310 performance in Scenario 3B seems to display an optimistic situation ( $EV > AC$  in Figure  
311 3, and  $CPI > 1$  in Figure 4). However, this information may be misleading because in  
312 terms of production, the project is not profitable to the contractor yet. Indeed, the actual  
313 cost at completion ( $ACAC$ ) exceeds the planned budget at completion ( $BAC$ ). This poor  
314 performance, which cannot be tracked using traditional EVM indicators, has been  
315 indeed present during all the project duration (as  $AC > AP$  in Figure 3).

316

317 Actually, the actual production is lower than the actual cost ( $AC > AP$  in Figure 3 and,  
318 therefore,  $PPI < 1$  in Figure 4). Therefore, whilst the cost performance identified using  
319 traditional EVM did not alert the contractor ( $CPI > 1$  in Figure 4), the proposed indicators  
320 informed the contractor that there was a problem with the project profitability ( $PPI < 1$  in  
321 Figure 4). The contractor has planned to earn 78,950 € at the end of the project,  
322 obtained as the difference between  $PP$  and  $PV$  at completion (Figure 5). Nevertheless,  
323 due to the “poor” performance of the project in terms of profitability, the contractor is not  
324 gaining as much as expected albeit the project cost performance seemed to be right  
325 when traditional EVM indicators are considered.

326

327 <FIGURE 5 HERE>

328

329 The proposed formulation enables a more accurate analysis of the project performance  
330 in terms of profitability, constantly informing the contractor about the project profitability.  
331 The inclusion of the proposed indicators to those considered in traditional EVM provides  
332 contractors under unit-price contracts with additional information that would enhance the  
333 management of the project. As it can be seen from this case study, the proposed  
334 formulation enables to analyze the production performance, as well as the profitability,  
335 of the project, which are not considered in traditional EVM.

336

337



338 **CONCLUSIONS**

339

340 EVM formulation can be directly applied to cost-reimbursable and lump-sum  
341 approaches, either by the owner or the contractor. However, EVM cannot be  
342 implemented by contractors when the payment agreement is based on unit-prices. In  
343 this payment approach, the owner pays the quantities actually executed according to  
344 the pre-agreed rate established in the contract for each unit or task; the income  
345 received by the contractor from the owner (production) is neither proportional to costs  
346 nor fixed a priori, as in cost-reimbursable and lump sum contracts, respectively.  
347 Therefore, contractors have to control not only cost but also production. The current  
348 formulation of EVM does not allow controlling production; an additional baseline is  
349 needed. Given this knowledge gap, this paper developed a rigorous methodology to  
350 enable application of EVM philosophy by contractors in unit-prices contracts; this is the  
351 contribution of this paper to the body of knowledge in project management. This way,  
352 contractors in unit-price approaches can apply EVM. The proposed EVM formulation  
353 relevant information for the contractor that traditional indicators do not capture:

- 354 • The planned production (*PP*) provides information about the expected monthly  
355 production, which can be compared against the expected cash flow. Additionally,  
356 this value allows estimating the planned profitability (*PB*).
- 357 • The actual production (*AP*) enables to track the profitability of the project. The  
358 comparison of *AP* with the actual cost (*AC*) enables the contractor to know  
359 whether the project is profitable or not.

- 360 • The difference between actual (*AB*) and planned profitability (*PB*) gives the  
361 contractor information regarding the project performance in terms of profitability.
- 362 • The production performance indicator (*PPI*) assesses the ratio between actual  
363 production and cost. Similarly than *CPI*, a value of *PPI* below 1 should provide  
364 the contractor with an early warning system, in terms of production performance.

365

366 Based on the results obtained in this study, it can be concluded that the proposed  
367 formulation enables contractors to generate further information from their project(s)  
368 compared to that of the traditional EVM alone and hence use them as a management  
369 tool for the contractor in unit-prices approaches. The information provided by the  
370 proposed formulation enables a more informed decision making and hence better  
371 management of the project, particularly in terms of cost. This formulation needs to be  
372 tested in different project scenarios providing further insight on the effect of uncertainty.  
373 Conversely, the proposed indicators focus only on cost, because of the limitations of the  
374 schedule indicators in traditional EVM; work-in-progress by the authors includes the  
375 extension of this proposal considering the Earned Schedule concept. Furthermore,  
376 when the payment approach is unit-price, determining the percent complete for unit  
377 items is a key issue; further research is going to be focused on this topic too.

378

## 379 **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

380

381 This research was partially supported by the Universitat Politècnica de València that  
382 funded a scholarship for Dr. Monty Sutrisna (action 19701344).

383

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462 **FIGURE CAPTION LIST:**

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464 **Figure 1: Contractor's planned budget and progress**

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466 **Figure 2: Scenario 3B - Contractor actual performance and progress**

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468 **Figure 3: Scenario 3B – Traditional EVM indicators and proposed indicators**

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470 **Figure 4: Scenario 3B – Production and cost performance indicators**

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472 **Figure 5: Scenario 3B – Planned production and value**

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**Table 1. Calculations of variances, performance and forecasting indices**

<u>INDICES</u>	<u>CALCULATION</u>
Cost Variance ( <i>CV</i> )	$CV = EV - AC$
Cost Performance Index ( <i>CPI</i> )	$CPI = EV / AC$
Cost Estimation at Completion ( <i>EAC</i> )	$EAC = AC + (BAC - EV) / CPI$

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**Table 2: Proposed EVM indicators for contractor cost management in unit prices approaches**

TYPE	INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION
Planning indicators	$PV = \sum pq * up$	Planned Value
	$PP = \sum pq * pc$	Planned Production
	$PB = PV - PP$	Planned Profitability
Main indicators	$EV = \sum aq * up$	Earned Value
	$AC = \sum aq * ac$	Actual Cost
	$AP = \sum aq * pc$	Actual Production
Variation indicators	$CV = EV - AC$	Cost Variance
	$AB = AP - AC$	Actual Profitability
Performance indicators	$CPI = EV / AC$	Cost Performance Indicator
	$PPI = AP / AC$	Production Performance Indicator

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Note:  $pq$  is the planned quantity of the units to execute;  $aq$  is the actual quantity of the executed units;  $pc$  is the contractor's planned rate;  $ac$  is the actual cost; and  $up$  is the unit rate agreed with the owner.

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**Table 3: Scenarios explored in the case study**

ID Scenario	UNIT RATES ( <i>up</i> versus <i>ac</i> )	QUANTITIES ( <i>pq</i> versus <i>aq</i> )	VARIANT	COST AT COMPLETION
0	<i>up = ac</i>	<i>pq = aq</i>	0	<i>BAC = ACAC</i>
1	<i>up = ac</i>	<i>pq ≠ aq</i>	1A	<i>BAC &gt; ACAC</i>
			1B	<i>BAC &lt; ACAC</i>
2	<i>up ≠ ac</i>	<i>pq = aq</i>	2A	<i>BAC &gt; ACAC</i>
			2B	<i>BAC &lt; ACAC</i>
3	<i>up ≠ ac</i>	<i>pq ≠ aq</i>	3A	<i>BAC &gt; ACAC</i>
			3B	<i>BAC &lt; ACAC</i>

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UNIT	BUDGET		PLANNED PROGRESS (MONTHS)				
	Planned quantity ( <i>pq</i> )	Planned cost ( <i>pc</i> )	1	2	3	4	5
m <sup>3</sup> of earth removal	70,000	5.00	<b>70,000</b>				
kg of steel in base slab	200,000	0.90		<b>200,000</b>			
m <sup>2</sup> of formwork in base slab	750	18.00			<b>750</b>		
m <sup>3</sup> of concrete in base slab	3,500	50.00			<b>3,500</b>		
kg of steel in stem	280,000	0.90				<b>280,000</b>	
m <sup>2</sup> of formwork in stem wall	1,200	18.00					<b>1,200</b>
m <sup>3</sup> of concrete in stem wall	2,500	50.00					<b>2,500</b>


PPAC = 1,117,100

**Figure 1: Contractor's planned budget and progress**


UNIT	CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE			ACTUAL PROGRESS				
	Actual quantity (aq)	Rate agreed with the owner (up)	Actual cost (ac)	1	2	3	4	5
m <sup>3</sup> of earth removal	73,500	4.50	4.73	<b>73,500</b>				
kg of steel in base slab	210,000	0.75	0.79		<b>210,000</b>			
m <sup>2</sup> of formwork in base slab	825	17.00	17.85			<b>825</b>		
m <sup>3</sup> of concrete in base slab	3,675	55.00	57.75			<b>3,675</b>		
kg of steel in stem	294,000	0.75	0.83				<b>294,000</b>	
m <sup>2</sup> of formwork in stem wall	1,320	17.00	18.70					<b>1,320</b>
m <sup>3</sup> of concrete in stem wall	2,625	55.00	52.25					<b>2,625</b>

BAC = ACAC =  
1,1091,715 1,144,010

**Figure 2: Scenario 3B - Contractor actual performance and progress**



**Figure 3: Scenario 3B – Traditional EVM indicators and proposed indicators**



**Figure 4: Scenario 3B – Production and cost performance indicators**




Figure 5: Scenario 3B – Planned production and value