

Document downloaded from:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10251/201654>

This paper must be cited as:

Martín-García, OJ. (2023). Nudging the Ship in the Right Direction: United States Public Diplomacy and Development in 1960s Spain. *Journal of Contemporary History*. 58(3):531-553. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094231166603>



The final publication is available at

<https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094231166603>

Copyright SAGE Publications

Additional Information

## **Nudging the Ship in the Right Direction: United States Public Diplomacy and Development in 1960s Spain.**

In 1953, the Dwight Eisenhower administration signed a defense pact with the authoritarian regime of General Francisco Franco that established US military bases of high strategic value in Spain. From then on, the US government maintained fluid cooperation with the Franco dictatorship in order to safeguard the US security apparatus on Spanish soil.<sup>1</sup> Within the framework of these friendly relations, in October 1964 the counselor of the US State Department and president of the Policy Planning Council, Walt W. Rostow, paid an official visit to Spain. At that time, this economist, historian and government official was also an intellectual reference point for the so-called modernization theory, the scientific paradigm used by the United States as an ideological antidote to the growing appeal of the communist development model in the global (semi)periphery.<sup>2</sup>

During the trip, Rostow took part in various activities (round tables, receptions, talks) in which he presented some of the assumptions and concepts of modernization thinking. One of these was the conference held at the Institute of North American Studies (INAS) in Barcelona, the contents of which were translated and distributed in Spain through a pamphlet produced by the US propaganda services.<sup>3</sup> In that speech, Rostow warned of the possible destabilizing effects of modernization on developing nations, which he considered highly vulnerable to the delusions of Marxist ideology, and warned the audience of the communist ability to exploit 'all the divergences, all the weaknesses, all the insecurities, that can threaten a society as it transforms and modernizes'.<sup>4</sup> His words summed up US perceptions and misgivings about the rapid and chaotic structural changes taking place in (semi)periphery states, including Spain. In the early 1960s, US officials feared that disorderly modernization might spark social and political turmoil that would compromise the US defense program in the Iberian

country. The article unravels the US public diplomacy programs to prevent Spanish 'take off' to modernity on a 'hazardous course'.<sup>5</sup> It examines the cultural, educational, and informational means employed by the US government in a bid to channel the socio-economic upheaval occurring in Spain in a direction that was compatible with US strategic interests. We also argue that modernization theory provided the ideological and intellectual framework for US persuasion efforts to shape the pace and orientation of the Spanish path to national development.

Rostow's aforementioned activities in Spain can be framed within the arsenal deployed by Washington in the global battle with Moscow to win the minds and hearts of mankind. A wide bibliography has highlighted that the Cold War was not only a strategic or military conflict, but also an ideological and cultural confrontation.<sup>6</sup> Within this literature, a robust strand of research has addressed US involvement in such bipolar cultural competition, focusing on the US public diplomacy to influence other societies through the dissemination of the virtues of its economic, political and social system, its scientific achievements and the most attractive aspects of its culture.<sup>7</sup> This body of work dissects the themes, official agencies, non-state actors, key individuals and target groups that made up the machinery of persuasion erected by the American superpower in the decades following World War II.<sup>8</sup> In connection with this historiography, a number of contributions have detailed the educational and public relations programs operated by the US power in Franco's Spain, while other pieces have illuminated the means used by the Spanish dictatorship to sell a positive image in the United States.<sup>9</sup>

This bibliography has contributed to introduce the Spanish case in broader histories on the Cold War dispute for cultural supremacy. But the United States and the Soviet Union were not only vying to become the most prestigious and admired nation on the planet. Beneath the surface of that cultural confrontation also lay a conflict between two antagonistic visions of the definition and nature of modernization. By exploring this approach in depth, the article attempts

to connect the US public diplomacy in Spain with the global struggle for control of the vectors of social and historical change in Third World regions.<sup>10</sup>

Between the 1950s and 1970s, the Southern Hemisphere became the epicenter of the Cold War. In that period, the East-West contest was crossed by a North-South dimension, resulting in the emergence of development as the axis of superpower rivalry.<sup>11</sup> In the postwar decades, both blocs contended to guide the modernization of the so-called ‘traditional societies’ in order to win ideological allegiances, forge strategic alliances, open new markets, expand geopolitical power and, above all, control and channel the profound post-colonial upheaval.<sup>12</sup> The US government employed its public diplomacy resources to propagate the superiority of made-in-America modernization over the Soviet model. Its objective was to present the US experience as the best way for less advanced nations to achieve economic prosperity without falling into communist revolution.

International history has scrutinized the role of development ideas and practices in US foreign policy toward nations on the global periphery, especially toward postcolonial states.<sup>13</sup> However, it is proposed here to extend the focus to a lesser known case, such as that of Franco’s Spain. In contrast to the emerging nations, Spain was located in Western Europe, had not suffered colonial domination, was not a member of the non-aligned movement, and included predominantly white inhabitants. Indeed, in the 1960s Spain was neither a part of the geographical space nor the political project of the Third World.<sup>14</sup> However, US State Department analysts felt that Spain also could not be considered to be ‘a typical Western European country’ since it had for long ‘lagged behind neighboring countries in modernizing itself’.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, although it was not a Third World nation, in official US perceptions Spain fell into the heterogeneous group of developing countries, a category that encompassed nations that were very different in historical, geographical and cultural terms, but which - according to American mental maps - shared a common point: they lagged behind the United States and,

therefore, needed to adopt American ideas, methods and values in order to 'take off' towards modernization in an orderly manner.

Consequently, the US mission to engineer the course to modernization of developing nations also had Franco's Spain as one of its targets. By combining the fields of cultural Cold War and international development, we aim to shed novel light on US cultural endeavors to steer Spanish society along a modernization path based on US-inspired capitalism, political stability, and alliance with the western bloc. The article also draws on recent approaches that treat local constituencies not only as recipients of Western aid and development discourses, but also as actors with their own interests and political agendas. This emerging historiography has begun to unravel how the US modernization gospel was received among local actors in Third World countries. Along this line, the essay analyzes how Spanish audiences reacted to the US modernization discourse and why it failed to address the new forces, expectations and demands derived from rapid social change.<sup>16</sup>

In the late 1940s the United States began to erect a powerful machine of psychological warfare to engage the Soviet Union in a worldwide competition for cultural hegemony. In 1948 the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act (also known as the Smith-Mundt Act) was passed, which launched an ambitious global propaganda campaign aimed at promoting knowledge of the United States abroad. Franco's Spain was not initially incorporated into the US offensive to conquer the souls of mankind. Since the end of World War II, international repudiation of the Spanish dictatorship had considerably reduced the American informational and educational presence in this country. However, this situation would not take long to change. The emergence of the Cold War led to the strategic reevaluation of the Iberian Peninsula which, together with the ironclad anti-communist character of Franco's dictatorship, contributed to diminish the animosity of the United States towards the Spanish regime. Thus, from 1949 onwards there was an increase - reinforced the following year by the Korean War

and the launching of the Campaign of Truth - in the US budget, personnel and information activity in Spain. The Iberian country was gradually incorporated into the US cultural circuits, parallel to the progressive diplomatic rapprochement between Washington and Madrid, which culminated in the signing in 1953 of the aforementioned US-Spanish military pact.<sup>17</sup> This agreement resulted in the establishment on Spanish soil of a complex of military bases which contributed significantly to strengthening the 'US deterrent and operational capabilities' in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa, making Spain an important piece in the Pentagon's 'worldwide defensive strategy'.<sup>18</sup>

Henceforth, strategic considerations guided the US attitude towards Spain, which was based on maintaining cordial relations with the Franco dictatorship in order to ensure the US defense program. It is therefore not surprising that since 1953 the task of the new flagship of US propaganda in Spain (the recently created US Information Agency, USIA) was to nurture a climate of opinion favorable to the military bases. To achieve this objective, the USIA's post in Spain (known as US Information Service, USIS) focused its persuasion work on the Francoist establishment and the elites in the world of politics, culture, journalism, business, the army and the Church. The aim was to convince groups close to power, and with influence over the rest of Spanish public opinion, of the mutual benefit of defensive cooperation with the United States.<sup>19</sup>

From the US point of view, the cultivation of a positive atmosphere for the US security goals was also bound to the preservation of Franco's status quo, and consequently, Spain's stability. However, in the second half of the 1950s, the country suffered a severe economic crisis which according to a 1956 US Embassy report, threatened to provoke 'political disturbances with obvious adverse implications' for US defensive interests.<sup>20</sup> Spain's economic deterioration reached a 'critical point' in 1959, which - in the words of a National Security Council (NSC) memorandum- threatened to unleash 'economic, probably political, disorder'.<sup>21</sup>

In this context, the growth of discontent, unrest and an incipient anti-Americanism in Spanish society raised concerns in US diplomacy about the prospects for the military bases after Franco's (who was then in his seventies) disappearance. This led the U.S. government to undertake a review of its relations with the Spanish regime, the conclusions of which were embodied in October 1960 in an NSC directive, which established the premises of US foreign policy toward this country for the rest of the decade. The revision did not question US support for Franco, but emphasized the need, in order to safeguard US defensive facilities in the long run in Spain, to prepare the way for the future demise of the dictator to be followed by a smooth transition to a successor administration favorable to US geostrategic priorities. Put another way, US diplomacy was intended to secure the American defense system and, at the same time, forge the conditions for an orderly, peaceful succession of Franco to a US-friendly government.<sup>22</sup>

U.S. strategists considered that the best way to achieve this objective was to encourage the internationalization, stabilization and liberalization of the Spanish economy initiated in the late 1950s.<sup>23</sup> From the US point of view, such a process would promote economic development which, in turn, would contribute, on the one hand, to fostering 'internal political stability (...) as a necessary concomitant to the US use of the joint-use Spanish bases and facilities', and on the other hand, to expanding the social bases for a non-traumatic post-Franco transition compatible with US objectives.<sup>24</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that the American representatives welcomed the economic growth that Spain began to experience at the beginning of the 1960s. However, the rapid adjustment and hatching of the Spanish economy caused inequalities and dislocations that increased the pressures that had existed in its society since the second half of the previous decade. As some scholars have noted, the 'transition from a traditional agrarian society to an industrial society took place in a rather chaotic and disorderly manner, giving rise to numerous tensions, conflicts and imbalances'.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, in June 1960, the US Operations Coordinating Board noted the 'growing evidence of dissatisfaction with the

present government'. And a few months later, the NSC referred to the 'pervasive political malaise in Spain, especially among the younger generations and including elements of the lower clergy'. In 1963 the State Department's Policy Planning Council (PPC) commented on the 'active dissent among intellectuals and youth'.<sup>26</sup> This and other signs led American officials to fear that the energies released by Spain's 'take off' would be 'consumed in political agitation and unrest'. Along this line, a PPC report suggested that the collision between the forces of change and traditional structures was likely to promote a situation of 'political instability and conflict' which would be exploited by radical movements to destabilize Franco's succession and challenge the US defense program.<sup>27</sup>

The situation in Spain in the early 1960s seemed to resemble the assumptions of modernization thinkers such as Walt W. Rostow, Max Millikan, Donald Blackmer, David Apter and Ithiel de Sola Pool, who believed that the accelerated 'take off' of developing nations could generate conflicts that would be exploited by communists to sow subversion. To guard against this potential threat, the US Embassy believed it was essential to help foment Spain's development 'with the minimum of social stress and human dislocation'. A 1961 US official communication stated that challenges posed by modernization required that efforts be made 'to nudge the Spanish ship in the right direction' in order to avoid 'it being wrecked or carried away on an errant tide — such as neutralism, or extreme nationalism, possibly extending as far as Fidelism'.<sup>28</sup> The US government felt that the best option was to encourage stable development to channel the pressures of modernization into becoming constructive and evolutionary changes.

The US government used the public diplomacy deployed by USIS as a key tool to harness and steer Spain's socioeconomic ferment. Since the early 1960s, USIS-Spain attempted to meet the new expectations that the emerging accelerated development had aroused among broad social sectors. To this end, it adopted a positive tone that linked the United States with



the development and welfare of the Spanish people.<sup>29</sup> The USIS post in Madrid portrayed the US presence in Spain as a lever for economic growth, for the opening of the country to modern ideas and for its progressive integration with the Euro-Western environment. Its aim was to project an American image of commitment to Spain's progress over and above its political regime in order to neutralize those critical voices that identified the United States as a supporter of Franco's dictatorship.<sup>30</sup>

In parallel, USIS-Spain broadened the audiences targeted by its outreach activities, which from the early 1960s began to include groups outside the Francoist establishment that were increasingly active in the country's political, social and cultural life. At that time, animosity toward the US was increasing among those groups where ferment was beginning to emerge, such as university students, intellectuals, factory workers, young professionals, grassroots clergy, the democratic left, and the liberal-progressive elements of the anti-Franco opposition. Among these factions a USIS assessment report published in February 1961 noted mounting criticism of 'US cooperation with the Franco regime as an egregious mistake on the part of the nation that was also the leader of the Free World'. Thus, as the Spanish dictator aged and social unrest grew, US strategists became more interested in those sectors beyond the status quo who were 'likely to be of influence in the post-Franco period'.<sup>31</sup> While ruling elites, particularly its technocratic and modernizing wings, continued to be a target group for USIS-Spain activities, it also sought to establish channels of communication with new actors demanding social change.<sup>32</sup>

Following the election of the John F. Kennedy administration, USIS posts in the southern hemisphere strove to familiarize Third World societies with the US development experience. To achieve this, they drew on the principles of modernization theory. Inspired by the works of US social scientists such as Walt W. Rostow, Edward Shils, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, among others, this paradigm presented a universalistic and linear notion of history which

prophesied an inevitable evolution of all societies involving various stages up to the peak of development. The proponents of the modernization doctrine believed that the US had been the first nation to achieve economic and political maturity. They considered that the US superpower should share its successful experience with those nations whose quests for advancement were being threatened by Soviet communism. In this view, the American journey to the pinnacle of progress provided a 'historical guide' which would be useful for the nations immersed in turbulent modernization processes.<sup>33</sup>

Such assumptions pervaded the message of USIS in Spain, which presented the US as a good friend willing to act 'as the source of guidance' for Spain. Starting in the early 1960s, US public diplomacy launched a range of activities showcasing how the US had attained 'orderly political, social, and economic progress ... as an indication of what Spain can achieve'.<sup>34</sup> These activities often focused on US history as a guide to avoid the turbulent and traumatic Spanish past. In March 1960 the Hispanic American Study Days held at the American House in Madrid attracted audiences of over 30 professors and students to discuss the US past.<sup>35</sup> In 1963, the US Embassy supported a 'Seminar on the Social History of the United States' which was organized by the American International Institute in collaboration with US historians and professors from the Fulbright Exchange Program (FEP).<sup>36</sup> Among other examples, in May 1964 US Ambassador Robert F. Woodward (1962-65) addressed the US's past in a lecture tellingly entitled 'Development towards the maturity of the United States' delivered at the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* (National Research Council) in Madrid. This event attracted an audience of professors, researchers, social scientists, and intellectuals. INAS Barcelona was also involved in several initiatives aimed at portraying US history as a 'tried and tested experiment' to be imitated by those societies yearning for peaceful progress and freedom.<sup>37</sup> In October 1964, it held a 'Week of the History of the United States of America' which subsequently was repeated at the Ramón Llull University student residence in Barcelona.

But despite the binational character of INAS and its counterparts in Madrid and Valencia, these cultural institutes were not spared from accusations of ‘Yankee’ imperialism and manipulation. In May 1965, the US consul in Valencia reported the anti-US graffiti at the binational Center of North American Studies in that city, which a few years later suffered a bomb attack.<sup>38</sup>

The USIS routinely distributed some of its printed material to the participants in the above-mentioned activities. Among the materials were the ‘sixty basic documents of US history’, selected and annotated by Henry Steele Commager; and an ‘Outline of American History’ which was prepared with advice from renowned Professor of American History at Columbia University, Richard Hofstadter. These and other USIS publications combined ideas from the intellectual schools of ‘consensus history’ and the ‘end of ideologies’ to associate the success of the US experiment with the preeminence of the liberal consensus and political moderation on social conflict and ideological strife as the driving forces of progress. Such a vision of the US past was echoed in an article published in 1962 in *Atlántico* (1956-1964), a USIS-Spain magazine with a circulation of 7,000 focused on the Spanish high culture and intelligentsia sectors.<sup>39</sup> The article was authored by Professor Clinton Rossiter, one of the main exponents of ‘consensus history’, along with such historians as the aforementioned Hofstadter and Commager. In this piece, Rossiter claimed that the US had achieved such a high level of progress because its society had remained ‘untouched by the calls of Marxism’ and other radical philosophies. The ‘good fortune not to be an ideological society’ described by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in a subsequent issue of *Atlántico*, had led the US nation to prosper unencumbered by political bigotry. Schlesinger believed that this pragmatic spirit had allowed the US to abandon the stark exploitative laissez-faire of yesteryear, and to construct a mixed economy system capable of extinguishing the old ‘revolutionary fires’ of the Industrial Revolution. Along the same lines, US intellectual Adolf Berle pointed out in several pieces disseminated by USIS-Spain in the early 1960s that the US regulated free market economy had

succeeded in combining economic growth and the redistribution of wealth, leading to the demise of classical ideologies which had been shelved definitively in the ‘museum of 19th century thought’.<sup>40</sup>

However, this was not the notion of US capitalism prevalent in Spanish sectors that could play an important role in the post-Franco future. According to US diplomatic reports, clandestine left-wing parties tended to associate the United States with ‘concepts of rampant capitalistic exploitation’. For their part, Spanish student activists rejected the ‘American experience as a monopolistic capitalistic economic system’. In 1963, the philosopher Julián Marías, one of the main American contacts in the intellectual world, considered that in the anti-Franco groups there was a tendency to equate US capitalism with Franco’s oppressive rule, which would ‘cause serious future difficulties between the US and what must be more liberal future Spanish regimes’. Therefore, in his opinion, ‘an effort to make American free capitalism [...] understood would be well worthwhile’.<sup>41</sup>

Consequently, the US persuasion apparatus devoted significant efforts to communicating to the Spanish public the advantages of US ‘welfare state capitalism’ and ‘its underlying principles, as against other concepts of economy theory and practice.’ US diplomacy sought to present US ‘capitalism with conscience’ as a constructive alternative to the Marxist discourse of social injustice in the Third World. This was the aim of the lecture entitled ‘The Development of Capitalism in the United States’ delivered in February 1966 by the Economic Counselor of the US Embassy John Fishburne, to 120 students at the University of Bilbao. However, the words of this US diplomat did not seem to convince part of the audience as, according to US official sources, his lecture was followed by a debate in which some attendees ‘showed open antagonism and tried to provoke’ the speaker with ‘sharp and biting questions’. The speech a few months later by US Ambassador to an audience of 400 people at the

University of Oviedo was interrupted constantly by coughing and heckling from a large group of students.<sup>42</sup>

The US information services in Spain also produced and disseminated numerous articles and pamphlets highlighting the capacity of US capitalism to distribute the fruits of its high productivity. For instance, *Noticias de Actualidad* (1948-1963) – a USIS-Spain magazine with a circulation of around 50,000 aimed at the country’s political, economic, and social leaders – frequently provided information on the progressive tax system in the US, its robust labor legislation (including minimum wage, vacation rights, housing, social protection instruments), unemployment benefit, retirement pensions, and equal access to education. All of these aspects according to a USIS pamphlet written by the prestigious economist John W. Kendrick, had enabled a drastic reduction in social inequalities in the US and by the early 1960s had resulted in around three-quarters of its population enjoying a middle-class standard of living.<sup>43</sup>

Another important element of the USIS presentation of US ‘welfare state capitalism’ was the union system. In a context of increasing ferment and rising expectations among Spanish workers, US public diplomacy linked the increasing welfare of their US counterparts with an approach to industrial conflict characterized by pragmatism and moderation. Among other examples, a USIS pamphlet circulating in Spanish labor circles in 1961, pointed out that US wage earners tended to accept private property, reject socialism, and identify with the middle classes.<sup>44</sup> A few years later, on Labor Day 1966, the US Embassy in Madrid distributed a small pamphlet on ‘The Fundamentals of Unionism in the US’ written by the US labor leader George Meany (president of the AFL-CIO between 1955 and 1979). It highlighted that labor relations in the US were defined by ‘peace at work’ which had been accomplished by collective bargaining based on responsibility and class collaboration.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to the printed word, US public diplomacy used other information and cultural resources ‘to acquaint [Spanish] labor as a whole with the nature of the American socio-

economic system and of the position of the US as the leader of the Free World'.<sup>46</sup> In early 1964 the city of Oviedo, center of an important industrial region, hosted a talk by the US Embassy's Labor Attaché on the world of work in the US. Just months later, USIS organized an event at the *Ateneo Cultural* (Cultural Club) in Vallecas, one of the largest working-class neighborhoods in Madrid, on 'Current Trends in the Labor Movement in the United States.' Likewise, the American Cultural Weeks held during these years in cities such as Avilés, Zamora, Alcázar de San Juan, and Béjar included round tables, documentary screenings, and exhibitions about capital-labor relations in US factories.<sup>47</sup>

Starting in the early 1960s, US labor diplomacy also employed professional visiting programs such as the Foreign Leader Program (FLP). As a unilateral initiative of the US government, the FLP was intended to facilitate direct contact with the US for foreign leaders with capacity to influence public opinion in their respective countries.<sup>48</sup> Spain joined this program in 1952 and by 1970 nearly 200 Spaniards had participated. From the late 1950s, the FLP-Spain began to include leaders of official Spanish trade unionism and the Ministry of Labor, professors of labor relations, journalists specializing in trade union issues, and members of Catholic labor organizations interested in 'increasing the pace of modernization within Spain'.<sup>49</sup> These participants were able to observe firsthand the workings of unions and labor relations in the United States through meetings with representatives of labor organizations, factory visits and seminars at industrial relations study centers.<sup>50</sup> At a time of increasing strike activity in Spain, the FLP was a means to expose domestic union leaders to US labor views with the aim of 'fortifying Spanish labor against appeals of political extremism which might surge to the surface at the time when Franco departed from the scene'.<sup>51</sup>

However, US efforts in this field did not succeed in halting the increase in labor unrest, which was on the rise throughout the decade. Nor did they mitigate the rejection of the United States among sectors of the working class that linked the American superpower with the

alliance between Franco and the business oligarchies. A significant number of Spanish factory workers did not associate the United States with development but with the unequal distribution of its benefits brought about by the dictatorship. In September 1965 Catholic labor leaders told the US Consul in Barcelona that 'in general the attitudes and beliefs of Spanish workers' expressed 'little sympathy or understanding' for US interventions in the Third World, were distrustful of US business, and suspicious of Washington's collaboration with the Franco regime. A few months later, the US Consul in Bilbao highlighted the contrast between the 'attitude of friendliness towards the US' among the wealthy elites and the lack of affection of the working classes who accused the US of 'letting Franco get away with what he is doing to the workers'. In the following years, the large US-owned companies (I.T.T. Corporation, International Harvester, Rockwell Standard Corporation) became 'a target of gradually growing anti-Americanism in Spain', especially among labor constituencies frustrated by the unfulfilled expectations of the Spanish 'economic miracle'.<sup>52</sup>

One of the branches of modernization theory approached the backwardness of Southern hemisphere countries from a psycho-cultural perspective. Authors such as Bert Hoselitz, Harold Laswell, Daniel Lerner and Wilburn Schramm considered the traditional ways of thinking of these societies as a serious obstacle to their economic development. In contrast to racial theories, modernization scholars contended that Third World nations were not genetically inferior but mentally backward. They argued that the stagnation of peripheral states was due not to biological reasons but to mental and cultural factors.<sup>53</sup>

The influence of these ideas on postwar US foreign policy contributed to reinforcing US deep seated perceptions of Spain as an atavistic people. Thus, although in the early 1960s Spaniards seemed increasingly attracted to the 'new forces at work in modern societies', US observers still viewed Spain as a 'traditional closed society.' According to USIS reports, the country had remained for decades in 'psychological and ideological self-sufficiency' and had

for 'long lived a national life somewhat apart from main currents of Europe and the modern world'. As a result, its institutions, society, and economy had 'lagged behind general Western evolution'.<sup>54</sup>

However, US modernization doctrine held that the minority of age of traditional societies such as Spain's was not a permanent condition but a transitory state of mind. To overcome it, US pundits believed a change to traditional values was crucial, especially among the elites who were being called on to play leading roles in the national development crusade. In this perspective, it was imperative that influential players in backward nations should adopt a modern mindset based on contact with US cultural forms.<sup>55</sup> In line with this thinking, USIS expressed in 1962 the desire to expunge Spain's 'ancient ways and values' by exposing its political, economic, cultural, and youth leaders to 'new ideas, new concepts and new techniques from the West, especially from the U.S'.<sup>56</sup>

The resources used by US diplomacy to modernize Spanish attitudes were cultural exchange and human capital training programs. The objective of these programs was to forge - through the mobilization and circulation of ideas, techniques and people - a global elite trained in the principles of modernization and interested in applying these ideas and schemes in their own countries. US officials regarded the exchange diplomacy as a subtle tool to allow the 'wide opening of the doors of Spain' to modern influences coming 'from without, especially from the United States'.<sup>57</sup> The main US scheme designed to help Spaniards achieve a development mindset was the Technical Exchange Program (TEP). The TEP was implemented in Spain by the US International Cooperation Administration between 1954 and 1963, and allowed more than 2,200 Spanish experts, specialists, and engineers to receive training in US centers. As a USIS pamphlet published in the early 1960s noted 'numerous expeditions of Spanish technicians in a multitude of specialties [such as economic planning, business management, civil aviation, energy, statistics, public administration] visited the United States to perfect their



knowledge in accordance with the modern systems practiced there and in order to adapt them appropriately to the improvement of Spanish production and industry'. At the same time, it involved dozens of US specialists traveling to Spain to run courses, take part in training activities, and provide technical advice.<sup>58</sup>

After the TEP was discontinued in 1963, Washington extended the Fulbright Exchange Program (FEP) that had been launched in Spain in 1958. From then until Franco's death in 1975, the FEP awarded some 1,100 scholarships to Spanish postgraduates, professors, and researchers which allowed them to travel to and train in the US and awarded almost 1,000 grants to US candidates interested in teaching and researching in Spain. This program was administered by a US-Spain Commission which ensured its bilateral reciprocity and academic integrity.<sup>59</sup> The Spanish side prioritized the sending of science and technical grantees to the United States, considering that the training of human capital in these fields was a fundamental element for the country's development. Thus, since the late 1950s, a good number of Spanish researchers, scientists and students traveled to the United States through the FEP in order to improve their training in various areas (mainly engineering, biology, chemistry and physics) and then apply this knowledge in Spain. For their part, the US representatives on the Fulbright Commission preferred to encourage academic exchanges in the humanities and social sciences to foster greater knowledge and understanding of American civilization in Spain. To this end, they focused on the promotion of the English language in Spain.<sup>60</sup>

The FEP aim of propagating the English language was in line with the emerging vision in US development circles of English as 'the password of modernization' for traditional societies. In the late 1950s, US modernizers and foreign service officers had begun to embrace the English language seeing it as key to accessing the knowledge essential for Third World advancement. From that time on, diffusion of English as a transnational *lingua franca* carrying modern mentalities and skills became part of the US cultural arsenal for boosting the progress

of developing states.<sup>61</sup> Fulbright scholars in Spain collaborated with binational cultural institutes which offered English courses for young people, university students, and professionals. Official sources report that during the first half of 1962 some 3,700 individuals attended English courses at centers in Spain. The FEP sent US professors and educators to Spain to teach English in universities and to advise on its implementation in curricula. In the opposite direction, Spanish visiting scholars and teachers traveled to the United States to improve their English language teaching skills. Finally, USIS-Spain attempted to spread this language as a carrier of modernization by offering English classes to workers, technicians, and civil servants and developing education programs which were broadcast on Spanish public television and numerous radio stations throughout the country.<sup>62</sup>

US promotion of English in Spain also involved non-official actors, such as the Ford Foundation (FF). This philanthropic organization was a fundamental cog in the wheel dedicated to expanding American hegemony in the global periphery through the formation of modernizing elites sympathetic to the United States. As part of that formation, the FF financed and promoted the teaching of English abroad under the belief that the modernization of Third World countries required US knowledge.<sup>63</sup> In 1965 it launched a project to train Spanish teachers of English which included specialized seminars, purchase of books, and establishment of language laboratories in several universities.<sup>64</sup>

This entity's activities related to the modernization of influential Spanish minds were not limited only to promotion of the English language. The FF focused on circulating US 'semantics of modernization' among Spanish economic, social, and intellectual leaders who according to US diplomacy were 'confused, inexperienced and wary' and in search of a model for their country's future.<sup>65</sup> In 1962 it began to host (until 1969) a program of research seminars for economists, sociologists, political scientists, and urban planners who the Foundation believed could play significant roles 'in the economic and social modernization of Spain along

democratic lines'. During these seminars industry policy, the tax system, public administration, development planning and other such issues related to the modernization of Spain were discussed and the results disseminated via courses, conferences, and books.<sup>66</sup>

In parallel, USIS magazines were making efforts to disseminate a 'modernizing ethos' in Spain by introducing their Spanish readers to US notions and theories of development through a wide range of articles, book reviews, and interviews such as the interview with Walt W. Rostow published in *Atlántico* in February 1964. As stated above, in October of that year, this distinguished economist and intellectual modernization theory reference visited Spain to participate in several development activities including a lecture on 'Some Lessons of Economic Development Since World War II' at the National Institute of Political Studies in Madrid. Rostow also participated in a round table on development at the Center for Training and Improvement of Civil Servants of Alcalá de Henares (Madrid), which was attended by some of those responsible for development plans in Spain.<sup>67</sup>

Throughout the 1950s, modernization thinkers had been optimistic about the political evolution in the Third World. They understood economic growth and the establishment of free institutions as interconnected and mutually reinforcing processes. Prominent US social scientists and modernizers such as Seymour M. Lipset, Gabriel Almond, Edward Shils and Lucian Pye generally believed that the transition to more sophisticated political forms similar to those of western democracies would naturally follow the economic advancement of traditional societies. In the postwar era, this vision of political development became the 'prevailing thinking' in the US State Department and resonated strongly with US foreign policy discourse on poor countries. Over this period, US development diplomacy rested on the theoretical premise that economic growth would 'pave the way for the emergence of broadly based democratic political systems' in Third World states.<sup>68</sup>

Echoing these ideas, in the early 1960s US diplomats in Spain affirmed that the forces of development would help 'to encourage peaceful evolution towards a more representative form of government in the post-Franco period'. Similarly, in 1963 a major PPC report noted that economic factors would serve 'to expand and strengthen the social basis for the evolution of a popularly-based political system' in this country.<sup>69</sup> However, as instability swept through postcolonial areas, these optimistic views began to coexist with psychopathological approaches to mass politics in Third World societies, considered by US modernization intellectuals as volatile and prone to ideological extremism. Similarly, US officials began to question the nexus between modernization and democracy in nations including Spain with immature political culture. US diplomats believed that Spain lacked the political traditions and attitudes required for democratic institutions to flourish. Its national history -according to US official sources- was marked by 'political turbulence', 'domestic discord', and a succession of failed monarchies, military takeovers, dictatorships, revolutions, and violent confrontations. Throughout this troubled past, Spanish experience 'in the arts of social co-existence and of democratic compromise' had been, in the opinion of US pundits, truly meager.<sup>70</sup>

In light of all these factors, US diplomats felt that Spain was not 'yet prepared for free discussion of the kind that we enjoy in the US'.<sup>71</sup> In March 1961, Ambassador John D. Lodge (1955-1961) stated that 'democracy as we know it does not seem practicable for Spain now'. In his view, Spain's lack of political sophistication meant that any attempt to 'install democracy' in this country could be premature and 'would run grave risks of opening Pandora's Box with chaotic results which would give Communists a long sought-for opportunity'. Therefore, Spanish society should not aspire to evolve 'politically overnight' but rather should aim for slow acquisition of the procedures that would allow a stable post-Franco transition to a pluralist system.<sup>72</sup>

Consequently, the US Embassy dismissed any democratizing reforms which might generate political instability in Spain, preferring cautious dissemination of ideas which would contribute to laying the foundations for the future emergence of 'a strong, moderate Center about which the political life of a nation gradually freed from authoritarianism could coalesce'.<sup>73</sup> Its campaign included presentation of American democracy as an example for Spain to follow in order to evolve gradually towards a future post-Franco representative government. Thus, from the late 1950s, US public diplomacy implemented an array of activities with the aim 'to explain the workings of the American governmental system' to those sectors that could play an influential role in the future succession of the Spanish dictator.<sup>74</sup> In the following years the US machinery of persuasion attempted to familiarize Spanish 'political, trade union, economic, media, educational and cultural fields' leaders with the 'liberal systems of progressive and peaceful change'.<sup>75</sup> This task had to be carried out with caution so as not to arouse the suspicions of Spanish rulers who were very wary of any US message or contact of a political nature.<sup>76</sup>

As part of this strategy, between 1960 and 1970 the magazines *Noticias*, *Atlántico*, and *Facetas* published more than 30 articles and special sections on the US institutional framework (Constitution, Congress, government, political parties). USIS-Spain also published several books on US democracy and distributed thousands of copies including 1,500 translations of Edward S. Griffith's, *The American System of Government*. Alongside this, the American House in Madrid disseminated in 1962 a pamphlet entitled 'A People in the Exercise of their Sovereignty', based on Catheryn Seckler-Hudson's *Our Constitution and Government*. In the years that followed, US public affairs officers circulated various pamphlets on the political thought which had inspired the US political organization, such as Max Lerner's 1966 piece on Alexis de Tocqueville's vision of democracy in the US<sup>77</sup>

The presentation of US democracy paid special attention to the institution of the presidency, its functions and its incumbents who were portrayed as expressions of stability and moderation of the American political system.<sup>78</sup> In 1960, *Noticias de Actualidad* dedicated a biographical section to all US presidents. Subsequently, to celebrate the inauguration of John F. Kennedy in January 1961, INAS Barcelona held a 'Presidential Party', in which the inaugural speeches were broadcast from Washington through the Voice of America. When Kennedy was assassinated, USIS in Spain issued a special publication on his life and political career. From the end of 1963, the US Embassy information apparatus was engaged in introducing the new President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Spanish public through brochures, radio programs, and the documentaries 'The President' and 'The LBJ Story'.<sup>79</sup>

For US propagandists, the legislative and presidential elections provided 'a vital opportunity to communicate ... to all peoples the stirring story of a free people acting to elect' their representatives. Since the early 1960s, the US cultural cold warriors had been increasing their outreach activities to publicize these electoral processes as an 'example of democracy at work' which could serve other countries well.<sup>80</sup> In Spain, USIS magazine *Noticias de Actualidad* in 1960 included a special section headed 'Electoral Dialogues' to address its Spanish readers' questions about the 1960 presidential elections while INAS Barcelona organized the '1960, Election Year. How the President of the United States is elected' colloquium. After the election, INAS screened the film 'The United States elects John F. Kennedy' which dealt with the developments of past elections.<sup>81</sup> Subsequently and coincidental with the November 1964 presidential elections, *Atlántico* published a supplement containing the opinions of two well-known intellectual figures in Spanish public life. In the same year USIS produced programs for broadcast on Spanish radio stations explaining how the US electoral system worked, and INAS mounted an exhibition of the presidential candidates.<sup>82</sup>

Exchange programs were used to show the workings of the US elections to influential Spanish individuals who were inclined 'to harmonize Spanish institutions with more democratic forms without risking internal strife and discord'. Between October and November 1960, the FEP financed a tour of the US by sixteen Spanish journalists interested in learning about the US electoral system. In 1964, at the invitation of the US State Department, Manuel Jiménez de Parga (a professor at the University of Barcelona) attended the US political party conventions. On returning from his trip to the US, this renowned specialist in political law gave a talk at INAS Barcelona on 'The Role of the Average American in the Presidential Election'. Other such examples include the round table held in October 1964 and entitled 'Impressions of the electoral campaign in the United States', in which several university students who had traveled in the US under the auspices of the Educational Travel Program participated.<sup>83</sup>

These activities with students were part of the 'Emphasis on youth' program that had been launched in 1963 by USIS-Spain to channel students' idealism and potential for change in favor of the US agenda of security and stable modernization. However, despite the US efforts to entice university students, they were the main promoters of anti-American activities in Spain in the following years. In March 1966, a US report acknowledged that 'some form of disapproval or unfavorable attitude towards the US would be found with virtual unanimity throughout the university population.' In December, former Education Minister Joaquín Ruiz-Gimenez told a US representative that 'Anti-American sentiment was growing in the university including faculty as well as student body, mainly because of Vietnam, and was spreading beyond the university into liberal Catholic circles'.<sup>84</sup>

Earlier that year, an air crash involving two US military planes – one loaded with atomic bombs- which occurred near the town of Palomares (southeastern coast of Spain) increased criticism of US defense policy by students and other groups in Spanish society. In April 1967, a secret US report acknowledged that the Palomares affair imposed on the US government a

‘serious problem of mounting Spanish public uneasiness over the continued presence of US forces in Spain’.<sup>85</sup> According to US Ambassador Angier B. Duke (1965-1968), issues such as Vietnam and Palomares were fueling ‘a rising chorus of opposition to the United States foreign policy’ among broad sectors in Spain. In Duke’s view, they encouraged rejection from a Spanish society in which could be heard ‘stronger echoes of general European longing to forget about the Cold War and the threat from the East’.<sup>86</sup>

This unfriendly stance towards the US worsened at the end of the decade in the wake of Global’68 and the spread of New Left ideas in Spain.<sup>87</sup> At the time, USIS officials appreciated that, with inestimable US assistance, Spain had experienced remarkable economic development and social transformation. US public diplomacy had tried to prepare Spanish society to face this profound change and funnel it through a constructive and non-traumatic path. Nevertheless, the country’s bumpy modernization had caused tensions and frustrations that fed anti-American tendencies among sectors dissatisfied with the US-inspired development promoted by Franco.

To conclude, in the 1960s, the US government tried to shape the vectors of historical and social change in Spain through various public diplomacy channels. At the beginning of that decade, Washington launched a range of information, cultural, and educational activities aimed at stimulating Spain’s modernization within a framework of stability and cooperation with the US. Modernization theory provided the ideological and conceptual basis for such operation of persuasion, the ultimate aim of which was to buttress US military interests in Spain and pave the way for Franco’s future succession.

However, the results of US attempts to steer the flow of change in 1960s Spain were indecisive. On the one hand, by the late 1960s, US public diplomacy had succeeded in shoring up support for Washington among the dominant circles (the regime’s modernizing elites, industrial bourgeoisie, financial oligarchy) benefiting from development. It also helped to boost capitalist economic growth, open the country to Western influences and foster Spain’s further



integration into the US-led transatlantic community. All these factors were fully consistent with US geo-strategic priorities and the preparation of a post-Franco period favorable to US interests. On the other hand, however, the Spanish 'economic miracle' encouraged by US officials generated substantial inequalities and imbalances which fueled social unrest and a significant increase in political agitation against the Franco dictatorship. Over the course of the 1960s, this social upheaval nurtured growing distrust of the US from forces and popular sectors afflicted by the contradictions inherent in the US-inspired development model. The accelerated social change fueled new and growing demands that US promises of prosperity, stability and security did not satisfy. While the United States gained the confidence of an increasingly challenged Francoist establishment, it lost support among strong movements and groups dissatisfied with the effects of authoritarian modernization.

As the 1960s went on, it became clear that the US cultural seduction endeavors had failed to counteract the loss of image induced by the US's alliance with the Spanish dictatorship. As US diplomacy acknowledged, this association with the Francoist status quo prevented it from winning the sympathy of emerging core political constituencies. These sections of Spanish society rebuffed the US crusade for security and orderly modernization. The centrality of strategic factors in Washington's policy toward Spain undermined the credibility of the US modernization discourse among large and vocal groups of Spanish public opinion. This increasingly hostile public opinion shaped US foreign policy toward Spain during the post-Franco transition to democracy that began in the mid-1970s. Then, US State Department adopted a low political profile, leaving its Western European allies to play the leading roles in the regime change which culminated in Spain's full integration into the Western bloc.

## Notes

---

<sup>1</sup> There is an extensive bibliography on the military and political relations between the US and Franco's dictatorship during the 1940s and 1950s. See among others, W. Bowen, *Truman, Franco's Spain and the Cold War* (Columbus, MO 2017); Hualde Amunarriz, *El cerco aliado. Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Francia frente a la dictadura franquista (1945-1953)* (Bilbao 2016); B. Liedtke, *Embracing a Dictatorship. US Relations with Spain, 1945-1953* (London 1996); Ángel Viñas, *En las garras del águila: Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945-1995)* (Barcelona 2003); A. Jarque, 'Queremos esas bases.' *El acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco* (Madrid 1998); F. Termis, *Renunciando a todo. El régimen franquista y los Estados Unidos desde 1945 hasta 1963* (Madrid 2005).

<sup>2</sup> M. Haefele, 'Walt Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action,' in D. Engerman, N. Gilman, M. Haefele, and M. Latham, (eds.) *Staging Growth. Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA 2003), 81-106; P. Ish-Shalom, 'Theory Gets Real, and the Case for a Normative Ethic: Rostow, Modernization Theory, and the Alliance for Progress', *International Studies Quarterly*, 50, 2 (2006): 287-311; N. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MA 2003); N. Cullather, 'Development? It's History', *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (2000): 641-653.

<sup>3</sup> INAS was one of the binational cultural centers, along with those in Madrid and Valencia, created by the United States in the late 1950s in order to project American culture, history and language in Spain. See P. León-Aguinaga, 'Los canales de difusión del mensaje norteamericano en España, 1945-1960', *Ayer*, 75, 2 (2009), 137-143. Walt W. Rostow's lectures were collected in the booklet entitled *Dos conferencias* (Madrid, 1964), produced by the Information Service of the American Embassy.

<sup>4</sup> 'Visit to Madrid by the Counselor of the Department Walt W. Rostow', 21 October 1964, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Box 204, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL).

<sup>5</sup> 'Briefing for Mr. Schlesinger', 24 March 1961, Record Group 59 (RG59), Records of the Department of State (DS), Bureau of European Affairs (BEA), Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 5, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA).

<sup>6</sup> J. Gienow-Hecht, 'Culture in the Cold War', in M. Leffler and O. A. Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, (Cambridge, 2010), 401. Also see D. Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (Oxford, 2003); T. Shaw, 'The Politics of Cold War Culture', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3, 3 (2001): 59-76; K. Osgood, 'Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War', *Journal of Cold*

---

*War Studies*, 4, 2 (2003): 85-107; W. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, NY, 1997)

<sup>7</sup> In the last two decades, there have been multiple methodological approaches to the concept of public and cultural diplomacy both from history and from other social sciences. See, for example, N. Cull, 'Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 616 (2008): 31-54; E. Gilboa, 'Public Diplomacy', in G. Mazzoleni (ed.), *The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication* (Oxford, 2015), 1297-1306; J. Gienow-Hecht and M. Donfried (eds.), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (New York, NY, 2010); N. Snow and P. Taylor (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York, NY, 2009); J. Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations* (New York, NY, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> L. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way. US Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia, PA, 2008), K. Osgood, *Total Cold War. Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Kansas City, KS, 2008); N. Cull, Nicholas Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York: NJ, 2008), M. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ, 2011); P. von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); G. Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire. The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain, 1950-70* (Brussels, 2008); R. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings. American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NJ, 2005).

<sup>9</sup> On US public diplomacy in Spain, see the works cited throughout this essay by authors such as Lorenzo Delgado, Francisco J. Rodríguez Jiménez, Pablo León and Antonio Niño. On the Franco regime's outreach activities in the United States, see N. M. Rosendorf, *Franco Sells Spain to America: Hollywood, Tourism and Public Relations as Postwar Spanish Soft Power* (New York, 2014) and, by the same author, 'Be El Caudillo's Guest: The Franco Regime's Quest for Rehabilitation and Dollars after World War II via the Promotion of U.S. Tourism to Spain', *Diplomatic History*, 30, 3 (2006): 367-407.

<sup>10</sup> Some contributions that have also explored this perspective in developing countries are V. Koschmann, 'Modernization and democratic values: the "Japanese Model" in the 1960s,' in *Staging Growth*, 225-249; G. Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill, NC 2007); J. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices. US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (New York, NY 2016).

---

<sup>11</sup> O. A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge, 2006), 86; S. Lorenzini, *Global Development. A Cold War History* (Princeton, NJ, 2019), 3; C. Unger, *International Development. A Postwar History* (London, 2018), 66. Also see M. Latham, *Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization and US Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca, NY, 2012).

<sup>12</sup> M. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC 2000), 312-33; N. Cullather, 'Development? It's History', *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (2000): 641-653; N. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MA 2003), 12-14.

<sup>13</sup> Just to mention a few examples from an extensive bibliography: B. Simpson, *Economists with Guns. Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations* (Stanford, CA 2008); N. Cullather: 'Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State', *The Journal of American History*, 89, (2002): 512-537; B. Offiler, *US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran. Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and the Shah* (New York, NY, 2015); N. Citino, *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in US-Arab Relations, 1945-1967* (Cambridge, 2017). A part of this historiography has also been interested in Latin American cases such as T. Field, 'Ideology as Strategy: Military-Led Modernization and the Origins of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia', *Diplomatic History*, 36, 1 (2012): 147-183.

<sup>14</sup> A conceptual definition of the Third World in R. McMahon, 'Introduction', in R. McMahon (ed.) *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York, NY 2013), 1-10.

<sup>15</sup> 'Justification for the Present Educational and Cultural Exchange Program in Spain', 23 October 1965, RG59, DS, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 2, NARA; 'Spain: a preoccupation profile', 11 November 1959, Record Group 306 (RG306), Records of the US Information Agency (USIA), Office of Research, Classified Research Reports, Box 3, NARA.

<sup>16</sup> See J. M. Hodge, 'Writing the History of Development (Part 2: Longer, Deeper, Wider)', *Humanity*, 7, 1 (2016): 125-174, and F. Cooper, 'Writing the History of Development', *Journal of Modern European History*, 8, 1 (2010): 5-23.

<sup>17</sup> This process is described in detail in L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 'La maquinaria de la persuasión. Política informativa y cultural de Estados Unidos en España' *Ayer*, 75, 3 (2009): 98-105.

<sup>18</sup> 'Comments on "Authoritarian Regimes" Receiving US Assistance (Military or Economic)' 2 May 1960, RG59, DS, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal 1956-66, Box 5, NARA. Also see R. Pardo, 'La política norteamericana', *Ayer*, 49, 1 (2003): 13-53

---

<sup>19</sup> L. Delgado, 'La maquinaria de la persuasión...', 118.

<sup>20</sup> 'Minister Arburua's Views on Spain's Inflationary Problems and Possible Government Control Measures', 20 December 1956, Record Group 84 (RG84), Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Box 196, NARA.

<sup>21</sup> 'National Security Council Report: Statement of US Policy Toward Spain', 5 October 1960, quoted in G. LaFantasie, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960*, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part (Washington, DC, 1991), 786-787.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 785-793. Disponible en <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v07p2/d335>

<sup>23</sup> In September 1958 the US government had encouraged Spain to join the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The following year Washington supported implementation of the National Economic Stabilization Plan, an ambitious package of structural economic reforms which included a wide range of liberalization, adjustment, and foreign investment promotion measures. This program boosted Spain's integration in the world markets and laid the foundations for an economic 'take-off' that began to bear fruit in the early 1960s. See E. Cavalieri, *España y el FMI: la integración de la economía española en el sistema monetario internacional, 1943-1959* (Madrid 2014); L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 'El ingreso de España en la Organización Europea de Cooperación Económica', *Arbor*, 170, 669 (2001): 147-179; J. Muns and M. Millet, *España y el Banco Mundial. Relaciones 1958-1994* (Madrid 1994).

<sup>24</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State, 28 September 1960, and 'Statement of US policy toward Spain', both quoted in LaFantasie, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 781, 778.

<sup>25</sup> Tezanos, 'Cambio social y modernización', 60. On the intense social conflict in Spain in the 1960s, see E. Hernández-Sandoica, M. A. Ruiz-Carnicer and M. Baldó, *Estudiantes contra Franco (1939-1975). Oposición política y movilización juvenil* (Madrid 2007); P. Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960-78* (Basingstoke 2011); P. Corral, *Protesta y ciudadanía: conflictos ambientales durante el franquismo en Zaragoza, (1939-1979)* (Zaragoza 2016); C. Molinero and P. Ysàs, *Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas. Clase obrera y conflictividad laboral en la España franquista* (Madrid 1998); X. Domènech, *Clase obrera, antifranquismo y cambio político: pequeños grandes cambios, 1956-1969* (Madrid 2008).

<sup>26</sup> 'Comments on "Authoritarian Regimes" Receiving US Assistance (Military or Economic)', 2 May 1960, RG59, DS, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal 1956–66, Box 5, NARA; 'Statement of US Policy toward

---

Spain' 5 October 1960, in LaFantasie, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 785-786; 'The Succession Problem in Spain', 17 July 1963, RG59, SD, Policy Planning Council (PPC), Subject Files, 1963-73, Box 16, NARA;

<sup>27</sup> 'USIS Country Plan for Spain, FY 1962', 7 March 1962, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4, NARA; 'The Succession Problem in Spain', 17 July 1963, RG59, DS, PPC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1963-73, Box 16, NARA.

<sup>28</sup> 'Visit of Ambassador and Mrs. Duke to Barcelona', 15 November 1965, RG59, DS, Central Foreign Policy (CFP), Education and Cultural Exchange, 1964-1966, Box 402, NARA; 'The Future of US-Spanish Relations,' 8 March 1961, RG59, DS, Lot Files-Office of Western European Affairs, 1953-1962, Spain, Box 8, NARA.

<sup>29</sup> This USIS-Spain strategy was in line with the new orientation towards Third World countries adopted by the USIA under the leadership of Edward R. Murrow. The new administration of John F. Kennedy tasked Murrow's USIA to place greater emphasis on 'US objectives of national development abroad by using the techniques of modern communication' and to handle 'all public information functions abroad with respect to the foreign assistance, aid and development programs of the United States Government', 'USIA and National Development', 8 June 1967, Papers of Leonard H. Marks, Box 25, LBJL; "USIA'S Role in National Development," 17 April 1968, Papers of Leonard H. Marks, Box 24, LBJL.

<sup>30</sup> L. Delgado, 'After Franco, What?' La diplomacia pública de Estados Unidos y la preparación del post-franquismo', in O. J. Martín-García and M. Ortiz (eds.), *Claves internacionales en la transición española*, (Madrid, 2010), 104-106; L. Delgado and F. Rodríguez-Jiménez, "España en el imperio informal estadounidense: captación de líderes y redes de influencia," in L. Camprubí, X. Roqué and F. Sáez de Adana (eds.), *De la Guerra Fría al calentamiento global. Estados Unidos, España y el nuevo orden científico mundial*, eds. (Madrid, 2018), 205

<sup>31</sup> 'Operations Plan for Spain', 27 October 1960, RG59, DS, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966, Box 5, NARA. A wide range of U.S. propaganda towards Spain in the 1940s and 1950s in the theme issue L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla (ed.), 'La ofensiva cultural norteamericana durante la Guerra Fría', *Ayer*, 75, 2 (2009).

<sup>32</sup> 'Inspection Report USIS Spain', 29 May 1959, RG306, USIA, Inspection Reports and Related Records, 1954-62, Box 8, NARA.

<sup>33</sup> Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future*, 62-64; Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, 63-65; 'The United States Information Agency during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1969', 1968, Administrative Histories, USIA, 1963-1969, Box 1, LBJL.

---

<sup>34</sup> 'USIS Country Plan for Spain-FY 1961', 25 June 1960, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Services Dispatches, 1954-65, Box 4; 'Country Plan for Spain', 3 December 1962, RG59, DS, CU, 1955-66. Box 31, NARA.

<sup>35</sup> The American House in Madrid was a US-Spanish cultural center dedicated, along with those in Valencia and Barcelona, to the promotion of US language, music, art, and history in Spain. According to the center's sources, by 1963 its English courses attracted some 900 students each term and it organized an average of four cultural events per month, attended by some 600 people. 'Fact Sheet for Submission by New Binational Center,' 27 October 1963, USIA, RG306, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 89, NARA.

<sup>36</sup> Between 1960 and 1970, some 65 US Fulbrighters in the field of history were sent to Spain. Although their main task was to study and conduct research on Spanish history, in several cases they also taught university courses and seminars on US history. 'Annual Report on Educational Exchange for FY 1963', 30 August 1963, RG306, USIA, CU, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 30.

<sup>37</sup> 'Barcelona Binational Center Activities Report', 18 September 1964, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA. According to INAS's own sources, in 1963 its library had 11,000 books and was visited by some 2,600 people per month. In addition, the institute organized an average of 14 cultural events per month with an attendance of about 4,000 people. 'Fact Sheet for Submission by New Binational Center', 27 October 1963, USIA, RG306, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 89, NARA.

<sup>38</sup> 'Barcelona Binational Center Activities Report', 18 September 1964, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA; *ABC* (February 29, 1964), 53; 'Barcelona BNC Report for April 1966', n.d., RG306, USIA, Office of the Assistant director for Europe, Policy Files, 1963-68, Box 5, NARA; 'Damages to Institute of North American Studies', 7 June 1967, and 'North American Study Center Bombed in Valencia', 18 February 1969, RG59, DS, CFP, Political and Defence, 1967-1969, Box 2491, NARA.

<sup>39</sup> On the magazines produced locally by the USIS-Spain see P. León-Aguinaga, 'Los canales de difusión', 137-140.

<sup>40</sup> C. Rossiter, 'Por qué Marx fracasó en los Estados Unidos', *Atlántico*, 20 (October 1962), 5-26; A. M. Schlesinger Jr., 'La sociedad abierta y... la sociedad cerrada', *Atlántico* 26 (January 1964), 17-27; A. Berle, 'Marx se equivocó; Krushchev se equivoca', *Noticias de Actualidad* (15 January 15, 1960), 8-9, and 'Si Marx volviese ahora' (Buenos Aires 1961), 5.

---

<sup>41</sup> 'The mood of Spain, Mid -1966', 6 August 1966, RG59, DS, CFP, 1964-1966, Box 2660, NARA; 'Student Unrest', 28 September 1968, RG59, CFP, 1967-1969, Political and Defence, Box 2489; 'Conversations between Dr. Julián Marías, Spanish Liberal Intellectual and Ambassador Stevenson', 20 December 1963, RG59, CFP, Box 4046, NARA.

<sup>42</sup> 'From US Consulate in Valencia to US Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke', 27 May 1965, RG59, DS, BEA Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 2, NARA; 'Monthly Report to USIS', 24 February 1966, RG59, SD, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 8, NARA; 'Student Disturbances during Ambassador's Speech in Asturias', 2 March 1966, RG59, SD, CFP, 1964-1966, Political and Defence, Box 2663, NARA.

<sup>43</sup>Servicio de Información de Estados Unidos (SIEU), 'El sistema de impuestos en los Estados Unidos' (Madrid 1961), 3; *Noticias de Actualidad* (15 January 1963), 12-16; SIEU, 'La vida universitaria en Estados Unidos', (Madrid 1967), 4; John Kendrick, 'Los recursos del progreso económico en los Estados Unidos', (Madrid 1962), 7-9; Berle, 'Si Marx volviese ahora', 3.

<sup>44</sup> 'USIS Country Assessment Report for Spain 1960', 15 February 1961, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Services Dispatches, 1954-65, Box 4, NARA.

<sup>45</sup> George Meany, 'Los fundamentos del sindicalismo en EE.UU.', (Madrid 1966), 1-4. However, although Meany was part of the global US crusade against communist unionism, his position on Spain, especially his refusal to collaborate with Franco's single union, did not always converge with Washington's geopolitical priorities. Internationally, the AFL-CIO criticized Franco's dictatorship and supported trade union organizations linked to the non-Communist democratic opposition. See F. Rodríguez-Jiménez, 'Palos en la rueda...'. *Acción exterior del sindicalismo estadounidense en España, 1945-1975*, *Hispania*, LXXVIII, 259 (2018): 377-408; and 'La AFL-CIO y el sindicalismo español, 1953-1971', *Hispania*, LXXV, 251 (2015): 863-892.

<sup>46</sup> 'USIS Country Assessment Report for Spain 1960,' 15 February 1961, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Services Dispatches, 1954-65, Box 4, NARA.

<sup>47</sup> 'American Cycle in Oviedo', 21 May 1964, RG306, USIA, Exhibits Division, Records Concerning Exhibits in Foreign Countries, 1955-67, Box 29, NARA; 'Monthly Highlights, USIS Spain', 31 May 1965, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA.

<sup>48</sup> One of the most rigorous works on this exchange program in G. Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire. The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain, 1950-70* (Brussels 2008).



---

<sup>49</sup> 'Country Assessment Report, USIS Spain 1961', 15 February 1962, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box, 4, NARA. About FLP in Spain see L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 'Objetivo: atraer a las élites. Los líderes de la vida pública y la política exterior norteamericana en España', in A. Niño and J. A. Montero (eds.) *Guerra Fría y propaganda. Estados Unidos y su cruzada cultural en Europa y América Latina* (Madrid 2012), 235-273.

<sup>50</sup> Some of these centers were dedicated to training representatives of anti-communist workers in American free trade unionism. See J. Schuhrke, 'Comradely Brainwashin" International Development, Labor Education, and Industrial Relations in the Cold War', *Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas*, 16, 3 (September 2019), 47-49.

<sup>51</sup> 'Country Assessment Report, USIS Spain 1961', 15 February 1962, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box, 4, NARA.

<sup>52</sup> 'From Rafael Sancho-Bonet to Angier Biddle Duke', 14 December 1965, RG59, SD, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966. Box 2, NARA; 'Review of Labor Developments in Spain in 1967 and Prospects for 1968', 20 March 1968, RG59, SD, CFP, 1967-1969, Economic-Laboral, Box 367, NARA.

<sup>53</sup> H. Shah, *Production of Modernization: Daniel Lerner, Mass Media, and the Passing of Traditional Society*, (Philadelphia, PA 2011), 7-11; A. Warne, 'Psychoanalyzing Iran: Kennedy's Iran Task Force and the Modernization of Orientalism, 1961-3', *International History Review*, 35, 2 (2013), 414.

<sup>54</sup> 'Addendum to the CU Contribution for a Country Guidelines Paper on Spain', 1963, RG59, SD, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 31, NARA; 'USIS Country Plan for Spain, FY 1962', 7 March 1962, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4, NARA.

<sup>55</sup> C. Unger, 'The United States, Decolonization, and the Education of Third World Elites', in J. Dülffer and M. Frey (eds.) *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, (London 2011), 241-245; Shah, *Production of Modernization*, 9-11.

<sup>56</sup> 'USIS Country Plan for Spain, FY 1962', 7 March 1962, RG306, USIA, OR, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4, NARA.

<sup>57</sup> 'Lecture and Related Program Activities of USIS Madrid', 30 June 1961, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 68, NARA; 'Annual Report on Educational Exchange for FY 1961', 6 July 1961, RG306, USIA, CU, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 30, NARA.

---

<sup>58</sup> L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, '¿El "amigo americano"? España y Estados Unidos durante el franquismo', *Studia Histórica*, 21, 1 (2003), 264-265; A. Álvaro, 'Guerra Fría y formación del capital humano durante el franquismo. Un balance sobre el programa estadounidense de ayuda técnica', *Historia del Presente*, 17, 1 (2011), 13-20; SIEU, 'Pueblo amigos' (Madrid n.d.); L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 'After Franco, What? La diplomacia pública de Estados Unidos y la preparación del post-franquismo', in Ó. J. Martín-García and M. Ortiz (eds.) *Claves internacionales en la transición Española* (Madrid 2010), 99-127.

<sup>59</sup> An administrative and organizational approach to the FEP in M. Bettie, 'Ambassadors unaware: the Fulbright Program and American public diplomacy', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 13, 4 (November 2015), 358-372.

<sup>60</sup> On the Fulbright Program in Spain see, among others, L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, *Westerly Wind. The Fulbright Program in Spain* (Madrid 2009); F. J. Rodríguez-Jiménez, 'Haciendo amigos: intercambios educativos hispano-estadounidenses en clave política', *Studia Histórica, Historia Contemporánea*, 25, 1 (2007), 339-362.

<sup>61</sup> 'English Language Teaching as an Important Tool of Foreign Policy', 23 September 1965, RG306, USIA, Subject folders 1955-1971, Box 121, NARA; D. Lemberg, 'The universal language of the future': decolonization, development, and the American embrace of global English, 1945-1965', *Modern Intellectual History*, 15, 2 (August 2018), 561-565. Also see C. H. Lee, 'The Way to Modernization: Language Ideologies and the Peace Corps English Education in Korea', *Education and Society*, 35, 1 (2017), 63-80.

<sup>62</sup> 'English Language Teaching, Spain', 1966, RG306, USIA, Office of the Assistant director for Europe, Policy Files, 1963-1968, Box 2, NARA; 'Solicitud preliminar de beca de estudios para los Estados Unidos', 10 October 1967, Expedientes de becarios y no becarios de la comisión Fulbright, becarios Fulbright-Hays (1959- ), AGA 51/10580 (RFSC). Also see Ó. J. Martín-García and F. J. Rodríguez-Jiménez, 'The Engaging Power of English-Language Promotion in Franco's Spain', *Contemporary European History*, 24, 3 (August 2015), 427.

<sup>63</sup> I. Parmar, 'American foundations and the development of international knowledge networks', *Global Networks*, 2, 1 (2002): 17-18.

<sup>64</sup> 'USG English Language Teaching Program', 2 January 1963, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 80, NARA; 'Monthly Highlights-USIS Spain', 31 May 1965, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA.

<sup>65</sup> 'Recommendations Regarding the CU Program in Spain', 14 January 1965, Central Foreign Policy, 1964-1966, Culture and Information, Box 402, NARA.

---

<sup>66</sup> For more details on these seminars see F. de Santisteban-Fernández, ‘El desembarco de la Fundación Ford en España’, *Ayer*, 75, 3 (2009), 159-191. Also see F. Rodríguez-Jiménez, ‘¿Forerunners of Change? The Ford Foundation’s Activities in Franco Spain’, in Óscar Martín García and Lorenzo Delgado (eds.), *Teaching Modernization. Spanish and Latin American Educational Reform in the Cold War* (New York, NY, 2019), 78-100.

<sup>67</sup> ‘Visit to Madrid by the Counselor of the Department Walt W. Rostow’, 21 October 1964, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Box 204, LBJL.

<sup>68</sup> ‘Political Development and US Economic Assistance’, February 1966, Papers of David Bell, Series 2.3, Agency for International Development 1963-1966, Box 23, JFKL.

<sup>69</sup> ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State’, 28 September 1960, quoted in LaFantasie, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 781; ‘The Succession Problem in Spain’, 17 July 1963, RG59, DS, PPC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1963-73, Box 16, NARA.

<sup>70</sup> ‘Briefing for Mr. Schlesinger’, 24 March 1961, RG59, SD, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 5, NARA; ‘Addendum to the CU Contribution for a Country Guidelines Paper on Spain’, 1963, RG59, SD, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 31, NARA.

<sup>71</sup> ‘Justification for the Present Educational and Cultural Exchange Program in Spain’, 23 October 1965, RG59, SD, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966, Box 2, NARA.

<sup>72</sup> ‘The Future of US-Spanish Relations’, 8 March 1961, RG59, SD, Office of Western European Affairs, 1953–1962, Box 8, NARA; ‘Statement of U.S Policy Toward Spain’, 5 October 1960, quoted in LaFantasie, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 785-786; ‘Discurso de despedida del señor Lodge ante los miembros del Club Americano’, *ABC* (April 5, 1961), 41. A comprehensive analysis of the role of the U.S. government in preparing for the democratization process in Spain in F. J. Rodríguez-Jiménez, L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Nicholas Cull (eds.) *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain. Selling Democracy?* (New York, NJ 2015)

<sup>73</sup> ‘Addendum to the CU Contribution for a Country Guidelines Paper on Spain’, 1963, RG59, SD, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 31, NARA; L. Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, ‘Estados Unidos, ¿soporte del franquismo o germen de la democracia?’, in L. Delgado, R. Martín, and R. Pardo (eds.) *La apertura internacional de España. Entre el franquismo y la democracia (1953-1986)* (Madrid 2016), 263-268.

<sup>74</sup> ‘USIS Country Assessment Report: Spain, 1959’, 8 December 1959, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 56, NARA.

---

<sup>75</sup> 'Annual Report on the Educational and Cultural Exchange Program for the Period July 1964-June 1965', 30 August 1966, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Historical Collection, Group XVI, Box 320, University of Arkansas Libraries.

<sup>76</sup> P. León-Aguinaga, 'US Public Diplomacy and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Spain: Approaches, Themes, and Messages', in *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain*, 100-101.

<sup>77</sup> P. León-Aguinaga, 'US Book Diplomacy in Latin America, the Castro Scare and Spanish Publishers' Paper presented at 15<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Association of Contemporary History, Córdoba, Spain, 9-11 September 2021; SIEU, 'Un pueblo en el ejercicio de su soberanía', (Madrid 1962), and 'Un gobierno del pueblo', (Madrid 1967); Max Lerner, 'La democracia en América de Tocqueville: la política, el derecho y las elites', (Madrid 1966); 7 *Días*, Instituto de Estudios Norteamericanos (I.E.N), 365, 1969 (The pages of this INAS. Barcelona newsletter are not numbered).

<sup>78</sup> P. León-Aguinaga, 'Faith in the USA. El mensaje de la diplomacia pública americana en España, 1948-1960', in *Guerra Fría y propaganda*, p. 225.

<sup>79</sup> 7 *Días*, 109, 1961; 'BNC Barcelona. Report for November 1964', 11 December 1964, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA; SIEU, 'El Presidente de los Estados Unidos', (Madrid 1963), 'El Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América: sus funciones, sus prerrogativas, su elección', (Madrid 1964), and 'El presidente habla. Discursos y mensajes de Lyndon B. Johnson', (Madrid 1965).

<sup>80</sup> 'The United States Information Agency during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1969', 1968, Administrative Histories, USIA, 1963-1969, Box 1, LBJL.

<sup>81</sup> 7 *Días*, 109, 1961.

<sup>82</sup> 'Las elecciones de noviembre. Dos puntos de vista,' *Atlántico*, 31 (November 1964), 12-30; 'Country Assessment Report' 29 January 1965, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA; *Facetas*, 1, 3 (1968), 35-45. 7 *Días*, 353 and 355, 1968.

<sup>83</sup> 'Annual Report on Educational Exchange for FY 1963', 30 August 1963, RG306, USIA, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 30, NARA; 'Annual Report on Educational Exchange for FY 1961', 6 July 1961, RG306, CU, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 30, NARA; 'Country Assessment Report', 29 January 1965, RG306, USIA, ICS, Cultural Operations Divisions, European Libraries and Centers Branch, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 95, NARA.

---

<sup>84</sup> 'Student Reaction to B52 Crash', 5 March 1966, RG59, DS, CFP, 1964-1966, Political and Defence, Box 2663, NARA; 'Notes on Harriman Conversation with Spanish Liberals', 21 December 1966, RG59, DS, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 9, NARA.

<sup>85</sup> 'From U.S: Embassy in Madrid to Department of State', 24 April 1967, RG59, CFP, 1967-1969, Political and Defence, Box 2492, NARA. Also, see D. Stiles, 'A Fusion Bomb over Andalucia: US Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 1 (2006), 49-67, and R. Moreno, *La historia secreta de las bombas de Palomares* (Barcelona 2016).

<sup>86</sup> 'US Policy Assessment', 9 May 1968, RG59, DS, CFP, 1967-1969, Political and Defence, Box 2493, NARA.

<sup>87</sup> Kostis Kornetis, 'Cuban Europe'?: Greek and Iberian tiersmondisme in the 'Long 1960s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 50, 3 (2015), 486-515.