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Awkward Alliances. Modernisation Theory and United States

Foreign Policy towards Franco's Spain in the 1960s

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Abstract. A body of literature on Cold War international history has studied the influence of modernisation theory in United States foreign relations with its authoritarian allies in the Third World during the 1950s and 1960s. However, this area of research has been much less interested in those Washington-friendly dictatorships that, as in the case of Francisco Franco's regime in Spain, do not fit into the Third World post-colonial analytical framework. This analysis assesses the contribution of modernisations theory principles to American foreign policy towards the Spanish dictatorship in the 1960s. The article studies how this theory provided the conceptual framework to justify the U.S. collaboration with the Franco regime in the name of development, security, and long-term democratisation. It examines the role of modernisation as, on one hand, an interpretative framework for Spain's economic and social evolution during that decade and, on the other, a tool of political legitimisation at the service of American strategic interests. In this way, this work sheds light on the ideological and intellectual underpinnings of the American alliance with the Franco dictatorship in a period of great challenges and transformations in Spain.

Introduction

In recent decades, a vibrant body of research has emerged focussing on the rivalry between blocs for engineering the modernisation and development of backward nations to gain their support in the Cold War. These works present East-West competition as an ideological struggle between two visions of the nature of global social change and the definition of modernity. From their perspective, the Third World's economic and social development constituted one of the chief battlefields of the bipolar conflict between the 1950s and 1970s. Throughout these decades, post-colonial regions became the arena of the contest between two opposing models of development, each aspiring to modernise the global periphery.¹

A considerable part of the bibliography on Cold War modernisation has concentrated on the history of American thought and development policy towards newly independent nations.² Within this field, a substantial literature has shown the role of modernisation theory in American relations with several authoritarian regimes in the Global South;³ however, such a strand of research has been much less interested in those Washington-allied dictatorships that, like the case of General Francisco Franco's regime in Spain, do not fit into the Third World post-colonial analytical framework.

In September 1953, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration and Franco's dictatorial regime concluded a defensive pact that began a long period of Spanish-American collaboration.⁴ This agreement allowed the Americans to establish under very advantageous conditions military bases of high strategic value on Spanish soil whilst giving Spain economic, technical, and military aid. From then on, matters of defense occupied a high priority in Washington's relations with the Franco regime.⁵ As an official American report stated in 1960, the "strong role" played by the Iberian country in America's "worldwide defensive strategy" meant the superpower's policy

towards Spain was “dictated” by “security interests”.⁶ It led the United States government to engage in cordial relations with Franco’s dictatorship, thus bringing Spain into the network of security alliances established by Washington during the 1950s and 1960s with many undemocratic regimes in the Third World.⁷

However, Franco’s Spain did not belong to that political project or the geographical space of the Third World that has attracted much historiographical attention on modernisation and American foreign interventions. By the 1960s, Spain had not suffered a recent past of European colonial domination, was not part of the non-aligned nations, and its inhabitants were predominantly White.⁸ Nevertheless, U.S foreign policy-makers felt that Spain could not be considered “a typical Western European country” either.⁹ On one hand, the U.S. State Department included the Spanish case within a wide and heterogeneous group of peripheral nations with economies, cultures and institutions classified as “under-developed”, “developing”, or “traditional” and, on the other, separated from the modern democracies surrounding it. As an official American report noted in 1959, Spain “lagged behind neighboring countries in modernizing itself”.¹⁰ A year later, the Information Service of the American Embassy at Madrid pointed out, “there is nothing in Spain’s economic backwardness compared to other European countries”.¹¹ Although Spaniards experienced remarkable economic and social modernisation throughout the 1960s, this vision remained in American analyses until after Franco’s death in 1975. Therefore, in American perceptions –despite historical, cultural, and geographical differences – Spain was grouped with Global South nations, whose relationships with Washington was mediated by the ideas and assumptions of modernisation theory. That is, this paradigm not only shaped American relations with the new Third World nations, but also with Powers that did not share the post-colonial or Afro-Asian character but were perceived in a similar way from the universalist

perspective of American modernisers and ideologues.¹²

Accordingly, it is necessary to bring Spanish-American relations into conversation with the global histories of modernisation and the Cold War, this by drawing and expanding in theoretical and empirical terms the existing research on development and America's Cold War alliance with the Franco's regime.¹³ This assessment analyses how the principles of modernisation theory contributed to articulating and rationalising American relations with Spain in the 1960s. The key resides in the role of modernisation as both an interpretative framework for Spanish social and economic development and tool of political legitimacy at the service of U.S. interests. In this way, it deepens knowledge about the ideological foundations of the American presence in Spain during a decade of great changes and transformations in the Iberian country.

First, the paper takes a theoretical approach to the modernisation paradigm, paying special attention to its contribution to the U.S. stance on issues such as a development, democracy, and authoritarian rule in the Third World. It then applies this conceptual framework to the Spanish case, focussing on the role of modernisation ideas in creating a scientific and intellectual justification for the U.S. alliance with Franco. Lastly, the article explores how the postulates of modernisation drove U.S. assistance in various economic, administration and educational reforms aimed at promoting economic growth, containing social conflict and safeguarding U.S. military bases in Spain.

Modernisation and the Cold War.

Various studies have traced the philosophical and intellectual precedents of modernisation theory through Enlightenment thought, European colonial ideology, the American doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and the liberal consensus of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.¹⁴ Nevertheless, and even bearing in mind this historical background, some scholars have convincingly argued that

the post-war version of this theory was a specific product of the interaction amongst the Cold War, decolonisation, and the rise of communism in the developing world. Three factors comprised the crucial backdrop that gave rise to modernisation as an American intellectual tool to understand and neutralise the challenge imposed by global social change and the revolutionary threat in the Third World.¹⁵

As an instrument of scientific knowledge and political control, modernisation theory prescribed how “traditional” societies should evolve towards a modernity epitomised by America’s experience as opposed to the radical promises of the communist model. The path towards progress proposed by American modernisers and social scientists put productivity and technology before ideology and class struggle as driving forces in development. Against the revolutionary and oppressive character of the Soviet model of development, modernisation offered an alternative inspired by the neutral and universally applicable nature of scientific knowledge. Drawing on the tenets of liberal internationalism and social-modernist approaches, this theory established that economic growth based on rational planning, State-led technocratic reform, and expert knowledge was the best vehicle for developing countries to catch up with First World nations without falling prey to socialism.¹⁶

During the 1960s, modernisation theory dominated social science thinking and exerted a significant influence on the American foreign policy concerning developing nations. Its principles framed Washington’s official discourse on development and intervention in post-colonial regions. In those years, modernisation went from being an academic theory to a foreign policy doctrine aimed at confronting the forces that threatened American interests in the Third World.¹⁷ The political influence obtained by modernisation theory was a result of its versatility for justifying diverse objectives – even contradictory ones – depending on United States priorities abroad. Such

malleability allowed modernisation ideas sometimes to call for the promotion of development in the name of democracy and, at others, to legitimate Washington's support of Third World dictators.¹⁸ American diplomats chose one or the other vision of modernisation, or combined elements of both, depending on their strategic objectives.

Emphasising the link between modernisation theory and United States economic, security, and strategic interests, several works have presented modernisation as an ideological device of American dominance in the Cold War.¹⁹ From this perspective, modernisation served as a political instrument, analytical model, rhetorical tool, explanatory framework, and value system in the exercise of United States global hegemony. Building on this approach, the role of ideology in American foreign relations during the Cold War is further enhanced.²⁰

An unfulfilled prophecy.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s a number of American modernisation theorists and experts gathered around the subdiscipline of political development took an optimistic view of political evolution in the Third World. These authors argued that developing nations would enter political modernity when reaching certain levels of industrialisation, urbanisation, education, and expansion of communications. Although adopting different approaches on this subject, they considered in general that transition to more sophisticated political forms and institutions similar to those of the Western democracies would follow the economic development of traditional societies. One of the main proponents of this explanation was the American sociologist and government advisor, Seymour Martin Lipset, who established a direct relationship between political development and several socioeconomic variables.²¹

This liberal-progressive vision of modernisation that linked development and democratisation impregnated American discourse in countries on the global periphery during the

1960s. Although it was a constant feature of U.S foreign policy until the end of that decade, the theoretical premise that economic development would foster political reform in postcolonial regions became particularly relevant during the John F. Kennedy administration.²² For instance, the *Foreign Assistance Act* that created the United States Agency of International Development [USAID] in 1961 called for a “historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy go hand in hand”. American programmes for development assistance deployed in the following years theoretically found basis on “prevailing thinking” that economic growth was “a sine qua non for desirable political development”. Throughout this period, the rhetorical underpinnings of the American foreign policy towards the Third World rested on the assumption that economic growth would “pave the way for the emergence of broadly based democratic political systems”.²³

Conceptually, American liberal internationalists and foreign policy-makers understood development as a force that would bring material well-being and political freedom to developing nations. However, in countries like Spain, this theoretical premise found application on the ground with significant nuances devolving from the strategic requirements of the Cold War. Indeed, United States development policy moved away from this progressive modernising prophecy as the 1960s unfolded. Whilst American discourse continued to claim the link between development and democracy, in practice this connexion either became subordinated to security interests or postponed to the remote indefinite future. As Floyd Feeney, special assistant to the USAID director, stated in a 1966 report, the United States had shown a limited interest in the political liberalisation of the poor nations. In fact, “activities through which the US could help develop effective democratic institutions in developing countries are not being undertaken”.²⁴ Under President Lyndon B. Johnson voices appeared within USAID noting that in many cases, American-

sponsored economic growth had not only failed to promote democracy, it had encouraged political developments in “authoritarian and totalitarian directions”.²⁵ Similarly, another USAID source concluded that although the “political development objective” had “a central place among overall US goals in almost every developing country”, the State Department and USAID seemed to pay more attention to anti-communist stability than to the establishment of free and open societies in the Global South.²⁶

As the optimism of the Kennedy years waned, Washington chose to promote a concept of development associated more with security than political liberalisation in backward countries. Such an approach gained ground in the American foreign policy establishment parallel to the increase in violence and insurgency in the newly emerging nations. In the course of the 1960s, socio-political chaos spread in the post-colonial regions. In June 1964, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of National Estimates pointed out that in recent years, “revolution and disorder in the southern two thirds of the world have been intensifying”. In these areas of the globe, “rising popular expectations”, “internal political strife”, and “competing ideological pressures” were creating a propitious terrain for the rise of subversive movements.²⁷ For American analysts, these emerging nations were going through an uncertain and disruptive process of modernisation that posed a serious challenge to the United States by generating social pressures and disorders exploitable by the Soviets. Walt W. Rostow, one of the leading intellectual exemplars of modernisation theory, contained that communism was a kind of disease that could befall developing societies undergoing sweeping and turbulent changes in their take off towards modernisation.²⁸

This threat led American officials to give greater weight to the counterinsurgency aspects of their foreign policy towards newly independent nations. As the 1960s progressed, the initial

liberal approach to decolonisation and development in the Third World gave way to support for authoritarian and military options.²⁹ Although American policy-makers never abandoned the rhetoric on development and democracy, preserving order rather than promoting human rights became the main objective of United States intervention in post-colonial and developing countries throughout that decade.³⁰

Simultaneously, modernisation advocates and American social scientists began conceptualising stability and security both as conditions and products of development. In light of the tumultuous post-colonial experience, several American scholars and political theorists claimed it necessary that strong authorities capable of promoting the progress of their countries under conditions of stability and closing the doors to communist opportunism lead the development of poor nations. Over the course of the 1960s, modernisation proponents increasingly began to see dictatorial governments – rebranded as modernising and developmentalist regimes – as the best guarantee to ensure the necessary social discipline to carry out development from above to block revolution from below. Although various theoretical perspectives existed, in general they considered that by fomenting modernisation within a framework of stability, the technocratic elites of anti-communist autocracies would help to put their nations on the road to democracy. American modernisers thus came to see right-wing authoritarian regimes as an effective vehicle for boosting economic growth, containing communism, and, as a result, facilitating the establishment of pluralistic systems in those countries in the long term.³¹

Numerous academic works that appeared during the first half of the 1960s expressed this benevolent view of conservative dictatorships, showing great confidence in the ability of illiberal technocratic rulers to promote orderly capitalist development.³² Generally, this literature valued the capacity of pro-American dictatorships to absorb the social pressures generated by

modernisation's take-off in countries like Spain; accordingly, during the 1960s, an emerging academic consensus developed around an authoritarian version of modernisation that conceived of anti-communist regimes as temporarily unavoidable in defense of stable development.³³ From this point of view, autocratic rulers represented the best guarantee of order and prosperity in countries, such as Spain, usually tempted by demagoguery, volatility, misrule, and radicalism. As a report prepared in 1959 by the United States Information Services on the Spanish case concluded, "the Spaniard is not capable of self-government but must be directed by strong authority".³⁴

This authoritarian approach drew on the insights of modernisation theory about the state of mind of traditional societies. In addition to its structural and economic aspects, modernisation also had a psychological dimension little explored by historians of international relations.³⁵ Although this theory took from past imperial ideologies, its main advocates tried to distance themselves from these through the replacement of Social Darwinism with psychological-, cultural-, and anthropological-type approaches. In the context of decolonisation, in which the old stereotypes of a racist nature suffered great intellectual discredit, American modernisers used a psychological approach to give a scientific lining to explanations of the weakness of under-developed peoples. According to this approach, poor nations were not genetically inferior but mentally backward. The stagnation of these societies was not due to biological reasons but to psychological traits.³⁶ From this perspective, the psychological attributes of advanced democracies differed and contrasted from those of developing societies. The former were societies guided by rationality, technology, empiricism, and consensus, the latter conceived as peoples stagnating in fatalism, irrationality, and frustration.³⁷

However, in contrast to racial and colonial theories, the psychological approach of modernisation theory claimed that the underage mentality of traditional societies was not

permanent. It was if anything a transient situation capable of being overcome. That is to say, if the problems associated with economic and political under-development had a psychological element, their solution resided in a change in mentality. American experts and advisors believed that to modernise developing countries mentality, these countries required exposure to and adoption of the capitalist values and beliefs of the Western North Atlantic world.³⁸ Thus, modernisation was not only a normative vocabulary in the hands of the American Cold warriors; it was also a cultural and psychological good for transmission to developing countries through contact and imitation of Western Powers.³⁹

The psychological profile of a traditional society.

In conceptual terms, the American discourse in Spain in the 1960s used various elements of the aforementioned liberal-modernist optimism about the political progress of developing countries. In 1961, a national security report pointed out that a “viable democracy” in Spain would appear “through gradual evolution, accompanied by improved living standards and considerable growth of the middle class”.⁴⁰ A few years later, another assessment noted economic development would contribute to expand and strengthen the social basis for evolution towards a popularly based Spanish political system.⁴¹ According to a State Department missive in 1966, United States intervention was “fundamentally based in the premise that solid economic and social growth must precede peaceful political change”.⁴² In short, American diplomatic rhetoric expressed firm faith in the capacity of development to create the conditions that would promote Spain’s political evolution. In practice, however, there was a large gap between such developmentalist rhetoric and Washington’s policy in Spain.⁴³

This dissonance between theory and practice became especially noticeable when the long-awaited economic development came to Spain in the 1960s. Since the beginning of the decade, the

country experienced an intense phase of economic growth, reaching spectacular average rates of 8.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product.⁴⁴ In just over a decade, Spain became the tenth largest economy in the world, industrialising and urbanising very quickly. An incipient mass consumer society emerged, the middle class grew, and new and modern cultural habits appeared.⁴⁵ The pace of the Spanish modernisation process accelerated so much that by 1962, American sources referred to the country as “the most developed of the underdeveloped nations”.⁴⁶

However, despite this rapid economic development, the American policy-makers thought that at the height of the 1960s, Spanish society was not yet mentally prepared to initiate a political evolution immediately. They used modernisation’s psychological approach to provide scientific and intellectual legitimacy to pre-existing visions deeply rooted in American diplomacy, which alluded to the mental immaturity of the Spanish people to achieve democracy. Through this prism, American diplomats perceived and portrayed the Spanish as a rough people attracted by conflict and devoid of a pluralistic political culture. The peaceful experience with representative institutions had constituted a “rare item” in a nation marked by the troubled succession of failed monarchies, military takeovers, dictatorships, and violent revolutions.⁴⁷

In 1963, one report remarked that the background “in the arts of social co-existence and of democratic compromise” was truly meagre in this country.⁴⁸ All this resulted from a national history characterised by “political turbulence” and “domestic discord” that had reached its peak in the “savage civil war” between 1936 and 1939.⁴⁹ Since then, the Spanish people’s contact “with the responsibilities of freedom” had been practically null. A lack of democratic experience and an inflexible character led American diplomats to think that the Spanish society was not “yet prepared for free discussion of the kind that we enjoy in the US”.⁵⁰

Echoing the vocabulary and categories of modernisation, American policy-makers

considered Spain still a “traditional closed society”. In a telling assertion in 1963, it had “long lived a national life somewhat apart from main currents of Europe and the modern world”.⁵¹ For centuries Spain had remained, according to American diplomatists, in “psychological and ideological self-sufficiency, where most institutions have lagged behind general Western evolution”. As a result, Spaniards were “inclined to strong, intolerant views infused with passion – or to apathy”. In addition, American observers emphasised that Spain was undergoing a “rapid economic and social transition” that was “breaking down decades of isolation”. Such an accelerated socio-economic evolution was intensifying the conflict between tradition and modernity, putting great pressure on the “ancient ways and values”, thus contributing to the increase in volatility of a society prone to swinging between extremes.⁵²

Taking into account Spanish psychological characteristics, American policy-makers considered the immediate implementation of any democratising experiment in the country counter-productive. The ambassador at Madrid, John D. Lodge, told Dean Rusk, the secretary of state, in March 1961 that “democracy as we know it does not seem practicable for Spain now”.⁵³ Lodge believed that in the short term, any political alternative to Franco would be very dangerous given the communist ability to exploit the conflicts and tensions within the volatile Spanish society. As he had indicated in an analysis in September 1960, “judging by Spain’s bloody experiences of the recent past [referring to the 1936-1939 Civil War] and by the present Spanish temper, attempts at this time to install democracy in Spain would run grave risks of opening Pandora’s Box with chaotic results which would give Communists a long sought-for opportunity”.⁵⁴ Seven years later, a report, “The Outlook for Spain”, still considered that any premature move in a democratic direction would harm U.S. military interests in the country.⁵⁵

Therefore, American policy-makers believed that Spanish society could not achieve

democracy until it modernised its traditional mindset. It required the Spanish people to embrace through exposure to American ideas and methods, Western attitudes consistent with development and liberal institutions. Along this line, Lodge considered that greater contact by Spanish society with the cultural, political, and economic practices of specific European democracies and the United States would weaken ancestral Hispanic extremism, paving the way for “an orderly transition after Franco toward a stable more representative form of government still friendly to the US”.⁵⁶ From this vantage point, the American task should not be to put pressure on Franco for an urgent and hasty democratisation with unforeseeable consequences. It would be better gradually and cautiously to prepare the Spanish for a freer future through exposure to “new ideas, new concepts, and new techniques from the West, especially from the U.S.”.⁵⁷

To this end, mainly through the United States Information Agency [USIA], Washington deployed various public and cultural diplomacy activities – public talks, magazines, pamphlets, book programmes, library services, exhibitions, and film screenings – to familiarise Spanish society with American values, political practices, and institutions.⁵⁸ For the U.S. State Department, the dissemination of the modern American outlook in Spain would contribute to meeting, in the end, the economic and mental conditions necessary for a future peaceful and moderate political transition to a pluralistic, Western-style government. Nevertheless, until such psychological prerequisites were in place, U.S. diplomats would continue to maintain friendly relations with the Spanish regime, a posture that in practice meant postponing the democratisation of the country to a distant and undefined post-Franco future.

Development and stability

At the beginning of the 1960s, the State Department’s main body for strategic and geopolitical analysis, the Policy Planning Council [PPC], stressed, “Spain, economically, has now very nearly reached the take-off stage”.⁵⁹ Such a reference to the concept of “take off” replicated

the famous metaphor popularised by Walt W. Rostow in his 1960 emblematic work, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* – Rostow was director of the PPC from 1961 to 1966. According to this Bible of modernising thought, “take-off” represented one of the final steps in the definitive transition from a traditional society to a modern one. In the Rostovian model, the nations at this stage became accustomed to experiencing impetuous and accelerated social change with possible destabilising effects.⁶⁰ Rostow thought that societies exposed to such transformations were “highly vulnerable” to the delusions of Marxist ideology;⁶¹ and he saw communists as the “scavengers of the modernization process” aiming to exploit abrupt social change in Third World countries.⁶² Rostow’s vision naturally passed to the PPC, which pointed out in spring 1962, “because of the structural and social upheavals which generally accompany the modernization process, all developing nations are susceptible to Communist subversion and insurgency to varying degrees”.⁶³

On a visit to Spain in autumn 1964, Rostow expressed a similar approach in a lecture given at the Institute of North American Studies in Barcelona, referring to the “impatience” of backward nations to increase their national income and welfare of their people. According to Rostow, these “vehement desires” for development could generate frustrations and social conflicts due to the obstacles and complexities of modernisation. In his opinion, communists were trying to take advantage of the frustration and confusion that accompanied the modernisation processes to sharpen social tensions, incite disorder, and take power. Their purpose, Rostow remarked, was to exploit “all the divergences, all the weaknesses, all the insecurities, that can threaten a society as it transforms and modernises”.⁶⁴

These ideas were central to the interpretative framework through which American officials observed and perceived the evolution of Spanish society and politics from the late 1950s onwards

– as mentioned above, when Spain experienced a period of spectacular economic growth, that Washington greeted with optimism. However, a notable increase in social conflict accompanied this “economic miracle”. In the labour field, the number of strikes and hours lost in industrial conflict increased significantly during the 1960s. *Comisiones Obreras*, a trade union movement mainly composed of communist and progressive Catholic militants, promoted a large number of these labour conflicts.⁶⁵ In that decade, Spanish universities also became a continuous venue of agitation against the Franco regime and its American ally. The anti-Franco student movement – led mainly by communist and New Left organisations – generated a climate of permanent revolt that altered the academic, political, and cultural life on the country’s campuses.⁶⁶ In addition, nationalist demands also emerged in some parts of Spain, especially in Catalonia and the Basque country. In the latter region at the end of the 1950s, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a terrorist, pro-independence, revolutionary, and Third World organisation, appeared; in 1973, it assassinated Franco’s right-hand man and Spain’s president, Luís Carrero Blanco.⁶⁷

These conflicts and social pressures did not go unnoticed by American observers. In October 1960, Eisenhower’s National Security Council had already detected a “pervasive political malaise in Spain, especially among the younger generations and including elements of the lower clergy”. In 1963, the PPC remarked on the “active dissent among intellectuals and youth”.⁶⁸ Shortly thereafter, American policy-makers took notice of a “growing restiveness among Spanish workers and students in favour of independent and representative organizations”.⁶⁹ At the beginning of 1970, a State Department analysis indicated that the frantic social dynamics of the previous decade had fueled the “revolution of rising expectations”, emergence of “political pressures”, and intensification of “demand for reform and social justice” in several groups in Spain.⁷⁰ Moreover, as the 1960s progressed, this increase in social unrest accompanied a growth

in anti-American sentiment in Spanish society due to the presence of American military bases, support for Franco's regime, and disinterest in fostering a democratic alternative to the dictatorship.⁷¹

Undoubtedly, in 1960s Spain, there was no threat as powerful and imminent as that projected by the spread of insurgent movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nevertheless, American policy-makers still viewed with concern the increase in Spanish mass protests resulting from rapid social change as they could generate political uncertainty that would affect Franco's succession. According to a 1963 landmark PPC report, "The Succession Problem in Spain", the clash between the social energies unleashed by hasty modernisation and authoritarian institutional structures could lead to a situation of "political instability and conflict" when Franco disappeared from the scene. From Washington's viewpoint, radical groups, communists, and leftists would likely exploit a post-Franco period dominated by instability and public disorder challenging American strategic interests in Spain.⁷²

The United States government sought to avoid this potentially threatening scenario by encouraging "healthy" economic development to neutralise possible disruptive forces and movements. The State Department thought that the promotion of an orderly development based on America's model of modernisation would foment the stability required to preserve the United States military programme in Spain. Indeed, a "Statement of U.S. policy toward Spain" indicated that one of the main objectives was to stimulate a "reasonable degree of economic stability and growth, recognizing their contribution to internal political stability . . . as a necessary concomitant to the US use of the joint-use Spanish bases and facilities".⁷³ In other words, American officials and experts deemed it essential to prevent Spain's modernisation from taking a "hazardous course".⁷⁴ They considered that U.S. diplomacy should assist in steering Spain's economic and

social development “with a minimum of social tension and human dislocation”.⁷⁵ As an official report in 1961 concluded, it was Washington’s task “to nudge the Spanish ship in the right direction”, to avoid “it being wrecked or carried away on an errant tide – such as neutralism, or extreme nationalism, possibly extending as far as Fidelism”.⁷⁶

Under the lens of modernisation, U.S. policy-makers perceived that the passage from a traditional to a modern society in Spain might undermine the stability of the existing authoritarian *status quo* on which their strategic interests rested. Under such circumstances, the Americans believed it convenient to help the Spanish government face the challenges of modernisation. To this end, they provided aid and assistance to Spain in various areas like the economy, industry, science, education, and public administration to underpin the capacity of the Francoist state to absorb the pressures caused by social change.⁷⁷ Within the Spanish regime, the main allies of this American mission were technocratic sectors linked to the Roman Catholic order, Opus Dei.

Technocratic allies.

In line with modernisation theory, American officials and experts viewed technocratic elites in illiberal states on the global periphery – usually trained in the United States or other Western countries – as the driving force for orderly change. The U.S. diplomatic establishment thought that because of their pragmatism and contact with Western knowledge, technocrats represented the most competent sector to lead the development of the traditional societies through reform from above as an antidote to Marxist revolution. Their modern mentality, anti-communist outlook, high qualifications, and preference for technical-scientific knowledge on democratic deliberation converted them – in the eyes of the American mandarins of modernisation – into a guarantee of progress and order.⁷⁸

Spanish technocratic leaders comprised a group of qualified and pragmatic experts committed to the mission of national development as an instrument to broaden the dwindling social

and political bases of Franco's dictatorship. In the agitated context of the late 1950s and 1960s, these technocratic experts sought to strengthen waning social support for the Spanish government through economic efficiency and increased per capita income. Their objective was to promote secure and stable modernisation to provide the authoritarian state with new developmentalist legitimacy. Some experts have described the technocratic project Spain as a "reactionary utopia" aimed at boosting economic growth and social depoliticisation as conditions for the perpetuation of the Franco regime as a modern illiberal state.⁷⁹ To carry out this task of autocratic re-legitimisation, the technocrats showed a clear willingness to look abroad, especially across the North Atlantic.⁸⁰

The United States began establishing relations with Spanish technocrats in the mid-1950s through channels such as the exchange programmes used to shore up the alliance with the Franco regime.⁸¹ From then on, U.S. diplomats and officials encouraged the rise of this group in Spain's political hierarchy with the aim of having key posts of the public administration occupied by effective technicians willing to modernise the country on Western models.⁸² This policy began to bear fruit in the second half of the decade.

The technocrats entered the Spanish government in 1957 with the mission of undertaking the economic and administrative modernisation of the state. Shortly afterwards, the technocratic ministers of the new executive drove, with Washington's endorsement, Spain's entrance into the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. In 1959, again with American support, they promoted the "Stabilisation Plan", which represented a sharp turnaround in the dictatorship's economic policy. From then on, the Franco regime abandoned autarchy and opted for financial discipline, liberalising, and internationalising the Spanish economy. These changes laid the foundation for the intense economic growth

experienced by Spain during the 1960s.

One of the main leaders of the Spanish technocrats was Laureano López Rodó, a professor of administrative law, who visited America in 1959 under the auspices of the United States Foreign Leader Program, a tool of exchange diplomacy aimed at attracting influential people.⁸³ At that time, López Rodó held a key position as head of the Office for Economic Co-ordination and Programming.⁸⁴ As such, he was the leading figure in an ambitious reform of the Spanish public administration that, according to American sources, would contribute to building a more modern, rational, and efficient state apparatus capable of responding to the needs of national development.⁸⁵ Hence, the United States International Cooperation Administration [ICA] assisted López Rodó's office in its efforts to modernise and rationalise the state bureaucratic machinery. American assistance here was especially significant in creating in 1960 the School for Training of Public Officials – *Escuela de Formación de Funcionarios Públicos* [EFFP] – in Alcalá de Henares near Madrid to provide a large number of the technicians responsible for implementing Spain's administrative, economic, and educational reforms produced throughout the 1960s.⁸⁶ Although the EFFP was based on various foreign models, a July 1961 American report stated that its operation was “oriented toward American public administration techniques mainly because Mr. López Rodó and other public administration leaders know the United States and United States techniques first hand”.⁸⁷

From 1962 onwards, López Rodó was in charge of directing the Social and Economic Development Plans that guided the Spanish economy until the beginning of the 1970s. Although these plans followed the logic of French-inspired indicative planning, they also drew on the approaches of American modernisation theorists. In fact, Rostow's ideas influenced the economic thinking of its director – as well as that of other prestigious technocrats and economists such as

Alberto Ullastres and Enrique Fuentes Quintana.⁸⁸ Rostow recalled during a 1964 talk given in Madrid the visits he received from López Rodó and other Spanish technocrats in the 1950s, when he was a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Given this connexion, it is not surprising that when López Rodó went to Washington in March 1962 on his first trip abroad as commissioner of the First Development Plan, he met – amongst others – with Rostow, then PPC director. A few years later, he wrote the prologue to the Spanish edition of Rostow's book, *Politics and the Stages of Growth*, published in 1971.

In addition to administrative and economic reforms, another area of co-operation between Spanish technocrats and their American allies was education. U.S. officials became interested in this field influenced by the educational ideas of a number of economists - such as Theodore Schultz, W. Arthur Lewis, Frederick H. Harbison, and Gary Becker- associated with human capital theory and modernising thinking. In the context of decolonisation and global social change, these social scientists identified education as a key to development. They regarded education as representing a valuable productive investment to train a qualified workforce that could respond to the needs of development. On one hand, these experts emphasised the central role of education and human resources in the promotion of economic growth; on the other, they conceived education as an efficient tool to disseminate to traditional societies the attitudes, methods, and modern values necessary to foster economic growth and prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas.⁸⁹

This vision led American diplomacy to pay attention to educational reform in Spain. Throughout the 1960s, Spain experienced an increasing demand for qualified workers, technicians, and scientists to meet the requirements of industrial modernisation – as well, the growing educational demands of the new middle classes emerging from development. All these pressures aggravated the acute crisis of the outdated, inefficient, and elitist educational system of the Spanish

dictatorship. The main expression of this educational crisis was the 1960s student unrest and agitation that disrupted academic life in Spanish universities. In this milieu, the American government tried to contribute to the correction of educational deficiencies and shortcomings in Spain through co-operation with two education ministers: Manuel Lora Tamayo (1962-1968) and José Luis Villar Palasí (1968-1973). These high-ranking technocrats, who had also participated in the Foreign Leader Program, played an important role in the Spanish regime's efforts to modernise its educational structures. Their offices received American economic, technical, and educational assistance aimed at alleviating structural educational conditions that could jeopardise Spain's development and stability.⁹⁰

Such co-operation culminated with the adoption of the *General Education Act – Ley General de Educación* [LGE] – in 1970, the “most important reform in the history of Spanish education in the twentieth century”.⁹¹ The LGE aimed to modernise the education system and put it at the service of economic development. In this regard, one of its main objectives was to provide the technical and professional labour required by a modern and industrial society. Consequently, the U.S. government supported this reform as it represented an instrument to promote economic development, meet the demands of the emerging middle classes and curb student protests.⁹²

American aid to educational reform in Spain provided training programmes for school administrators, university executives, and English teachers, as well as the creation of the Spanish National Service of Scientific and Technical Training. In the late 1960s, Washington encouraged aid from the World Bank and Ford Foundation to improve educational research and innovation in Spain. It also worked with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, whose international committee to advise and support the new LGE included two prominent American experts: Philip Coombs, a former assistant secretary for education and culture under

John F. Kennedy, and Cornell University president, Dexter Perkins. In short, although Spain's educational reform had assistance and advice from various international actors,⁹³ the United States "acted as the main source of foreign support, providing financing, training, experts, and material for development of the educational reform".⁹⁴ Not surprisingly, in 1969, an evaluation report on American policy in Spain highlighted that the LGE was "largely based on US models".⁹⁵

Thus, American support for educational reform in Spain was part of a more general strategy of collaboration with the technocratic elites of Franco's dictatorship. This co-operation sought to achieve several goals consistent with United States geostrategic interests in Spain. It aimed at promoting an orderly and secure development that, first, would occur on the American model of modernisation and, second, contribute to fostering stability as a fundamental requirement for preserving American military bases in Spain.

Conclusion

During the 1960s, modernisation theory played an important role in American policy towards Franco's Spain as an instrument of political legitimacy and an interpretative framework. First, U.S. officials used various ideas and concepts of this theory to explain support for the Spanish dictatorship. Drawing on a liberal vision of political modernisation, American discourse conceptualised co-operation with the Spanish regime as a lever for economic development that would lead, in an almost direct and linear way, to the democratisation of the country.

However, despite the rapid economic growth and profound social changes of the 1960s, American officials felt that Spanish society was not yet mentally prepared for a process of political evolution. Based on the psychological categories of modernisation, they thought the Spanish people unprepared to govern themselves. Their irrational, unstable, and uncontrollable character made any immediate political alternative to Franco seen with suspicion from the U.S. Embassy.

For the Americans, any pressure in terms of democratising could have unpredictable consequences in a country prone to misrule and violence. Therefore, the best option to preserve American strategic interests involved supporting the Spanish government to foster stable economic development and greater Spanish contact with modern American ideas and methods. In this way, it would be possible to create the economic, social, cultural, and mental conditions for a peaceful democratisation in the long term, a position implying the *de facto* postponement of any regime change to a distant and undefined post-Franco future.

Therefore, in practice, military and geo-strategic priorities led Washington to encourage development in Spain not as a democratising force but as a security factor. This pragmatic stance found a basis of intellectual legitimacy in the authoritarian version of modernisation elaborated by American social scientists as violence and subversion spread across postcolonial regions. According to this view, U.S. support for dictatorships like Franco's was justified insofar as it guaranteed the promotion of economic development, stability, and long-term political liberalisation in an anti-communist framework.

Second, modernisation theory provided the lens through which American foreign policy-makers interpreted the dazzling economic and social change in 1960s Spain. Influenced by the framework of modernisation, they perceived the abrupt "take off" and growing social conflict in this country as a potential danger to the preservation of U.S. military bases. To avoid this threat, Washington co-operated with the technocratic sectors of the dictatorship to promote an orderly development that would neutralise communist opportunism, underpin the stability necessary for the American military programme, and pave the way for a smooth post-authoritarian transition after Franco's demise.

This analysis shows that during the 1960s, there was a close relationship between

modernisation theory and America's Spanish policy. Possibly, for this reason, the crisis suffered by this theory after the end of the decade affected the United States credibility in Spain. Thereafter, the decline in the intellectual and political prestige of modernising thought was paralleled by a serious deterioration of the U.S. image in this country. During the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, anti-American sentiment grew amongst important sectors of Spanish society. By the time of Franco's death in 1975, many Spaniards rejected the United States as a symbol of progress, development, and freedom. They did not see the American superpower as a force for modernisation and democratisation of the country but, rather, as a pillar of the authoritarian and repressive *status quo* that was beginning to disappear. This anti-American reaction was one of the reasons why the United States subsequently played a low-key role in Spain's democratic transition in which the Western European Powers took the international leadership role.

Notes

¹ See Sara Lorenzini. *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton 2019); Corinna Unger, *International Development. A Postwar History* (London, 2018); Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms", *Diplomatic History*, 24/4(2000), 551-55; Michael Latham, "The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975", in Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn Leffler, eds; *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2010); Nick Cullather, "Development? It's History," *Diplomatic History*, 24/4(2000), 641-653.

² In the last few decades, an extensive and rich bibliography has dealt with this topic. Cf. Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, 2010); idem., "Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State", *Journal of American History*, 89/2(2002), 512-37; Nathan Citino, *Envisioning the Arab Future. Modernization in U.S.-*

Arab Relations, 1945-1967 (Cambridge, 2017); David Engerman, “Development Politics and the Cold War”, *Diplomatic History*, 41/1(2017), 1-19.

³ The following works, amongst others, serve as an example: Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns. Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (Stanford, CA, 2008); Thomas C. Field, *From Development to Dictatorship. Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era* (London, 2014); Roland Popp, “An application of modernization theory during the Cold War? The case of Pahlavi Iran”, *International History Review*, 30/1(2008), 76-98; Ben Offiler, *US Foreign Policy and the Modernization of Iran. Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah* (London, 2015).

⁴ Rapprochement between the United States and Franco’s dictatorship began in the late 1940s with the advent of the Cold War. Since then, and during the early 1950s, there were military exchanges, economic co-operation programmes, and contacts in the areas of culture and tourism. See Florentino Portero, “El régimen franquista y Estados Unidos, de enemigos a aliados”, in Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and María D. Elizalde, eds., *España y Estados Unidos en el siglo XX* (Madrid, 2005), 141-55; Boris Liedtke, *Embracing a Dictatorship. U.S. Relations with Spain, 1945-1953* (London, 1996); Rosa Pardo Sanz, “La política norteamericana”, *Ayer*, 49(2003), 13-53; Sasha D. Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain* (NY, 2006), Neal M. Rosendorf, “Be El Caudillo’s Guest: The Franco Regime’s Quest for Rehabilitation and Dollars after World War II via the Promotion of U.S. Tourism to Spain”, *Diplomatic History*, 30/3(2006), 367-407.

⁵ An extensive bibliography exists on political and military relations between the United States and Franco’s dictatorship. Cf. Charles Powell, *El amigo americano. España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia* (Barcelona, 2014); Ángel Viñas, *En las garras del águila: Los pactos*

con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945-1995) (Barcelona, 2003); Arturo Jarque, “*Queremos esas bases*”. *El acercamiento de Estados Unidos a la España de Franco* (Madrid, 1998); Fernando Termis Soto, *Renunciando a todo. El régimen franquista y los Estados Unidos desde 1945 hasta 1963* (Madrid, 2005).

⁶ “Comments on ‘Authoritarian Regimes’ Receiving U.S. Assistance (Military or Economic)”, 2 May 1960, RG 59 [Department of State Record Group, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD], Bureau of European Affairs [BEA], Country Director for Spain and Portugal 1956–66, Box 5.

⁷ Adan Garfinkle and Adam Luxenberg, “The First Friendly Tyrants”, in Adam Garfinkle and Daniel Pipes, eds; *Friendly Tyrants. An American Dilemma* (London, 1991), 23-28.

⁸ On the concept of Third World, see Robert J. McMahon, “Introduction”, in idem., ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York, 2013), 1-10.

⁹ “Justification for the Present Educational and Cultural Exchange Program in Spain”, 23 October 1965, RG 59, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, 1956-1966, Box 2.

¹⁰ “Spain: a preoccupation profile”, 11 November 1959, RG 306 [United States Information Agency [USIA] Record Group, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD] Office of Research, Classified Research Reports, Box 3.

¹¹ “USIS Country Assessment. Report for Spain, 1960”, 16 February 1961, Ibid. USIA, Office of Research, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4.

¹² Michael E. Latham, “Introduction: Modernization, International History, and the Cold War World”, in David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark Haefele and Michael Latham, eds; *Staging Growth. Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War* (Boston, 2003), 13.

¹³ See the special issue, Lorenzo Delgado Gómez Escalonilla, ed., “Modernización *made in USA* y su impacto en el ámbito iberoamericano”, *Historia y Política*, 34/2(2015), 13-179.

¹⁴ See Naoko Shibusawa, “Ideology, Culture and the Cold War”, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (Oxford, 2012), 32-49; David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (NY, 2009), 3-5; Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY, 1989), 25.

¹⁵ Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago, IL, 2006), 65-66; Mark Berger, “Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945–1975”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 34/3(2003), 422.

¹⁶ On the ideas and principles of modernisation theory, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future. Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD, 2003); Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000); Janeen Klinger, “A Sympathetic Appraisal of Cold War Modernization Theory”, *International History Review*, 39/4(2017), 691-712.

¹⁷ Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 6.

¹⁸ Nicholas Danforth, “Malleable Modernity: Rethinking the Role of Ideology in American Policy, Aid Programs, and Propaganda in Fifties’ Turkey”, *Diplomatic History*, 39/3(2014), 477-502.

¹⁹ In addition to the aforementioned works by Latham and Adas, see Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ, 1995); James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT, 1995).

²⁰ Some of the main works on ideology and Cold War international relations are John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (NY, 1997); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA, 1992); David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War”, in Leffler and Westad, *Cold War*; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005).

²¹ See Seymour M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, *American Political Science Review*, 53/1(1959), 69-105.

²² Jon Roper, “John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson”, in Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch, and Nicolas Bouchet, eds; *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion. From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* (New York, 2013), 109-111.

²³ “Political Development and US Economic Assistance”, February 1966, Bell [David Bell Papers, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, MA] Series 2.3, Agency for International Development 1963-1966, Box 23.

²⁴ “Political Development and US Economic Assistance”, “Development of Democratic Institutions”, both February 1966, both Ibid.

²⁵ “AID Political Development Efforts”, 30 May 1966. Ibid.

²⁶ “Political Development and US Economic Assistance”, February 1966, Ibid.

²⁷ “Trends in the World Situation”, 9 June 1964, LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, Austin, TX] National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 1.

²⁸ Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, 1960), 164.

²⁹ Brad Simpson, “Indonesia’s ‘Accelerated Modernization’ and the Global Discourse of Development, 1960-1975”, *Diplomatic History*, 33/3(2009), 471-72.

³⁰ See Field, *Development to Dictatorship*, 45.

³¹ Michael Latham, *Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization and US Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca, 2012), 153.

³² Henry Bienen, *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago, IL, 1971), 9-21. Amongst those works were William Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (London, 1964); Samuel Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (NY, 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago, IL, 1964).

³³ David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989* (NY, 2003), 2-3.

³⁴ “USIS Country Assessment Report: Spain, 1959”, 8 December 1959, RG 306, Information Center Service, Cultural Operations Divisions, Country Files, 1949-1945, Box 56.

³⁵ Andrew Warne, “Psychoanalyzing Iran: Kennedy's Iran Task Force and the Modernization of Orientalism, 1961–3”, *International History Review*, 35/2(2013), 414, points out “psychology was central in the formation of Modernization theory, yet we have neglected to address this as a subject of analysis”.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 396-422.

³⁷ Latham, “Modernization”, 722-31.

³⁸ Latham, “Modernization, International History”, 3.

³⁹ Joel Isaac, “The Human Sciences in Cold War America”, *Historical Journal*, 50/3(2007), 741; Nick Cullather, “Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology”, *Diplomatic History*, 28/2(2004), 227.

⁴⁰ “The Outlook for Spain and Portugal”, 26 September 1961, LBJ, National Security File-National Intelligence Estimates, Box 5.

⁴¹ “Addendum to the CU Contribution for a Country Guidelines Paper on Spain”, 1963, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs [CU], Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 31.

⁴² “Attached Letter for your signature to Ambassador Duke”, 26 July 1966, Ibid. BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966, Box 7.

⁴³ Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, “Modernizing a Friendly Tyrant: U.S. Public Diplomacy and Socio-Political Change in Francoist Spain”, in Francisco J. Rodríguez-Jiménez, Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Nicholas Cull, eds., *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain. Selling Democracy?* (New York, 2015), 63-92.

⁴⁴ Gabriel Tortella, *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1994), 280-81.

⁴⁵ The literature on socio-economic change in 1960s Spain is extensive. Nigel Townson, ed., *Spain Transformed. The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-1975* (Basingstoke, 2007) is one thorough work.

⁴⁶ “USIS Country Plan for Spain, FY 1962”, 7 March 1962, RG 306, Office of Research, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4.

⁴⁷ “The Future of US-Spanish Relations”, 8 March 1961, RG 59, Office of Western European Affairs, 1953-1962, Box 8.

⁴⁸ “Addendum to the CU Contribution for a Country Guidelines Paper on Spain”, 1963, Ibid., Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 31.

⁴⁹ “Justification for the Present Educational and Cultural Exchange Program in Spain”, 23 October 1965, *Ibid.*, Bureau of European Affairs, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966, Box 2.

⁵⁰ “The Future of US-Spanish Relations”, 8 March 1961, *Ibid.*, Office of Western European Affairs, 1953-1962, Box 8.

⁵¹ “Addendum to the CU Contribution for a Country Guidelines Paper on Spain”, 1963, RG 59, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 31.

⁵² “USIS Country Plan for Spain, FY 1962”, 7 March 1962, RG 306, Office of Research, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4.

⁵³ State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1958–1960, Western Europe*, Volume VII, Part 2, Document 335, 990-91.

⁵⁴ *FRUS, 1958-1960*, VII, 2, 778-81.

⁵⁵ “The Outlook for Spain”, 5 April 1967, LBJ National Security Files, Box 5.

⁵⁶ *FRUS, 1958-1960*, VII, 2, 778-81.

⁵⁷ “Country Assessment Report-USIS Spain 1961”, 15 February 1962, RG 306, Office of Research, Foreign Service Dispatches, 1956-1966, Box. 4.

⁵⁸ Pablo León Aguinaga, “US Public Diplomacy and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Spain: Approaches, Themes and Messages”, in Rodríguez-Jiménez, Gómez-Escalonilla, and Cull, *US Public Diplomacy*, 93-113; Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, “‘After Franco, What?’ La diplomacia pública de Estados Unidos y la preparación del post-franquismo”, in Óscar J. Martín García and Manuel Ortiz Heras, eds., *Claves internacionales en la Transición Española* (Madrid, 2010), 99-127.

⁵⁹ “The Succession Problem in Spain”, 17 July 1963, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Planning and Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1963-73, Box 16.

⁶⁰ See Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*.

⁶¹ Mark H. Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action”, in Engerman, Gilman, Haefele, and Latham, *Staging Growth*, 84-85.

⁶² Walt W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas”, *Department of State Bulletin*, 7(1961), 234-47.

⁶³ “Basic National Security Policy Planning Tasks”, 7 May 1962. JFK [John F. Kennedy Presidential Papers, Presidential Library, Boston, MA] National Security Files, Box 6.

⁶⁴ Walt W. Rostow, *Dos conferencias* (Madrid, 1964): pamphlet produced by the Information Service of the American Embassy, transcribing the two talks given by Rostow during his October 1964 visit to Spain.

⁶⁵ A number of studies highlight the high levels of labour conflict in Spain during the 1960s and 1970s. Cf. Carme Molinero and Pere Ysàs, *Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas. Clase obrera y conflictividad laboral en la España franquista* (Madrid, 1998); Xavier Doménech, *Clase obrera, antifranquismo y cambio político* (Madrid, 2008); Sebastián Balfour, *La dictadura, los trabajadores y la ciudad. El movimiento obrero en el área metropolitana de Barcelona (1939-1988)* (Valencia, 1991); Joe Foweraker, *La democracia española. Los verdaderos artífices de la democracia en España* (Madrid, 1990); José Babiano, *Emigrantes, cronómetros y huelgas. Un estudio sobre el trabajo y los trabajadores durante el franquismo (Madrid, 1951-1977)* (Madrid, 1995).

⁶⁶ On student upheaval in Spanish universities, see José María Maravall, *Dictadura y dissentimiento político. Obreros y estudiantes bajo el franquismo* (Madrid, 1978); José Álvarez Cobelas,

Envenenados de cuerpo y alma. La oposición universitaria al franquismo en Madrid, (1939-1970) (Madrid, 2004); Eduardo González Calleja, *Rebelión en las aulas. Movilización y protesta estudiantil en la España contemporánea, 1865-2008* (Madrid, 2009); Elena Hernández Sandoica, M. Ángel Ruiz Carnicer, and Marc Baldó, *Estudiantes contra Franco (1939-1975). Oposición política y movilización juvenil* (Madrid, 2007).

⁶⁷ Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, “Nuevos y viejos nacionalistas. La cuestión territorial en el tardofranquismo, 1959-1975”, *Ayer*, 68(2007), 59-61.

⁶⁸ “The Succession Problem in Spain”, 17 July 1963, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Planning and Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1963-73, Box 16.

⁶⁹ “Talking Points for Leddy-Ball Meeting”, 8 November 1965, *Ibid.*, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966, Box 2.

⁷⁰ “US Policy toward Spain”, 16 January 1970, Nixon [Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA] National Security Council Files, Institutional Files, Meeting Files (1969–1974), NSC Meetings, Box H-41.

⁷¹ Óscar J. Martín García, “‘The Most Developed of the Underdeveloped Nations’. US Foreign Policy and Student Unrest in 1960s Spain”, *International History Review*, 41/3(2019), 539-45.

⁷² “The Succession Problem in Spain”, 17 July 1963, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Planning and Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1963-73, Box 16; “USIS Country Plan for Spain, FY 1962”, 7 March 1962, RG 306, Office of Research. Foreign Service Dispatches, 1954-1965, Box 4.

⁷³ *FRUS, 1958-1960*, VII, 2, 785.

⁷⁴ “Briefing for Mr. Schlesinger”, 24 March 1961, RG 59, BEA, Country Director for Spain and Portugal. 1956-1966, Box 5.

⁷⁵ “Visit of Ambassador and Mrs. Duke to Barcelona”, 15 November 1965, *Ibid.*, Central Foreign Policy File, Education and Cultural Exchange, 1964-1966, Box 402.

⁷⁶ “The Future of US-Spanish Relations”, 8 March 1961, *Ibid.*, Lot Files-Office of Western European Affairs, 1953–1962, Spain, Box 8.

⁷⁷ On the various facets of American aid to Spain, see Adoración Álvaro Moya, “Guerra Fría y formación del capital humano durante el franquismo. Un balance sobre el programa estadounidense de ayuda técnica”, *Historia del Presente*, 17/1(2011), 13-25; Nuria Puig and Adoración Álvaro Moya, “La Guerra Fría y los empresarios españoles: la articulación de los intereses económicos de los Estados Unidos en España”, *Revista de Historia Económica*, 22/2(2004), 387-424; Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, “¿El ‘amigo americano’? España y Estados Unidos durante el franquismo”, *Studia Histórica*, 21(2003), 231-276; Rosa Pardo Sanz, “Las dictaduras ibéricas y el aliado americano en clave de modernización, 1945-1975”, *Historia y Política*, 34(2015), 147-79.

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⁷⁹ Ismael Saz, “Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos enfrentados”, *Ayer*, 68(2007), 152.

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⁸⁵ *Noticias de Actualidad* (1 November 1960), 14-15. The United States Information Service produced and distributed this magazine in Spain. Its collections can be consulted at the Miguel de Cervantes Online Library: <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/noticias-de-actualidad/>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ “Annual Report on Educational Exchange for FY 1961”, 6 July 1961, RG 59, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Country Files, 1955-66, Box 30.

⁸⁸ Antonio Cañellas Más, *Laureano López Rodó. Biografía política de un ministro de Franco (1920-2000)* (Madrid, 2011); idem., “La tecnocracia franquista: el sentido ideológico del desarrollo económico”, *Studia Histórica, Historia Contemporánea*, 24(2006), 257-88. Also see Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, “La derecha tecnocrática”, *Historia y Política*, 18(2007), 23-48.

⁸⁹ Charles Dorn and Kristen Ghodsee, “The Cold War Politicization of Literacy: Communism, UNESCO, and the World Bank”, *Diplomatic History*, 36/2(2012), 383-85; Phillip Jones and David Coleman, *The United Nations and Education: Multilateralism, Development and Globalisation* (NY, 2005), 31.

⁹⁰ See Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and Patricia de la Hoz, “US Assistance to Educational Reform in Spain: Soft Power in Exchange for Military Bases”, in Óscar J. Martín García and Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, eds; *Teaching Modernization. Spanish and Latin American Educational Reform in the Cold War* (New York, 2020).

⁹¹ Mariano González-Delgado and Tamar Groves, “Educational Transfer and Local Actors. International Intervention in Spain during the Late Franco Period”, in *Ibid.*, 118.

⁹² On the LGE, see Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Pamela O’Malley, eds., *Education Reform in Democratic Spain: International Developments in School Reform* (NY, 1995); Félix Ortega Gutierrez, “Las ideologías de la reforma educativa de 1970”, *Revista de Educación*, extraordinario (1992), 31-46; Manuel Puelles Benitez, “Tecnocracia y política en la reforma educativa de 1970”, *Ibid.*, 13-29; Leonardo Sánchez Ferrer, *Políticas de reforma universitaria en España: 1983–1993* (Madrid, 1996).

⁹³ Various works have explored the international dimension of Spanish educational reform in the late 1960s. Cf. Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and Óscar J. Martín García, “El apoyo internacional a la reforma educativa en España”, *Historia y Memoria de la Educación*, 14(2021), 177-208; Cecilia Milito Barone, and Tamar Groves, “Modernización o democratización? La construcción de un nuevo sistema educativo entre el tardofranquismo y la democracia”, *Bordón*, 65/4(2013), 135-46; Gabriela Ossenbach and Alberto Martínez Boom, “Itineraries of the Discourses on Development and Education in Spain and Latin America (circa 1950–1970)”, *Paedagogica Historica*, 47/5(2011), 679–700; Tamar Groves, *Teachers and the Struggle for Democracy in Spain, 1970-1985* (London, 2013).

⁹⁴ Delgado and de la Hoz, “US Assistance”, 118.

⁹⁵ “US Policy Assessment”, 8 October 1969. RG 59, SNF, 1967-69, Spain, Box 2493.