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Will displaced Ukrainians return home? Exploring return migration through an aspirations-capabilities lens: cases from Spain and Sweden

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Abstract
Since February 2022 many Ukrainians have been being forcibly displaced in the ongoing war. However, little is known regarding the experiences of internationally displaced Ukrainians. This article explores these experiences and unpacks their return migration aspirations, through in-depth interviews, participatory workshops, and participatory observation with Ukrainians displaced to Spain and Sweden (May-December 2023), as well as policy and context analysis. Building on the aspirations-capabilities framework, we analyse how aspirations and capabilities, combined with macro and micro-factors, shape the narratives and decision-making processes of these displaced individuals regarding a possible return. Our findings reveal the interplay between macro sociopolitical environments and micro-factors such as stigma and trauma, highlighting a strong gender dimension. We showcase the concept of "virtual return", underlining the role of digital connectivity in maintaining transnational ties and contributing to home country recovery. The study provides nuanced insights into the multifaceted nature of (return) migration and critical implications for both Ukrainian and EU migration policies.

Keywords Return, Refugees, Ukraine, War, Gender, Trauma, Policies, Aspirations-capabilities, "Virtual return"

Introduction

Russia's aggression on Ukraine triggered one of the largest forced migrations in recent history, compelling millions of Ukrainians, primarily women with children, to flee (UNHCR, 2024). Many have sought refuge in the European Union, where the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) activated in March 2022 has provided immediate assistance to over 4 million Ukrainians (Eurostat, 2024).

The expiration of the TPD in March 2026 makes it urgent to address their possible return home and raises concerns for EU and Ukrainian policymakers. Ukraine is negotiating future migration policies with the EU, and promoting its citizens' return. For

instance, Presidential Advisor Serhiy Leshchenko stated, "I believe that host countries should stop supporting refugees so that they can return home" (Tagesanzeiger, 2024).

Indeed, refugees often face pressure from national and international authorities and organisations to return to their home countries, something framed as beneficial for all parties involved (Sinatti, 2015). However, this can overlook the nuanced considerations influencing refugees' decisions, with policy dialogues concerning repatriation often sidelining their aspirations and capabilities (de Haas, 2021; Omata, 2013; Sinatti, 2015).

Some studies that explore whether Ukrainians want to return home yield puzzling results. For example, some surveys show that approximately 60% of Ukrainians abroad plan to return (CES, 2023; Sologoub, 2024). However, other studies suggest that many might choose to stay in European and other host countries (Culbertson & Szayna, 2023; Harmash, 2023). Meanwhile, an OECD report indicates that a significant portion of Ukrainian refugees remain unsure about returning (OECD, 2023). These ambiguous findings underscore the complexity of decision-making under very uncertain (post)war conditions, stressing the need for in-depth explorations to better understand potential future return.

This research aims to examine how internationally displaced Ukrainians envisage their future return migration. We focus on potential migration pathways and narratives among individuals displaced after 24 February, 2022, residing in Spain and Sweden. We conduct 35 in-depth interviews, participatory workshops and policy-context analysis, along with participatory observation. We analyse the data through the aspiration-capabilities framework lens (Carling & Collins, 2018; de Haas, 2021), and consider the desires, means and opportunities of internationally displaced Ukrainians, alongside the macro and micro-factors that shape their future mobility-immobility paths.

Our research aims to contribute to the discourse on human mobility and immobility in the following key ways. Theoretically, we contribute to an emerging body of work examining the drivers of return through applying the aspiration-capabilities framework to international mobility after forced displacement (see, for instance, (Karimi & Byelikova, 2024; Müller-Funk et al., 2023; Müller-Funk & Fransen, 2023).

Empirically, we provide in-depth insights into the experiences of internationally displaced Ukrainians, complementing large-scale surveys. Additionally, we generate new data from two underexplored EU host countries: Spain and Sweden. While the reception of Ukrainians in Poland and Germany has been widely studied (Brücker et al., 2023; Duszczyk et al., 2023; Łysienia, 2023). In this regard, existing evidence suggests that structured policies and robust refugee support systems that create a sense of future security play a crucial role in shaping Ukrainian refugees' decisions to remain in Germany (Lazarenko, 2024; Peers & Roman, 2024). In contrast, geographical and cultural proximity are primary factors influencing their settlement in Poland and the Czech Republic (Amit et al., 2024). However, this knowledge remains largely absent for Spain and Sweden, which are also important destinations for Ukrainian refugees (Eurostat, 2024). Our research addresses this critical gap by exploring how different national contexts shape the migration decision-making process of displaced Ukrainians.

Finally, understanding how internationally displaced Ukrainians perceive and navigate their potential return holds profound policy significance. Their individual perspectives have broader implications for policy formulation and humanitarian response efforts in the EU and Ukraine. As such, our study seeks to contribute to a more nuanced

understanding of the experiences and aspirations of internationally displaced populations in armed conflicts.

The article is organised as follows: we describe the theoretical framework, examining the applicability of the aspiration-capabilities framework to forced migration situations. We then detail our methodology. The results Sects. ("Setting the stage: context and policies" and "Examining the interplay of aspirations and capabilities, macro and micro-factors, through participants' experiences"), firstly describe macro-factors affecting aspirations-capabilities, referred to as "setting the stage". They then delve into the aspirations, capabilities, and macro and micro-factors experienced by displaced Ukrainians in Spain and Sweden. The discussion section analyses our findings through the lens of the aspirations-capabilities framework, and further explores the concept of "virtual return" (a concept coined by the participants to describe returning home digitally while physically staying in the host country), and develops initial implications for migration policy in Ukraine and the EU. We conclude with a summary of our findings and their broader significance.

Analytical framework: forced displacement and the aspirations-capabilities framework

The aspirations/ability model explored why people migrate, using the explanations for mobility expressed by migrants or prospective migrants themselves (Carling & Collins, 2018; Carling & Schewel, 2018). The model was proposed in a seminal paper exploring involuntary (im)mobility (Carling, 2002). Aspirations are defined as "a conviction that migration is preferable to non-migration", and the model examines how aspirations are formed by individual-level characteristics and the "emigration environment" (Carling & Schewel, 2018, p. 946). The emigration environment encompasses the social, economic and political contexts that produce the "social constructions of migration" (Carling & Schewel, 2018, p. 946). The model also analyses how potential migrants' actual ability to migrate is influenced by the "immigration interface" interacting with individual-level characteristics. The immigration interface reflects the macro-level context of barriers and opportunities, including resources such as the necessary finances, social networks, and legal opportunities to migrate. The aspirations/ability model is often applied as a two-step process: first, an understanding is constructed regarding migration as a potential action, and second, the processes leading to the (in)ability to make it happen are analysed. The model offers a nuanced understanding of migration by highlighting the interplay between the desire to move, the ability to move, and the reasons for staying, providing a comprehensive framework for studying migration dynamics.

Later, de Haas, drawing on Carling's aspiration-ability model and Amartya Sen's capability approach, proposed an aspirations-capabilities framework (de Haas, 2014; Haas, 2021). This takes a similar stance to Carling's vision of aspirations, often related to people's preferences and notions of a "good life" (de Haas, 2021). However, in terms of theory, de Haas conceptualises capabilities further, to encompass not just the means to migrate, but broader freedoms and opportunities that allow people to achieve their goals, whether through migration or other life choices. Therefore, migration is seen as a function of people's capabilities to realise their aspirations, influenced by structural conditions such as development levels, human rights, and governance. The aspirations-capabilities framework highlights the understanding of migration as part of wider processes

of social change resulting from the interrelationship between agency and structure (de Haas, 2021).

Thus, in parallel to the aspirations/ability model, individual migration capabilities and aspirations are shaped in their interaction with macro-structural factors. However, these macro-structural conditions are much broader and can be conceptualised as positive and negative freedoms, incorporating the role of states and policies in migration, and shaping the absence of obstacles to mobility and a person's sense of self-realisation through migration (de Haas, 2021, 24–25). In the framework, perceived geographical opportunity structures also affect mobility (de Haas, 2021, p. 25).

Both aspirations-ability models and aspirations-capabilities frameworks integrate the psychological and subjective dimensions of migration dynamics, which are also embedded in people's contexts and situations (Carling & Schewel, 2018; de Haas, 2021). At the same time, they are both key in articulating human mobility and immobility in migration studies.

The latter articulation is key when understanding mobility in cases of forced displacement. We understand mobility as "people's capability (freedom) to choose where to live, including the option to stay" (de Haas, 2021, p. 22). A subject's migration possibilities (migration aspirations) can result in involuntary mobility such as in the case of refugees and internationally displaced people, a category not originally included in Schewel and Carling's original work (de Haas, 2021; Müller-Funk et al., 2023). Migration is in this case primarily driven by imminent danger at home rather than the attraction of opportunities abroad. While opportunities abroad do influence decisions about the specifics of their migration – such as how, when, and where to move – and individuals strive to exercise their agency, these opportunities are not their main motivation. Consequently, refugees are considered forced migrants because they cannot safely remain in their home country (de Haas, 2021, p. 21).

Despite their contributions to the theoretical understanding of (im)mobility, aspirations approaches have not sufficiently explored forced displacement due to violent conflict, persecution, natural or human-made disasters and expulsive migration regimes (Müller-Funk et al., 2023). However, more recently, adaptations have expanded the applicability of aspirations-capabilities frameworks to understand returning (or not) in contexts such as those of Syrian refugees and displaced Ukrainians in Canada and Germany (see, for instance, Müller-Funk et al., 2023; Müller-Funk & Fransen, 2023; Karimi & Byelikova, 2024).

The studies underline the importance of broader life goals in shaping aspirations to return, as well as return capabilities being influenced by socioeconomic stratifications (Müller-Funk & Fransen, 2023). Karimi and Byelikova (2024) underline pre-war aspirations and the sociocultural capital of displaced Ukrainians as pathways leading to Canada, Germany, and other EU countries. They also identify being a young man as shaping aspirations to migrate and the capability to do so, given war-time exit restrictions, and also recognise the importance of gender norms and stigma among Ukrainian men who left the country (Karimi & Byelikova, 2024).

Work by Müller-Funk et al. highlights psychological factors in understanding the relationship between aspirations and capabilities in forced displacement (Müller-Funk et al., 2023). Prominently, citing Boccagni and Kivisto (Boccagni & Kivisto, 2019), they stress the ambivalence of staying and moving in displacement contexts, as these are

not mutually exclusive and can be co-present in an individual's experience. Moreover, migration might be perceived by displaced people not as investment or freedom, but as loss and restriction. Regarding the conceptualisation of aspirations and capabilities, the authors highlight how contexts of displacement may impede a safe return and diminish political freedom (Müller-Funk et al., 2023). Recent works show that positive life aspirations and imaginings of the future can be crucial coping and healing mechanisms for psychological problems caused by trauma and stress (Müller-Funk et al., 2023). In this regard, more work is needed to theoretically and empirically incorporate an understanding of trauma and stigma within aspirations-capabilities frameworks.

Another area requiring further development is the incorporation of transnational perspectives in the aspirations-capabilities dynamics in contexts of forced displacement. We broadly understand transnationalism here as "occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation" (Portes et al., 1999, p. 219). The approaches of transnationalism towards migration move away from a binary comprehension of the phenomenon whereby migrants are either seen as immigrants or emigrants (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002, p. 14). Therefore, by questioning dichotomies such as origin/destination, or categories such as 'permanent', 'temporary' or 'return', transnationalism has challenged assimilationist approaches to integrating immigrants, 'as well as the modernist political construct of the nation-state and citizenship' (de Haas, 2010, p. 247). Civic and political migrant transnationalism, covering both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation in civic and political realms, has long made important contributions regarding migrant practices aiming at the development of people's countries of origin (Goldring, 2002; Itzigsohn & Villacrés, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Within transnational frameworks, social remittances—the transfer of ideas, values, and social capital (Levitt, 1998)—are key mechanisms that link diaspora engagement with social change, influencing norms, practices, and development outcomes in origin countries. Similarly, the moral economy of migration, which emphasizes shared norms of reciprocity, solidarity, and collective obligations have also been explored in voluntary and involuntary mobility processes (Kleist, 2017; Ciubrinskas, 2023), operates within transnational networks, guiding decisions about remittances, return, and community support. Together, these perspectives demonstrate how transnational exchanges of knowledge, values, and collective obligations shape migrants' aspirations and capabilities for return. These transnational practices, the so-called "transnational turn" in migration, influences aspirations-capabilities approaches (Carling & Collins, 2018). However, more work is needed to understand transnational practices, forced displacement, and return.

Building on contributions made to the aspirations-capabilities framework (de Haas, 2021; Carling & Schewel, 2018; Müller-Funk et al., 2023), we examine how internationally displaced Ukrainians envisage return migration by exploring the interplay of macro-factors and micro-factors (Fig. 1). Macro-factors are conditions shaping the opportunity structures affecting the mobility of displaced people, which can include sociopolitical, economic, cultural and security-related dimensions. In the analysis, they are identified on the one hand in the contexts of residence of displaced Ukrainians and in Ukraine, and are operationalised as policies regarding mobility and international protection, the sociocultural environment, Ukrainian settlement before February 2022 and actual access to basic services. On the other hand they are operationalised as the policies and



Fig. 1 Analytical framework (based on de Haas, 2021; Carling & Schewel, 2018; Müller-Funk et al., 2023)

sociocultural environment of a country at war in relation to its internationally displaced citizens. Micro-factors refer to individual characteristics and norms linked to individual characteristics affecting subjective experiences (such as gender expectations); they also include psychological factors, including coping mechanisms, resilience, and mental health conditions affecting aspirations and decision-making processes related to migration (Müller-Funk et al., 2023). In our analysis, macro-factors are first explored descriptively, then subsequently examined in the interplay of aspirations and capabilities. Micro-factors emerge when analysing each individual's capabilities. It is worth mentioning here that although aspirations and capabilities are theoretically independent, empirically the boundaries between them are blurred: a consequence of the mutual constitution of agency and structure (de Haas, 2021).

Methodological framework

This research adopts a comparative perspective by examining the future (return) migration outlook of internationally displaced Ukrainians in Sweden and Spain after 24 February, 2022, using a multi-method qualitative approach including policy and context analysis, workshops, interviews, and participatory observation.

Firstly, a comprehensive policy and context analysis was conducted, exploring macro-level factors in Ukraine, Spain, and Sweden. This involved reviewing policy documents, scholarly literature, and media sources to understand the sociopolitical, economic, and environmental contexts affecting displaced Ukrainians. Special attention was given to policy frameworks, institutional arrangements, and sociocultural dynamics, providing critical contextual insights for interpreting participants' experiences. The time period for data collection covered February 2022-May 2024.

Participatory workshops were conducted in May 2023 in Valencia, Spain, and August 2023 in Stockholm, Sweden, involving 35 displaced Ukrainians (20 in Spain and 15 in Sweden (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Annex)). These workshops encouraged dialogue on future migration aspirations, using brainstorming sessions and group discussions. A visual scale-based approach (see Fig. 2) facilitated discussions on factors influencing



Fig. 2 A visual scale-based tool used in the workshops.
(Source: Authors)

participants' decisions to return or to stay. Results were documented through audio recordings, written notes, and visual materials, enabling detailed analysis and synthesis.

In addition to the workshops, the research used semi-structured interviews with the same 35 displaced Ukrainians, conducted between May and December 2023. These interviews, incorporating in-depth biographical elements (Fedyuk & Zentai, 2018), aimed to explore participants' experiences and migration aspirations. Using an interview guide with open-ended questions, we focused on the complexities of their decision to return to Ukraine or to stay. Interviews were conducted face-to-face or via video call in the participants' native language and lasted 30 min to 1.5 h. Detailed field notes and transcriptions enabled thorough data analysis.

Complementing these interviews, participatory observations immersed researchers in participants' daily lives, capturing non-verbal cues and group interactions during the whole research process. Throughout the research, reflections and emerging themes were documented in a reflexive field diary, and later triangulated with other qualitative data sources for a nuanced understanding.

Participants were recruited via online platforms, community organisations, and personal networks, emphasising inclusivity and confidentiality, and targeting individuals displaced from Ukraine after the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion. In Spain, the group comprised 20 participants (18 female, 2 male), aged 19 to 68, with an average age of 40. Most had degrees, two had doctorates. Participants hailed from various Ukrainian regions; most were married with children, although some were divorced or separated. Employment varied from full-time positions and remote work to informal jobs and further education. Housing ranged from renting to staying with relatives or in support programme facilities; economic status before the war varied from low to high.

In Sweden, there were 15 participants (13 female, 2 male), in their 20s to their 60s, most in their late 30s to early 40s. They also had diverse educational backgrounds, primarily holding bachelor's or master's degrees. Participants came from various Ukrainian regions, and most were married with children. Employment ranged from full-time and part-time work to unemployment and further education, with some engaged in remote work. Housing arrangements were more stable, facilitated by Swedish municipalities or rental agreements. Participants' economic status ranged from low to high, with many in the middle.

It is important to highlight that the research has a critical autoethnographic approach, in that one of the researchers "is a complete member in the social world under study" (Anderson, 2006, p. 379): our research team includes a Ukrainian researcher, personally affected by the 2022 Russian invasion, who has provided keen insights into the experiences of displaced Ukrainians. Her participation facilitated trust and rapport with participants and an accurate understanding of them (Anderson, 2006; Carling et al., 2014). Alongside her, a non-Ukrainian researcher maintained an "outsider" perspective, ensuring analytical distance to describe and interpret the results. Throughout the research, the team engaged in ongoing discussions about their perspectives and biases. In addition, the team employed strategies such as data triangulation to mitigate bias, and prioritised

transparency and participant feedback to ensure rigorous and ethical research practices. This approach helped address the challenges of finding a critical balance between participation and observation, while also mitigating the potential insider and outsider divide in the article.

Setting the stage: context and policies

Context in Ukraine

In response to mass migration and the projected demographic crisis due to the full-scale Russian invasion (Kulu et al., 2023), the Ukrainian government took several measures. This research highlights key initiatives. First, the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War was established under Presidential Decree No. 266/2022. The National Council launched 24 working groups to develop a comprehensive post-war recovery and development plan. Notably, Working Group No. 5 focuses on supporting the return of citizens temporarily displaced abroad and facilitating their reintegration into Ukraine's socioeconomic life (CabMin, 2022).

Second, return efforts are integrated into Ukraine's broader migration policy. The State Migration Policy Strategy of Ukraine promotes the return of displaced Ukrainians, fosters social and cultural ties with the diaspora, and encourages cooperation with international partners on migration management (UkrInform, 2024).

Third, the Ministry of Social Policies presented a demographic development strategy for up to 2040 (MinSoc, 2024), where emphasis is now placed on motivating the return of Ukrainians, highlighting patriotism and cultural ties.

Fourth, the Ukrainian government has implemented measures to regulate the movement of draft-age men. Amid the ongoing Russian invasion, Ukraine has lowered the conscription age from 27 to 25 (GovUA, 2024) and is considering further reducing it to 18, partly due to discussions influenced by international partners, to address manpower shortages (Reuters, 2024).

In 2024, Ukraine suspended consular services for male citizens aged 18 to 60 living abroad, later resuming them with the condition that applicants present military registration documents (GovUA, 2024). Additionally, the government has restricted the issuance of new passports to some draft-age men abroad (GovUA, 2024).

In Germany, the Ukrainian government has launched initiatives to facilitate the return of refugees, such as establishing "Unity Hubs" in cities like Berlin. These centers assist Ukrainian refugees with job placement, housing, and educational opportunities back home. The initiative underscores Ukraine's need for skilled labor in critical sectors, including defense production, energy, and reconstruction. Returnees with specific professional qualifications may also be exempted from military service, reflecting the strategic value of their return (Welt, 2024).

Overall, these measures illustrate the government's dual approach: restricting the movement of draft-age men while actively promoting the return of displaced citizens to support Ukraine's recovery and labor needs.

Context in the EU: Spain and Sweden

The European Union responded to the crisis swiftly with the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), granting Ukrainian residents entry into the EU and extensive rights (Guild & Groenendijk, 2023). Spain has become a key destination: in April 2024 it hosted



Fig. 3 Number of Ukrainians hosted under TPD in Spain and Sweden. Source: Data Eurostat (March, 2025)

nearly 200,000 displaced Ukrainians (Eurostat, 2024; La Moncloa, 2023), making it the fourth-largest host in Europe, and by far the largest in Southern Europe (ELCANO, 2023). Sweden has welcomed approximately 35,000 displaced individuals (Eurostat, 2024), positioning it as a major destination in Northern Europe, although with numbers declining over time (see Fig. 3).

While both Spain and Sweden offer temporary protection to Ukrainians under the TPD, their strategies differ. The differences reflect their sociodemographic, economic, and political and policy pathways. Spain employs a decentralised approach, with regional and local governments playing a significant role in providing support to newly arrived Ukrainians, and outsourcing the management of reception centres and support services to NGOs such as the Red Cross and CEAR, ensuring flexibility and local adaptation (MinInc, 2024). In contrast, Sweden's system is centralised, with the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) directly overseeing most of the process, from initial reception to long-term integration, ensuring a uniform and standardised service (Migrationsverket, 2024).

In addition to structural differences, a key distinction lies in how newcomers acquire essential documents. In Sweden, obtaining a Swedish Personal Number is not possible for people under TPDs (Migrationsverket, 2024). This poses a challenge for Ukrainians, hindering their access to vital government services (Petition, 2024). This bureaucratic obstacle complicates everyday tasks such as opening bank accounts or enrolling in Swedish language courses. In contrast, acquiring the necessary documents (principally the Foreign Citizens' Identification Number) is comparatively more straightforward for Ukrainians in Spain, ensuring access to essential services for displaced people (UNHCR Spain, 2024).

Economic support for Ukrainians under temporary protection reveals disparities between Sweden and Spain. Sweden provides a monthly allowance of up to 189€, whereas Spain offers 400€ (MinInc, 2024; Migrationsverket, 2024). However, both are heavily criticised. Spain's support has drawn criticism for delays and bureaucratic hurdles and its discontinuation since September 2023 (EuroNews, 2024). Similarly, Sweden's support system has faced criticism for not meeting basic living expenses in Sweden (UNHCR, 2023).

Housing arrangements also differ significantly. Sweden has established a coordinated system with municipalities to provide accommodation for Ukrainians, ensuring a more

structured approach throughout municipalities (Migrationsverket, 2024). In Spain, limited support is available through organisations like the Red Cross, as a part of the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migrations' reception and integration programme, which provides accommodation and assistance to asylum seekers with insufficient financial resources (UNHCR Spain, 2024). The majority of displaced Ukrainians in Spain must, however, navigate finding accommodation independently, which can be challenging without a Spanish work contract and speaking Spanish.

Language and support courses vary between the two countries. SFI (Swedish for Immigrants) courses, crucial for integration and employment, are open to all foreigners with a Swedish Personal Number, but not available for Ukrainians in Sweden (Migrationsverket, 2024). Spain lacks Sweden's centralised language programmes for foreigners, which are in part offered by regional and local actors. However, some support is available for the participants in the Ministry of Inclusion programme run by NGOs (UNHCR Spain, 2024). Thus, in both countries, language acquisition and socioeconomic integration for displaced individuals are severely limited.

Regarding health service access, Sweden and Spain also vary significantly. Sweden offers Ukrainians under temporary protection only emergency health services (Migrationsverket, 2024). In contrast, individuals from Ukraine residing in Spain, regardless of their administrative status, can access medical care on par with Spanish nationals (MinInc, 2024). In terms of education, both countries provide schooling to Ukrainian children that is similar to what is available to residents, thus ensuring continuity in education for displaced children, as highlighted by Migrationsverket (2024) and MinInc (2024).

In summary, while both Sweden and Spain extend temporary protection to displaced Ukrainians under the TPD, their approaches diverge across administrative procedures, economic support, housing arrangements, language and skills courses, healthcare provisions, employment opportunities, and so on.

The next section shows how these different contexts are experienced by internationally displaced Ukrainians in Sweden and Spain.

Examining the interplay of aspirations and capabilities, macro and micro-factors, through participants' experiences

Mobility aspirations: going home or staying?

Our discussions with participants were mainly focused on return migration; however, many also talked about their initial relocations to Spain and Sweden. Participants cited various reasons for choosing Spain, including personal connections, familiarity from previous visits, or an affinity for the country's culture and climate. As one participant noted,

"I always dreamed of living here; I love the culture and the weather"(ES#5).

In contrast, migration to Sweden was often more circumstantial. Several participants admitted to having limited knowledge of Sweden before their arrival, making the decision based on immediate opportunities, such as transportation availability at border crossings or acquaintances' recommendations. Others were drawn by Sweden's reputation for offering extensive support to refugees.

While talking about return, many participants from both the Swedish and Spanish groups aspire to return home, driven by emotional and cultural ties, familiarity with

their homeland, and a desire to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction. As a participant from Sweden (SWE#4) noted, "Of course I want to go home, because it is my home." Migration aspirations are often linked to socioeconomic status. Career aspirations, potential income, and access to better private services influence return. A participant from Spain (ES#10) remarked, "Here I can have an okay life, let's say picking strawberries or doing some simple work. But in Ukraine, I can make a difference. I can start my own company or work in the government… If you have ambition, you go back. If you want an okay life, you stay here." According to our observation notes, the emotion Ukranians in Sweden and Spain felt regarding returning home cannot be captured by "words alone": "It resembled an expression of sadness and nostalgia, one that was universally felt by nearly all participants in the study, as reflected in their facial expressions."

In both Spain and Sweden, the desire to remain in the host country is closely tied to the pursuit of a "good life," which participants define in ways that reflect the unique cultural context of each nation. In Sweden, this aspiration is rooted in a high level of trust in institutions, a strong justice system, and society's commitment to the rule of law, environmental protection, and gender equality:

> *"There are children's parks here in Stockholm, with small shops offering sweets, coffee, and other items. There's no one overseeing whether you pay or not; you simply place your cash in the box or pay by card and take what you need. And people do it. For me, this reflects respect and trust in society, a value I want for my children as they grow up." (SWE#8).*

Participants view these elements as essential to providing their children with stability and a "good life" in a place where individuals can thrive in a well-functioning, fair and equitable society. This is an interpretation supported in our observation notes:

> *"… even after one year, Ukrainians in Sweden had already adopted many local ways of doing things, or perhaps they were drawn to Sweden precisely because of these values. All participants arrived on time for our sessions, with some even arriving early. During discussions, the atmosphere in the room was calm, and everyone patiently waited their turn to share their thoughts… During several Ukrainian protests in Stockholm people often quietly walked in the march through the streets… In informal conversations, many participants commented on how much they appreciated the calm, peaceful, and orderly nature of Swedish society." Observation notes.*

In contrast, participants in Spain describe the "good life" in terms of a more relaxed and culturally rich lifestyle. The vibrant social scene, along with the emphasis on leisure and enjoying the simple pleasures of life, such as "enjoying a cup of coffee on a sunny day even with very little money in your pocket" (ES#8), is highly valued. Here, the "good life" is associated with contentment, fulfilment, and a sense of community, leading to a balanced everyday life:

> *"Participants arrived late. The discussions were lively, with a high level of energy and frequent laughter… During the protests I attended, participants were actively singing songs and chanting loudly throughout the march. Many participants mentioned, in informal conversations, that one aspect they particularly appreciated about life in Spain was the sense of joy it brought." Observation notes.*

An emerging theme observed in our study is the aspiration for a "virtual return", a term coined by the Spanish group and referred to as "online life" in the Swedish group. This concept describes the inclination of individuals to remain in their host countries while actively contributing to life in Ukraine from a distance, primarily through digital channels. Participants expressed sentiments such as "I really cannot return with kids to Kharkiv. We lost everything there. Even if the war were over, I would be worried about mines. I would be constantly worried about my kids. But I want to be part of Ukraine. I want my kids to study in a Ukrainian school. I want to be a part of the reconstruction. I kind of want to be there and here…" (ES#2).

Moreover, many individuals expressed complex mobility aspirations, grappling with choosing between returning home, staying in the host country, opting for a virtual return, or even moving to another country. This reflects the diverse and nuanced perspectives among displaced Ukrainians in Spain and Sweden.

Capabilities and macro-factors

Even though a majority of the participants aspire to return home, and while many express the capability to do so, the realisation of this capability hinges upon several critical factors. Here we consider participants' expressions of capability that are linked to macro-factors (countries' social and policy environments). The first, highly distressing, aspect to consider is that there is an ongoing devastating armed conflict in Ukraine, leading to safety and livelihood concerns under wartime or postwar conditions to shape capabilities to fulfil aspirations. One participant from Spain (ES#1) noted: "Will the mines be cleared? Will it be safe for my kids? Will I be able to find a job?". Another macro-factor mentioned by participants is their perception of the Ukrainian government not helping facilitate their return enough. A participant from Sweden remarked: "They say they want us back, but will they be able to provide housing, secure jobs, or schools for my child amidst the ruins…?" (SWE#4).

Conversely, the ability of Ukrainians in Sweden and Spain to remain in their host country depends on various structural aspects, particularly legal frameworks governing settlement and residency. Administrative barriers, such as the absence of recognised documentation in Sweden, pose significant challenges. These issues hinder access to rights and services, impacting integration and long-term settlement prospects. One participant explained (SWE#14):

> *"If I could pinpoint one thing that makes my life so challenging here, it would be the Personnummer (Swedish Personal Number). Unlike in other countries where national identity numbers serve specific purposes like taxes, personal numbers in Sweden are crucial for virtually every aspect of daily life. For instance, banks require a Personnummer and a job contract to open an account, but to get a job, you need a Personnummer and a bank account. It's a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation." (SWE#14).*

Moreover, economic support in both countries is perceived as inadequate, leaving displaced people doubting their capabilities to stay in host countries. In Spain, many Ukrainians have precarious jobs without contracts in low-paid sectors. One participant (ES#16) noted, "I work as a nanny one day a week, clean apartments two days a week, and wash dishes on Fridays." In Sweden, the stringent regulatory environment and

limited economic support filter out those without specialised skills, pushing vulnerable individuals to other countries in Europe or back to Ukraine: "If you cannot find a good job here, you just have to leave" was a comment made in the Swedish group (SWE#11). Housing presents a significant challenge for those in Spain, with governmental integration programmes outsourced to organisations like the Red Cross, and giving insufficient support. The participants in Sweden recognised the good but limited municipal housing assistance.

Linguistic proficiency emerges as a critical capability for staying in one of the host countries. However, participants highlighted disparities in access to Swedish language courses; these are available to other refugees, but not to Ukrainians (who lack the necessary personal identification numbers). This places them in a limbo regarding access to linguistic services. Cultural barriers further complicate language acquisition, as initiating conversations with Swedes on the street can be challenging due to cultural norms. In contrast, participants from the Spanish group reported learning the language through street interactions: "I do not attend classes, but I can already speak some Spanish. Everyone talks with me here, and it is easy to learn" (ES#18).

While talking about macro-factors and capabilities for "returning virtually", participants highlighted the importance of digital infrastructures. They mentioned digital tools such as state service apps, online education platforms, Zoom, and digital remittance services as crucial for enabling "virtual return" among displaced individuals. These technologies facilitate ongoing connections with the homeland, supporting financial and social contributions. Participants described daily Zoom calls with their spouses and partners, shared activities and discussions among work colleagues in Ukraine, and their children attending classes online.

Participants also emphasised the pivotal role of digital tools such as Zoom and online educational platforms in preserving their connections with Ukraine and enabling them to take back home, for example, new gender perspectives that they had encountered in Sweden. One respondent stated "my child is studying in a Swedish school and also online in a Ukrainian school. One day she came home from the Swedish school and started saying that she was shocked that girls had not been able to vote before… and every day she would bring more and more stories with a gender angle. Another day I had a call with the teacher from the Ukrainian school and she was very impressed with the new gender perspectives my girl brings to the online Ukrainian school" (SWE#3).

Some even mentioned managing a business in Ukraine remotely, while navigating regulatory challenges with digital solutions to start a new venture in Spain. Participants also noted how digital platforms foster political engagement, with many joining webinars and online discussions to stay informed about developments in Ukraine.

However, participants highlighted the need to navigate bureaucratic barriers, such as tax regulations, in both their host and home countries, to enable "virtual return." They emphasised the empowering potential of these digital tools to bridge geographical divides and foster meaningful participation in socioeconomic and political life in the homeland.

Capabilities and micro-factors

Regarding displaced Ukrainians' capabilities and micro-factors influencing their migration decisions, the analysis shows the intersection of psychological factors and inequality

axes such as gender, age or education influencing war-displaced people's capability of returning or staying. Hence, a clear gender dynamic is visible. Male participants often feel societal pressure to fulfil traditional roles as protectors and warriors, influencing their considerations for returning to Ukraine. Many who left faced social stigmas, labelled as "betrayers for leaving the battlefield and seeking refuge abroad" (ES#19), which limited their capacity to repatriate effectively. In contrast, women's decisions are primarily influenced by caregiving responsibilities. They face their own form of stigmatisation, particularly when bringing their children back to Ukraine for brief visits. Locals often accuse them of endangering their children's safety and "taking Ukraine's future out of the country" (ES#10). Many women prioritise the safety of their loved ones, often at the expense of their own aspirations to return. In the case of mothers who have their children with them, their choice to remain in the host country reflects a desire to provide stability and support for their children. These societal perceptions add layers of complexity to women's migration decisions and contribute to their reluctance to return.

Trauma brought by war and the accompanying culture of violence also emerges as a significant barrier to returning. As one participant from Sweden (SWE#2) expressed, "I am afraid that we are all so traumatised. Ukrainian society is traumatised and angry. There will be serious problems with mental health. And there will be weapons. This is not the environment I want my kids to grow up in."

Our research finds that capabilities of staying in the host country, societal pressures, caregiving responsibilities, and trauma significantly impact the prospects of displaced Ukrainians. In this regard, gender dynamics are also very visible in our findings. Men, burdened by societal and self-exerted pressure and feelings of guilt for leaving their country, often suffer depression, hindering their ability to integrate into their host communities. Women face challenges to integration due to the overwhelming emotional and physical burden of single-handedly caring for their children. One participant from Sweden (SWE#12) noted, "People want to see us smiling and being grateful for shelter. And the only thing I want to do is to scream or cry… I have two girls to dress and feed every day. The show must go on. So, I continue, but it is difficult to find friends, a job, or integrate. In general, no one likes grumpy and sad people." The psychological scars from war and displacement, something echoed by both men and women, severely hindered Ukrainians' ability to adapt and integrate.

Regarding capabilities for "virtual return", the participatory workshop and interviews highlighted the pivotal role of digital literacy, often age-related, in facilitating virtual return among displaced Ukrainians. Thus, on the one hand, participants emphasised that proficiency in using online resources empowers them to maintain connections with their homeland and contribute to its development from a distance. On the other hand, they also emphasised the need for improved training and access to resources to enhance digital literacy among displaced Ukrainians. A participant from the Spanish group (ES#20) commented: "My mother does not really know how to use all those digital tools. I am helping her. But what about other women of her age that are without their families here?".

Discussion of the results and policy implications

Making sense of the relationship between aspirations, capabilities, macro-factors and micro-factors

This study is an empirical account of the interplay between aspirations, capabilities, and both macro and micro-factors shaping the migration outlook of displaced Ukrainians in Spain and Sweden. This work uses an aspirations-capabilities analysis to question simplistic policy and institutional narratives that celebrate return as the preferred solution for both forced displaced people and their host and home countries (Bradley, 2023; Sinatti, 2015). The research shows that while many of the displaced Ukrainians participating did aspire to return, others wished to remain in the host countries, and many envisioned a "virtual return" or aspired to move to another country. Moreover, some individuals in our sample felt ambivalent aspirations. This all highlights the diversity of return intentions among displaced populations (Eastmond, 2006; Müller-Funk et al., 2023).

In our results, aspirations for future mobility or immobility are based on participants' perceptions of a "good life". The concept of the "good life" includes desires such as contributing to homeland reconstruction, living under robust rule-of-law institutions such as those in Sweden, or embracing a more relaxed lifestyle, as seen in Spain. In this sense, we have shown that displaced individuals are not mere passive recipients of involuntary mobility nor people "being 'pulled' and 'pushed' like atoms by somewhat abstract (…) causal forces", but active agents pursuing their aspirations for a "good life" (de Haas, 2021, p. 30).

This idea also goes in line with other case studies from Poland or Germany. Some Ukrainians prioritize cultural familiarity and existing networks, guiding them to stay in Poland and the Czech Republic (Amit et al., 2024). Germany, in contrast, offers structured integration and economic security, attracting those looking for this type of "good life" (Lazarenko, 2024; Peers & Roman, 2024).

Moreover, the research illustrates many displaced individuals envisioning a future in countries such as Sweden or Spain, despite limited financial support and reintegration policies compared to destinations such as Germany or geographically and culturally closer destinations, such as Poland (Łysienia, 2023; Brücker et al., 2023; Duszczyk et al., 2023). This result parallels previous research where displaced people or refugees choose to stay in countries with perceived higher institutional qualities or a more welcoming environment, even under constrained conditions (Müller-Funk et al., 2023). Moreover, the finding can also be put in dialogue with the discussion on the discursive practices of Poland and other post-communist countries' migrants around the "privations they endured" in their origin country (McGhee et al., 2012:725). In this regard, further research is needed to explore the differences around the shared discourse of economic instability in post-accession migration from Poland, Lithuania and other CEE countries and the experience of war for Ukrainian refugees. Hence, the findings point to the key importance of what de Haas names "perceived geographical opportunity structures" to understand return migration aspirations (de Haas, 2021).

The study contributes to the emerging body of literature that applies aspiration-capabilities frameworks to forced migration in war-context cases such as Syria and Ukraine (Brzozowska, 2023; Karimi & Byelikova, 2024; Müller-Funk et al., 2023; Tarkhanova & Pyrogova, 2023). The articulation of forced migration experiences using the

aspiration-capabilities framework shows, like other studies, that aspirations alone are insufficient to initiate (im)mobility without the corresponding capabilities to fulfil them.

Recent studies have begun to explore the impact of macro-level factors, such as national policies and cultural and geographical contexts, on the migration patterns of Ukrainians (Fóti, 2024; Karimi & Byelikova, 2024; Tyldum et al., 2023), and underscore the significance of these factors. Similarly to the comparative analysis conducted by Tyldum et al. (2023) between Sweden and Norway, our examination of Spain and Sweden reveals subtle yet potentially decisive differences among EU countries under the same Temporary Protection Directive. As Tyldum et al. (2023) suggest, even slight disparities in macro approaches can significantly shape migration patterns, ultimately affecting host societies as a whole. In this regard, even though this is clearly mere conjecture, the themes expressed by the participants in our study point to more Ukrainians choosing to settle in Spain and fewer in Sweden (proportionally to their numbers in each country).

Something less discussed in the aspiration-capabilities literature is what we define as the micro-factors affecting capabilities to stay or return. Our study highlights the significant impact they make. For instance, stigma towards those who have left Ukraine limits some Ukrainians' ability to return. This is common in post-conflict settings, where returning populations face stigmatisation and strained relations with those who stayed behind (Eastmond, 2006). In our case, and even though we have relatively few male respondents, this stigma is notably gendered, with male participants in both Sweden and Spain highlighting this issue. This aligns with Wojnicka (2023), who discusses male migrants' vulnerability to social stigmatisation due to perceived failures to protect their families during conflicts. Masculinity studies (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) further illustrate how traditional gender roles and expectations influence men's decisions about returning.

Conversely, women in our study often assumed caregiving roles and faced societal pressure to prioritise family welfare over personal migration aspirations, something highlighted in other publications (e.g. WHO, 2017). Furthermore, trauma from war and displacement profoundly impacts both men and women, hindering their capability to integrate into host communities, something exacerbated by societal expectations of gratitude. In this regard, we have seen that men often experience depression and guilt, impeding their efforts to integrate. This issue is highlighted by several authors who call for more research into the experiences of Ukrainian male refugees, "a salient minority" (Mickelsson, 2023; Wojnicka, 2023). Meanwhile, women in our study struggled with the emotional and physical burden of caregiving, further limiting their capabilities for integration. This is something that Oleinikova (2023) showed in the case of Australia, Buchcik et al. (2023) showed for Germany and Kovács et al. (2023) for the cases of Poland and Hungary, highlighting how Ukrainian women navigate the dual pressures of integration and caregiving.

Finally, the emergence of the concept of "virtual return"– residing physically in the host country but maintaining active engagement with their homeland– is strong in our study. We propose that the prominence of this concept is closely tied to the pivotal role technological and virtual tools have played in Ukraine's national discourse and policymaking, both during and before the war. For instance, under President Zelensky, the Ministry of Digitalisation was established before the war, reflecting his vision of transforming Ukraine into a 'smart' nation. This concept positions displaced individuals—whom we

term "virtual returnees"—as active participants in the social, economic, and political life of both their host and home countries. Here, digital technologies and virtual spaces are key for bridging geographical divides, enabling active contributions to their homeland's development. This phenomenon points to the need for further research into the dynamics of transnationalism, aspirations and capabilities for return migration. Specifically, we suggest examining the idea of "virtual return" through the lens of social and financial remittances, as explored in transnational migration literature. Previous studies, such as those on Central and Eastern European (CEE) post-communist migrants within the enlarged EU (Bobova, 2016; Grabowska et al., 2017), have demonstrated the dynamics of social and cultural remittances. Additionally, concepts such as the moral economy of migration —previously applied to CEE migration (Ciubrinskas, 2023)—and civic and political transnationalism offer valuable frameworks for further analyzing the "virtual return" of forcibly displaced Ukrainians.

Implications for migration policies

The previous ideas call for a shift in policy approaches, recognising the bidirectional flow of influence between host and home countries facilitated by these transnational dynamics. Overall, our study's findings have implications for both Ukrainian migration policy and EU-level responses, urging a comprehensive re-evaluation of existing frameworks to effectively address the evolving dynamics of Ukrainian migration.

Ukrainian migration policy that emphasises facilitating the physical return of displaced individuals to their homeland overlooks their diverse aspirations. Our findings challenge physical return as the main choice for many Ukrainian refugees. Instead, policy approaches need to acknowledge transnational perspectives on migration. Acknowledging the "virtual" dimension of return and migration, Ukrainian policymakers can move beyond solely prioritising mass physical repatriation and reconstruction, instead focusing on enhancing digital infrastructure and literacy among "virtual returnees" to enable their meaningful contribution to Ukraine's recovery efforts remotely. This approach aligns with transnationalism theories, emphasising strong connections between migrants and their homeland, irrespective of physical location (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2008; Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011).

Rather than solely focusing on repatriation as the primary objective, Ukrainian migration policy could embrace the myriad complex micro-factors identified in our study as barriers to returning. For example, by acknowledging the stigma and fear of returning and adopting gender and intersectionality lenses, Ukrainian policymakers can adopt a holistic reintegration approach. Tackling traditional gender norms, implementing gender-sensitive measures, and offering individuals opportunities to redefine their roles can create a supportive environment for return.

At the EU level, our study calls for a recalibration of the Temporary Protection Directive, originally designed for immediate relief and increasingly inadequate for addressing the prolonged displacement that Ukrainians are experiencing. Moving towards a long-term integration approach can foster more sustainable solutions and more inclusive communities. This shift is crucial given that many participants in our study may remain in host countries for an extended period.

As noted by others (Tyldum et al., 2023), if the majority of Ukrainians are expected to return to Ukraine soon, it might be sufficient to focus on meeting their basic needs until

their departure, something that Sweden and Spain are largely doing, as we have shown in this study. However, for those who may stay longer, EU countries could implement policies and provide rights that facilitate long-term integration, mitigating future risks of marginalisation and promoting social cohesion.

Conclusions

Our examination of Ukrainians displaced to Spain and Sweden following the full-scale Russian invasion found that the aspiration-capabilities framework does indeed provide a valuable lens for exploring mobility under conditions of forced migration. First, we found that aspirations are crucial for displaced individuals. These individuals are active agents with diverse goals, challenging conventional narratives of victimhood and reflecting their "freedom of choice" and pursuit of a "good life" as proposed by de Haas, even under conditions of forced migration. Second, we showed how the capabilities to fulfil those aspirations are significantly influenced by macro and micro-factors.

On the one hand, our study illustrates a number of macro-factors that affect the capabilities of Ukrainians to stay in the host countries. In Sweden, for example, administrative barriers, a higher cost of living and a "colder" culture are examples of substantial macro-factor barriers. Spain's lack of large-scale support seems to be compensated for by more accessible legal documentation processes and employment opportunities, even in informal sectors, and a more welcoming cultural context, according to the participants. On the other hand, importantly, our findings highlight the need for more detailed analysis of micro-factors dynamics in aspirations-capabilities approaches, especially in forced migration. For instance, examining how emotions such as shame and guilt, or intersecting identities– including race, ethnicity, sexuality, gender identity, socioeconomic status, and disability– shape individuals' migration aspirations and capabilities can offer deeper insights into the complex dynamics of migration decision-making following forced migration.

The research also emphasises the importance of incorporating transnational perspectives in the aspirations-capabilities frameworks. The "virtual return" concept coined by participants shows the transformative potential of digital technologies to foster transnational engagement and return strategies among displaced populations, something worth analysing further.

The exploratory character of this research indicates that, in light of our findings, we should advocate for a paradigm shift in migration governance in Ukraine and the EU towards a more holistic, inclusive, and flexible approach that views displaced individuals as active agents driven by aspirations for better lives. This involves prioritising the voices and aspirations of displaced populations in policy formulation and investing in comprehensive measures to enhance their capabilities to fulfil their aspirations, whatever these may be.

Annex 1. Participants details

See Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1 Participants in Spain

Participant	Gender	Age	Education	Origin	Kids	Family Status	Employment	Housing	Was Spain the first country they arrived
1	F	30s	Higher	Odessa	2	Divorced	Unofficial	Renting a room	no
2	F	40s	Secondary	Kharkiv	2	Married	Unofficial	Renting a room	no
3	F	30s	Higher	Odessa	2	Married	Unemployed	Renting a flat	yes
4	F	40s	Higher	Kyiv	3	Married	Unemployed	Red Cross support	no
5	F	30s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married (with husband in Spain)	Employed	Renting a flat	yes
6	F	40s	Higher	Dnipro	1	Divorced	Unofficial (nail services)	Not shared	yes
7	F	40s	Higher	Kharkiv	–	Single	Employed	Not shared	no
8	F	40s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married	Unemployed	Red Cross support	no
9	F	30s	Higher	Sumy	–	Single	Remote (Ukraine-based)	Renting a room	yes
10	F	30s	Higher	Rivne	2	Married	Unemployed	Living with relatives	yes
11	F	60s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Divorced	Employed (university support)	Living with daughter	yes
12	F	50s	Technical	Lviv	1	Divorced	Unofficial (cleaning)	Friend's house	yes
13	M	40s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married (with wife in Spain)	Remote	Renting a flat	no
14	F	30s	Higher	Odessa	–	Single	Unofficial (physiotherapy)	Renting a room	no
15	F	60s	Secondary	Rivne	1	Widow	Unofficial (cleaning/babysitting)	Living with relatives	yes
16	F	40s	Higher	Kyiv	–	Married	Unofficial	Renting a flat	no
17	F	20s	Higher	Kherson	–	Single	Student	Renting a room	no
18	F	40s	Secondary	Donetsk	1	Married	Remote	Renting a flat	yes
19	M	30s	Higher	Kharkiv	2	Married (with wife in Spain)	Remote	Renting a flat	yes
20	F	40s	Higher	Rivne	1	Separated	Unemployed	Red Cross support	yes

Table 2 Participants in Sweden

Participant	Gender	Age	Education	Origin	Kids	Family Status	Employment	Housing	Was Sweden the first country they arrived
1	F	30s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married	Employed	Municipality Support	yes
2	F	40s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married	Employed	Friends	yes
3	F	40s	Higher	Kharkiv	2	Married (with husband in Sweden)	Employed	Municipality Support	yes
4	F	30s	Higher	Dnipro	2	Married	Remote	Friends	no
5	F	40s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married	Unemployed	Municipality Support	yes
6	F	40s	Higher	Odessa	3	Married (with husband in Sweden)	Unemployed	Municipality Support	no
7	F	30s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Divorced	Remote	Municipality Support	no
8	F	50s	Higher	Kharkiv	2	Divorced	Remote	Municipality Support	yes
9	F	60s	Higher	Chernihiv	1	Married	Unemployed	Family	yes
10	F	30s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married	–	Municipality Support	no
11	M	30s	Higher	Lviv	–	Married (with wife in Sweden)	Employed	Municipality Support	yes
12	F	30s	Higher	Sumy	2	Married	Remote	Municipality Support	no
13	F	40s	Higher	Kyiv	1	Married	–	Municipality Support	no
14	M	40s	Higher	Kherson	1	Divorced	Remote	Municipality Support	yes
15	F	40s	Secondary	Kyiv	1	Married	Unemployed	Municipality Support	yes

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Declarations

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

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