

Document downloaded from:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10251/201824>

This paper must be cited as:

Martín-García, OJ. (2015). The End of the Carnival: The United Kingdom and the Carnation Revolution in Portugal. *Contemporary British History*. 29(2):199-221.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2014.970392>



The final publication is available at

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2014.970392>

Copyright Taylor and Francis Group

Additional Information

'The End of the Carnival': The UK and the Carnation Revolution in Portugal

Oscar Jose Martin Garcia

This article examines the role that Harold Wilson's Labour government played in the democratisation process begun in Portugal after the military coup of 25 April 1974. As we shall see, British policy towards regime change in the Iberian country is a relevant subject of study for various reasons. However, little attention has been paid by historians to the British government's policy during what is known as the Carnation Revolution. To help remedy this oversight, this article analyses the economic, political and diplomatic measures employed by the British Foreign Office to establish parliamentary democracy in Portugal, which brought an end to the final chapter in the 'carnival' of revolutions that had spread throughout Europe over the preceding two decades.

Keywords: Portugal; UK; Revolution; Democratisation; International Relations

Introduction

This article examines the role that Harold Wilson's Labour government played during the political crisis brought about by Portugal's 'Carnation Revolution'. In chronological terms, its focus is on the brief period between the military coup on 25 April 1974 and the failed revolt led by extreme-left sectors of the army in November 1975. This short period, according to *The Times* (8 October 1975), represented a 'thoroughgoing upheaval which [affected] all the political, social and economic structures of the country, and in which all the pre-existing relationships involving authority and discipline were questioned if not actually abolished'. It all began in the early morning of 25 April 1974, when the military coup carried out by young and lower ranking officers organised in the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) quickly toppled the authoritarian *Estado Novo*, which had been founded in 1926 by the dictator António de Oliveira Salazar. Immediately, the political power passed to a

National Salvation Junta, presided over by the prestigious General António de Spínola who, in May of that year, was to become the president of the Portuguese Republic.

From that point, there began a turbulent process of political change, which took place in three phases. The first (May–September 1974) was characterised by the struggle between President Spínola and the AFM over the issue of decolonisation in Africa and the process of democratisation in Portugal. While the AFM called for a quick exit from the territories in Africa, Spínola favoured a federal solution to the colonial problem. Spínola was also a proponent of a moderate political transition, which would strengthen his power and see the AFM relegated to a secondary position. However, Spínola lost the battle against the AFM and resigned on 28 September 1974, thus ushering in a new phase in the revolution. The subsequent months, up until March 1975, were marked by tense efforts to define which social model should be implemented in a post-authoritarian Portugal. From autumn 1974, the AFM held control of all the means of power in the country, but it was not long before dissension emerged within its ranks. The existence of a variety of political agendas in the organisation resulted in the creating of opposing ‘blocs’ within the AFM—factions that were supported by various political parties. On the one hand, there were the military sectors linked to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), who were in favour of a Soviet-type model. On the other, there were those who advocated the establishment of a Western-type pluralist democracy. This group was led by military personnel close to the Socialist Party and other centrist parties. Finally, there were also revolutionary military units that, in conjunction with extreme-left-wing organisations, favoured a popular revolution.¹

The failure of the *coup d'état* staged by the right-wing forces on 11 March 1975 marked the start of the final phase in Portugal's revolution. This phase, between March and November 1975, was marked by fierce clashes between the different factions of the AFM and their respective politico-social branches. Finally, the intense anti-communist mobilisation the country experienced during the summer of 1975 managed to tip the balance in favour of the pro-Western moderate forces. However, the triumph of the socialists and centrists in the mobilisations of the *verao quente* of 1975 did not mean a definitive victory for the pro-Western pluralist model. That victory was only achieved when the ultra-left-wing military *coup* on 25 November 1975 failed. Only from then on did the popular movements become neutralised and the liberal democratic way finally triumph. Shortly afterwards, the holding of elections and the enactment of a new constitution during the first half of 1976 established a parliamentary system that eliminated the radical democratic legacy of what would turn out to be the final left-wing revolution of the twentieth century.²

Thus, Portugal went from being the country experiencing the strongest aftershocks of revolution since the end of the Second World War to hosting the first post-authoritarian transition of the ‘third wave’ of democratisations. According to S. Huntington, this major surge in contemporary global democratisation started in the mid-1970s in southern Europe, bringing liberal governments to Latin American and Pacific Asian countries in the 1980s, and finishing in Eastern Europe after the collapse

of the Soviet Union.³ The influence projected by the ‘third wave’ theory in the social sciences has helped to present the pluralist systems as the only possible positive outcome of the post-authoritarian transitions in the late twentieth century. However, the emergence of Western democracy in Portugal was by no means a foregone conclusion.⁴ In this article, I intend to demonstrate that, within a tumultuous and unpredictable historical context, such an outcome was possible only because of the intervention of many different players on the international stage.

Why Great Britain?

A few months before Harold Wilson won the British general election of February 1974 and the ‘Happy Revolution’ began in Portugal,⁵ Marcelo Caetano—Prime Minister of Portugal and successor to the dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar—arrived in London to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, which had been forged by the Treaty signed in 1373. This visit sparked a great deal of controversy in the UK because it coincided with recent massacres perpetrated by the Portuguese army in Mozambique. On 10 July 1973, a few days before Caetano had landed on British soil, *The Times* reported on the killing of 400 people as part of a counter-insurgency operation carried out by Portuguese special forces in Wiriyamu—a village in a region of intense fighting between the colonial army and FRELIMO, the Marxist liberation movement threatening to take control of Mozambique.⁶

In condemnation of these events, Harold Wilson, then leader of the Labour opposition, demanded that Caetano’s visit be suspended, used the term ‘genocide’ in reference to the Wiriyamu killings, and pressed for Portugal’s expulsion from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Eventually, the Portuguese Prime Minister’s visit went ahead, but he was greeted in the streets of London by a campaign of impassioned protest against his regime, with many prominent members of the Labour Party involved. The largest of these demonstrations was a march headed by the Portuguese Socialist (PS) leader Mário Soares, who was in London as a guest of the Labour Party.⁷ At the time, nobody could have imagined that Soares, an exile who had fled persecution by Salazar’s police force, would return to London soon afterwards as Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the first post-Caetano government. This latter visit, which took place only some weeks after the dictatorship’s collapse, marked Britain’s status as Portugal’s most valued friend after their traditional ally—Brazil.

These events indicate the various links that existed between Britain and Portugal in the mid-1970s. However, although numerous articles have been written on the international aspect of Portuguese democratisation,⁸ little attention has been paid to the role played by the British government during Portugal’s post-authoritarian transition. Such lack of interest could be related to Britain’s decline as a global power after the Second World War. From the late 1940s onwards, Lisbon’s main ally increasingly became the USA rather than her ‘Oldest Friend’, as exemplified by the defence agreements of 1948, which gave the Americans access to military bases on the

Azores Islands.⁹ Also, during the 1960s, the relations between Salazar and London were less close than those between Portugal and other European allies who were more accepting of Lisbon's colonial policies.¹⁰ Despite this, British policy towards regime change in Portugal in the mid-1970s is a relevant area of study for various reasons.

In June 1974, a telegram from the USA mentioned the significant role played by Harold Wilson's government in the post-Caetano era, 'given [the] Labour Party's close contacts of long duration with [the] leaders of [the] democratic socialist movement in Portugal'.¹¹ A short time earlier, Soares had told the press that he was 'very grateful for the support given to him in recent years by the Labour Party in Britain' (*the Guardian*, May 17, 1974). Indeed, although Wilson's first government (1964–70) never adopted an openly hostile stance towards the *Estado Novo*, from the early 1960s onwards the British Labour movement gave aid to various anti-Salazar socialist organisations operating from exile in the UK. These links were strengthened by the aforementioned condemnation by the Labour Party of Caetano's visit to London in summer 1973. Moreover, during the British election campaign that began in the winter of 1974, Wilson criticised the Conservative Party for their benevolence towards the dictatorships in Chile, Spain, Greece and Portugal.¹² This public stance gave Wilson more room for manoeuvre when, having been elected Prime Minister, he needed to deal with the new post-authoritarian authorities in Lisbon. Having previously rejected Caetanism, the Labour government (elected in February 1974) was in a more favourable position than other Western allies during Portugal's crisis.¹³

It might be argued that the Carnation Revolution represents an important chapter in the evolution of 1960s and 1970s British foreign policy, in that the events in Portugal tied in with other, more pervasive, international processes, such as European Economic Community (EEC) enlargement, decolonisation, the weakening of transatlantic links and *détente*. Caetano's fall took place in a context where the UK was trying to counter the damage to its international status caused by the weakening of the Commonwealth, its exit from the area 'East of Suez' and the fragile state of its economy. In view of this situation, in 1973, entry into the EEC was viewed as the only option if Britain wanted to retain its international influence as a regional power.¹⁴ This step meant Britain gave up maintaining a 'global role that was a hangover from Empire', representing the culmination of a long process of transformation of its international position.¹⁵

This dramatic change in Britain's foreign policy coincided with a significant change of direction in the process of European integration, manifested in the effort to make the community a credible international actor. This attempt to lend the EEC a clear political identity was a consequence of major changes in Western Europe's economic, political and social balance and on the broader international scene.¹⁶ Post-1989 liberal triumphalism has led to a tendency to ignore the fact that, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the debate concerning the economic order in various societies was still raging. The energy crisis in 1973 intensified the talk of alternatives to the market economy. In addition, the 'democratic decline' of certain advanced societies which, according to some authors, were suffering the collapse of order and the weakening of

post-war institutions, also cast doubt over the model being advanced by the Americans. In this regard, the 1968 social revolution damaged the liberal ideal, which had dominated post-1945 European construction and jeopardised the stability of the Western democracies.¹⁷

In addition, the Portuguese revolution occurred in a context where, according to contemporary US sources, 'the Atlantic alliance was still suffering from the severe shocks that had jolted USA–European relations' during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. That conflict 'had revealed sharp differences of interest and opinions' between the two sides of the Atlantic, and came on top of an atmosphere of uncertainty marked by tensions in Cyprus, the fall of the military dictatorship in Greece, and the rise of the Communist Party in Italy, France, Portugal and Spain.¹⁸ As the British journalist Victor Zorza wrote in September 1974, the communists were 'on the march across southern Europe' against a backdrop of social instability. All these factors have meant that the history of the region during that time has largely been subsumed within the global dynamics of the Cold War.¹⁹

In the face of these challenges, the EEC tried to develop a more independent foreign policy, which ran counter to the bipolarity of the post-1945 international system. In Varsori's view, the regime changes in southern Europe represent a test case that confirms the decline of the West as a unitary political entity. These post-authoritarian transitions also marked the emergence of the EEC as an international player with influence of its own in countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, where the US' prestige had been tarnished by its collaboration with 'unpopular regimes'.²⁰ In other words, the loss of credibility suffered by the USA during the 1960s and 1970s damaged the American Cold War ideology as a political solution to the Portuguese crisis. In its place, the European model of democratisation played an important disciplinary role as the new guarantor of the *status quo* during the tumultuous Portuguese revolution.

British–Portuguese Relations: Old Alliance, Cold War and Decolonisation

The *Estado Novo*, established in 1926 by António de Oliveira Salazar, held power for 48 years, making Salazar's the longest surviving right-wing dictatorship in Europe. Although it underwent many changes during this period, the Salazar regime always remained unmistakably authoritarian, Catholic traditionalist and imperialist in nature. In spite of the anti-liberal nature of its political system, Portugal's neutrality during the Second World War allowed Salazar to enter post-1945 international society. Shortly afterwards, the start of the Cold War and the inclusion of Portugal in the newly formed NATO consolidated the *Estado Novo*'s international position. In addition to his staunch anti-communism, Salazar offered his Western allies the use of military bases in the Azores, Madeira and the Cape Verde Islands, a key position in the Mediterranean via the naval base at Lagos (located in the region of the *Algarve*, in southern *Portugal*), together with the air bases at Espinho–Esmoritz (close to Porto) and Montijo (located in the district of Setúbal, in the southwest of the country).²¹

During the 1950s, Anglo-Portuguese relations were generally cordial. In 1959, both countries became founding members of the European Free Trade Association. However, Salazar's determination to stand against the 'winds of change' heralded by the British in their move to give up their major colonies in the early 1960s caused disagreements within the Old Alliance. In an international context in which the Third World seemed to be emerging as an important new actor, the UK facilitated self-government and racial equity in Africa, in an attempt to preserve its liberal image as a moral leader of the Commonwealth and the Free World.²² Portugal, on the other hand, viewed Britain's withdrawal from its imperial territories as a climb-down—one that played into the hands of radical African nationalists and communists and also further isolated Portuguese colonialism.

Salazar's determination to safeguard Portuguese imperial holdings was ideologically supported by the nationalist dogma of 'Lusitanian pluricontinentalism'. Under this doctrine, Portugal's territories from Minho to Timor were not viewed as imperial colonies but as provinces belonging to a single and indivisible state. This imperial philosophy and hard diplomatic pragmatism of the *Estado Novo* were complemented by the 1950s 'lusotropical' theories of the Brazilian writer Gilberto Freyre. Freyre argued that the Portuguese had forged a distinct and more tolerant relationship with their overseas provinces, creating a multiracial, multicultural and mythical Lusitanian entity, which was not European but global.²³

The different stances of the British and Portuguese towards colonialism caused a number of disagreements—especially over Lisbon's military actions in Angola and Goa. However, the main point of tension between London and Lisbon in these years came in 1965, with Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. In the struggle between mainland British power and the white-minority Rhodesian government, Portugal sided with the latter, violating the economic sanctions imposed by the Wilson government against the rebel colony. Portugal's support for the racist regime in Rhodesia had the effect of weakening relations with the UK, at least for a time. In general, though, in contrast to the belligerent stance taken by the Americans, the British adopted a moderate position towards Portuguese colonialism.²⁴ Whitehall was reluctant to put too much pressure on the *Estado Novo*, as it feared its collapse could leave a dangerous power vacuum in Africa.²⁵ Furthermore, London did not want to complicate relations with a valuable anti-communist ally on NATO's strategic southern flank, or weaken its unfavourable balance of payments. During the 1960s, British economic and commercial involvement in both metropolitan and colonial Portugal remained substantial. At the beginning of the 1970s, 25 per cent of all foreign investments in Portugal were British, and the UK was still Portugal's best customer, receiving 23 per cent of its exports and supplying 13 per cent of its imports.²⁶

Relations between the UK and Portugal markedly improved at the start of the 1970s. A combination of factors facilitated this rapprochement. Firstly, in 1968, Salazar was incapacitated by an accident, leaving as head of the Portuguese regime Marcelo Caetano—a moderate liberaliser whose reformist agenda was well received in London because it seemed to begin to pave the way for internal democratisation and controlled

decolonisation. Second, in June 1970, Edward Heath was elected Prime Minister in Britain. The new Conservative Premier, and the Lusophiles Alec Douglas-Home (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) and David Muirhead (British Ambassador in Lisbon), adopted a more pragmatic and indulgent position with regard to the swiftness of Portugal's exit from Africa. London showed itself to be optimistic as to Portugal's ability to gradually withdraw from its colonies in Africa, which could benefit British oil, mining and agricultural interests in the region.²⁷ As a whole, Heath's government was more sympathetic to preserving the *status quo* in Southern Africa, for the sake of British investment and for control of the Cape Route. This underlying benevolence towards Portugal meant that the British Foreign Service was unable to grasp the irreversible deterioration of the dictatorship, linked to the profound national crisis caused by the seemingly endless wars in Africa.²⁸ After February 1974, the Labour government inherited a Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Southern European Department (SED) that was dominated by a significant number of lusophile diplomats, which partially accounts for the difficulty in foreseeing the military coup in Portugal.

The British Response to the Portuguese Revolution

Hardly had Harold Wilson begun his second term as prime minister in March 1974 when he was blindsided by the military coup that toppled the *Estado Novo* in Portugal.²⁹ The Western diplomatic services were well aware of the disastrous effects the colonial wars had wrought on Portugal's society, and particularly her army. However, they misjudged the depth of the crisis in which the *Estado Novo* found itself. Therefore, they were unable to foresee the imminent *coup d'état*. This unexpected regime change was given a cautious welcome in London. Although Wilson was glad to see the end of the dictatorship, the government did not recognise the new Portuguese authorities until early May 1974 when, in an interview alongside Wilson, the Foreign Secretary and Labour leaders, Soares expressed his confidence in António de Spínola and demanded 'urgent recognition' for the National Salvation Junta.

Thereafter, the promises made by Portugal's First Provisional Government—of political liberalisation at home and a firm commitment to dismantling the Portuguese Empire in Africa—helped dissipate the suspicions originally held by the FCO. In principle, the plans for decolonisation put forward by the new Portuguese president, General Spínola, were viewed positively in London because they relieved Britain of a political burden that had long been a stumbling block in its relations with Portugal. In addition, Portugal's exit from Africa offered 'new opportunities' for Britain to play a leading role on the international stage, given that, as Soares told *The Times* in May 1974, Britain's experience in dissolving its former empire offered the best model for the solution of colonial problems for the new rulers in Lisbon.³⁰ Certainly, the Portuguese officers admired the British approach to decolonisation and were looking for guidance from London as to how to dismantle their empire in an orderly manner. It was therefore no surprise that Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who had

previously been Labour spokesman for colonial affairs, expressed a willingness to cooperate in Africa. Callaghan offered his Portuguese counterpart, Soares, the possibility of sharing 'Britain's experience in decolonisation' with the aim of safeguarding London's considerable interests in Rhodesia and bolstering the West's efforts to contain the Soviet Union's increasing influence in the region.³¹

The view of the Foreign Office was that decolonisation had to depend on the stability of the process of internal political change in Portugal. However, it was not long before the British Ambassador in Lisbon, Nigel Trench, began to have misgivings about the new Portuguese authorities' ability to contain the unprecedented unrest, which followed the collapse of the dictatorship. According to Trench, the military rebellion had opened the door to an uncontrollable 'general feeling of liberation'.³² The *coup* was immediately followed by the release from prison of political prisoners, the dismantling of the political police force and the occupation of government buildings. During the spring and summer of 1974, Portugal experienced mass strikes on the part of students, civil servants, military personnel and field workers. At the same time, hundreds of independent commissions were set up to represent workers in hospitals, banks, public administration bodies and schools.³³ The weakening of the state and the resulting power vacuum had given rise to an explosion of popular feeling, which turned a traditional military *coup* into a revolutionary movement: a grassroots movement that was spiralling out of the control of both the communists and the socialists, and was therefore extremely worrying for the Western powers.³⁴ In this climate of social upheaval, Ambassador Trench was concerned by Spínola's fall in September 1974 and the seemingly unstoppable spiral of strikes and demonstrations which, in his opinion, were plunging Portugal into 'conditions very close to anarchy'.³⁵

In view of this revolutionary atmosphere, it is unsurprising that over the next few months FCO officials grew deeply disturbed by the appointment of communist ministers in Lisbon, who might, it was feared, adopt a stance of international non-alignment. Washington shared the same concerns, telling London that it regarded the situation as 'proof of a shift towards the left in European politics which could lead to neutralism'.³⁶ Salazar's alliance with the West, the colonial wars and the influence of Third World ideas in the struggle against the dictatorship had led even the moderate and centrist parties in Portugal to call for a reduction of their country's involvement in NATO and the gradual closing of foreign military bases in Portuguese territories.³⁷ According to the British Military Intelligence Service and Ministry of Defence, if left unmitigated, this tendency could lead to Portugal's exit from NATO. This would have a very negative 'psychological effect' on an alliance whose southern flank was militarily weak, officials argued. It could also have a 'contagious' effect in countries where there was growing anti-NATO sentiment, such as Sweden, Norway and Holland.³⁸ All these dangers led the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to point out, during an Anglo-American meeting in June 1975, that a neutralist government in Portugal (even a democratic one) was less compatible with NATO's essential aims of defence than the right-wing dictatorship had been.³⁹

The possibility that opposition to the ideological precepts of Cold War bipolarity could spread through southern Europe gradually hardened the US' stance on Portugal. The 'wait and see' attitude adopted by the State Department in spring 1974 became increasingly hostile as the political situation in Portugal was deemed more radical.⁴⁰ In light of this situation, Kissinger began to take a favourable view of the possible 'inoculating' effects of a satellite regime linked to Moscow being established in Portugal.⁴¹ In a meeting with British diplomats in summer 1975, Kissinger argued that Portugal's exit from NATO, were it to come about, would give the Europeans a 'healthy shock', which would help to strengthen the weakened cohesion between the two sides of the Atlantic.⁴²

In contrast, the Head of the SED, David Thomas, and the FCO's Permanent Under-Secretary, Thomas Brimelow, thought it would be counterproductive to consider Portugal a lost case—all the more so given that many military and political leaders in Portugal still appeared to 'attach particular importance to Portugal's traditional links with Great Britain'.⁴³ In the same vein, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan disagreed with Kissinger's estimation of the situation in Iberia and, like other European leaders, believed that Portugal was 'not yet beyond saving'.⁴⁴ From that point of view, Ambassador Trench considered that certain belligerent gestures from Washington (such as pressure for Portugal to leave NATO and contacts with ultra-right-wing sections in the country) would give ammunition to anti-Western elements within the AFM and push Lisbon country firmly and prematurely into the arms of extremists.⁴⁵ Such a split would, in effect, negate any future possibility of extending the process of European integration southwards.

The FCO considered that if links between Portugal and the 'Free World' were broken there would be a vacuum that could be exploited by the countries of the East. Faced with the dangers that such a scenario entailed, the Head of the SED considered that while the chance still existed to establish a democracy in Portugal it was worth responding as positively as possible to the new Portuguese authorities' requests for assistance, even though the ranks of those authorities included communists. Wilson's government concluded that collaboration with Lisbon in some areas would increase Britain's ability to influence the decisions made by the Portuguese authorities.⁴⁶

Accordingly, in February 1975, Callaghan visited Portugal to meet with President Francisco da Costa Gomes, Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves and the communist leader Álvaro Cunhal. Speaking at a dinner to an audience that included members of the AFM, the Foreign Secretary said that a British mission would visit Lisbon to study how London could give economic aid and technical assistance, in order to show British 'support and encouragement' to Portugal in its 'progress towards a stable, pluralist democracy'.⁴⁷ However, only a few months later, during a visit to London by the Portuguese Foreign Minister, General Ernesto Melo Antunes, Callaghan had to admit that 'there was a limit to what the UK could do alone in providing aid and assistance to Portugal'.⁴⁸ Ultimately, the economic problems that the UK was suffering meant it was only possible to pursue a programme of 'modest proportions'. Nonetheless, this was 'extremely well received' in Lisbon.⁴⁹

In spite of the scarcity of resources, the British thought that the economic and technical initiatives could act as a 'lever' to the advantage of the pro-West groups, which existed in the Portuguese AFM.⁵⁰ This institution was regarded by British analysts as an ideologically heterogeneous organisation, within which there were also moderate and liberal elements. At the end of May 1975, Callaghan remarked to Henry Kissinger and US President Gerald Ford that the AFM was 'a micro-cosm of all kinds of opinion and [Britain did not] regard them as beyond redemption'.⁵¹ It is hardly surprising, therefore, that British plans involved providing moral support, political guidance and financial help to those groups that represented an 'ideological and democratic alternative' to radical military leaders. Wilson's government advocated increasing contacts and strengthening relations with those who, from inside Portugal, could counter the increasing communist control over the revolutionary process.⁵²

Unlike with other scenarios in the Cold War, in the case of Portugal, the protection of British strategic interests and the struggle against communism were compatible with the championing of democracy. This commitment to democracy allowed Wilson's government to reconnect with the fundamentals of Labour policy—such as socialist internationalism, cooperation and defence of universal moral norms—which had been betrayed by the *realpolitik* pursued between 1964 and 1970.⁵³ In late January 1975, the FCO's Assistant Under-Secretary for southern Europe, Hugh Morgan, informed the Americans that Wilson's government 'had encouraged direct relations between British political parties and their Portuguese counterparts'.⁵⁴ British Labour and Conservative politicians cooperated closely on the issue of Portugal. Callaghan maintained regular contact with Geoffrey Rippon, Conservative spokesman on Foreign Affairs, during the latter's voyage to Porto to participate in a conference at the Centro Democrático e Social (CDS). Rippon was accompanied by Michael Young, Conservative Party Research Officer, who had already visited the country at the request of Sir Alec Douglas-Home in order to identify 'groups and forces in Portugal which [the] Conservative Party might guide and help in [the] democrati[s]ation process in [the] post-Caetano era'.⁵⁵ Ultimately, such bipartisan collaboration sought to encourage the ideological alignment of Portuguese leaders by channelling political, technical and economic resources towards those Portuguese parties which generally corresponded to those in Westminster.⁵⁶

There were also a number of visits in the opposite direction. In late 1974, the leaders of the CDS expressed to British diplomats their desire to visit the UK with the aim of consolidating their 'overseas connections, mainly with the Conservative Party'. The FCO supported that request, aware of how important it was in Portugal for the CDS to be 'seen to be accepted abroad as a legitimate party'.⁵⁷ In late December 1974 its leader, Freitas do Amaral, visited Britain as a guest of the Conservative Research Department. A few months later, in October 1975, do Amaral, a Christian Democrat, returned to the UK, invited by the Federation of Conservative Students to speak at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool on that occasion, do Amaral expressed his gratitude for the 'help and assistance British Conservatives had given his party'.⁵⁸

However, such visits were not solely the preserve of the Portuguese political class. During 1975, almost 200 lecturers, intellectuals, writers and opinion leaders were invited by the British Council, the Instituto de Alta Cultura, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and other philanthropic organisations to visit the UK. This was intended to create a network of influential local spokespeople, which the British government could use to explain its vision regarding the relevance of democratic freedoms for Portuguese society.⁵⁹ Specifically, the Wilson government directed most assistance to the PS Party, which was seen by the Labour Party 'as very much the counterpart of its own'. In late May 1974, the FCO's Assistant Under-Secretary, Charles Wiggin, admitted to the American ambassador in London that the Wilson government had 'put all their eggs in Soares's basket'.⁶⁰ Once the Portuguese dictatorship fell, the General Secretary of the Labour Party, Ron Hayward, had wasted no time in inviting Soares.⁶¹ During the trip, the Portuguese leader met Wilson, Callaghan and Jack Jones, chairman of the international committee of the Trade Union Congress. That meeting led to a series of proposals of financial, technical and organisational assistance for the PS. The aim was to strengthen Soares's party, which, at that time, had a very weak organisational structure. The aim in the Labour camp was to drive forward the Portuguese moderate left in order to counterbalance the radical democratising demands of the popular movements, avoid a possible ultra-right-wing counter-mobilisation, challenge the communists' dominance of the left, and go into the future elections with certain guarantees in place.

At this meeting it was suggested that members of the British government, Parliament and the Labour Party could also visit Portugal. This was an attempt to use the British institutions' traditional prestige in Portugal to boost the PS's democratic credentials. To that end, Callaghan made a stopover in Lisbon in early 1975, which Soares made good use of to strengthen his internal position in the tense domestic struggle for control of the revolution.⁶² British officials stressed that it was a working visit, but the arrival of a senior Labour politician was also seen in Lisbon as discreet backing for the PS. The aim was quite simple to demonstrate to the people of Portugal that their country's socialists had international support.

On some occasions, the Wilson government carried out this task in collaboration with various non-governmental organisations. These NGOs had greater room for manoeuvre than the government itself, which was forced to adopt a wary attitude so as not to appear to be interfering in an increasingly volatile internal situation in Portugal. Along these lines, in February 1975, Jack Jones briefed Callaghan that 'he was planning to visit Portugal in March and would be speaking on PS platforms around the country'. Jones also noted that 'his union had contributed funds to the PS and would be granting more money in the future'.⁶³ At the same time, the Labour government also collaborated with the International Federation of Transport Workers so as to counterbalance the growing presence of labour leaders from the East in Portugal. The result was the organisation of various seminars aimed at 'opening the eyes of Portuguese trade unionists to the pitfalls of communist manipulation'.⁶⁴

In general, the Portuguese policy implemented by the Labour cabinet between 1974 and 1976 was very similar to the one adopted during Harold Wilson's first term (1964–70) with regard to Italy—another country perceived to be under threat from communism. Then, the Labour government tried to encourage the diverse social-democrat splinter groups to join together to form a strong, moderate, anti-communist party, which was open to establishing solid governmental coalitions with liberals and Christian Democrats.⁶⁵ In Portugal, Wilson's government also focused its assistance on the more moderate, reformist and pragmatic faction of the socialist family. This support attracted a number of criticisms from within the Labour movement. In September 1975, for example, two Members of Parliament (MPs), Judith Hart and Audrey Wise, who had recently visited Portugal, argued that 'it was wrong for the Labour Party to attach itself lock, stock, and barrel to the Socialist Party and it alone'. Such an approach, they believed, ignored the fact that 'much of the pace of the revolution was being made by the people, not the parties, through neighbourhood councils, work councils, and industrial and agrarian takeovers'.

Similar criticisms were also expressed during the 1975 Labour Party Conference in Blackpool. However, as noted in *The Times* on 3 October 1975, James Callaghan heavily censored the opinions expressed by the Labour left wing. He also showed little interest in the PS groups, which were more inclined towards collaborating with the PCP. This was an attempt to put an end to the possible creation of popular-front experiments in Portugal that were modelled on the French example. All told, the struggle between working-class, Mediterranean socialism open to left-wing alliances and north European socialism more sympathetic to big business was also being settled in Portugal. The social democrats from the North and the 'soft Labour' at the head of the British government rejected any collaboration whatsoever with communists, arguing that this would weaken the ideological cohesion achieved by the non-communist left during the post-war period.

On the Edge of the Abyss: The UK and the End of the Revolution

The political polarisation in Portugal was heightened after the attempted coup by a right-wing group, led by Spínola, on 11 March 1975. According to Ambassador Trench, the failure of the *putsch* meant that Portugal's political development 'took a sharp turn to the left'.⁶⁶ The abortive coup unleashed a counter-coup of mobilisation, which meant that from then onwards the democratic revolution entered its socialist phase. The failure of the attempted revolt provided the radical officers of the AFM and the communists with a golden opportunity to strengthen their grip on the country. During the next few weeks, the PCP's presence in the government grew, the banking system was nationalised and one purge followed another.⁶⁷

In this context, Callaghan asked the FCO's section in charge of guiding British information policy abroad to increase broadcasts by the British Broadcasting Services (BBC)'s Portuguese Service in order to compensate for the rising pro-communist tendencies in the Portuguese media. Callaghan argued that it was of vital importance

in Portugal's struggle for democracy that the BBC services should be extended in carrying accurate news. At the same time, however, Winston Churchill, Secretary of the Conservative Party's Committee for Foreign Affairs, voiced the concerns of Portuguese moderates that the BBC's Portuguese Service had a 'clear pro-Communist bias'. Churchill decried the fact that such a service should employ 'people who represent the enemies of democracy in what is supposed to be the voice of Britain in the world'.⁶⁸ The result of this complaint was that—in spite of protests from journalists and from Gerard Mansell, the BBC's Managing Director of External Broadcasting—greater editorial control was imposed, and recording sessions were supervised. Questions reached Parliament, forcing the Guidance and Information Policy Department of the FCO to publish a memo regarding the nature of the radio services. According to that document, the BBC did not have editorial freedom, but rather were obliged to consult the FCO so as not to damage national interests.⁶⁹

Political changes in Portugal also led to an increase in the occupation of land by landless peasants and workers commissions,⁷⁰ which affected the holdings of British landowners in the south-central region of Alentejo. At the same time, the fact that an increasing number of factories were being taken over 'worried the British business community and caused difficulties in the management of several companies' with British capital.⁷¹ The sudden lurch to the left provoked by the abortive coup caused growing concern among Portugal's NATO allies. As a consequence, Kissinger complained to the FCO about European passiveness, which, in his opinion, was facilitating the establishment of a left-wing, neutralist dictatorship supported by communists.⁷² In short, the situation in Portugal during the spring of 1975 represented the last and most radical episode of the transnational cycle of protests, which spread throughout the 'long' decade of the 1960s. The occupation of land and takeovers of companies challenged the disciplinary logic of the Cold War, thus endangering the stability of the international *status quo*.⁷³

Even so, Callaghan considered that although Portugal seemed to be heading towards 'a totalitarian regime controlled by communists', there was still a smooth interrelation of forces within the country.⁷⁴ In spring 1975, the FCO believed that the communist and radical sections of the AFM controlled the political situation in Portugal. However, the moderate groups (centrists, liberals, socialists and Christian-democrats) could tip the balance in their favour because they still enjoyed widespread support both in the Portuguese army and in civil society. The key was to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly, which were scheduled for 25 April 1975, as this would shift the source of legitimacy of the political apparatus from military to electoral. The FCO adopted a double-edged strategy to achieve these objectives. On the one hand, Callaghan asked Trench to initiate a round of meetings with Portuguese leaders to express British wishes for elections to be held in a 'stable and balanced' atmosphere as an 'important step towards the consolidation of democracy'.⁷⁵ On the other hand, efforts were made to improve the organisational and propaganda structure of the PS for these elections. A short time earlier, members of that party and centre-right

organisations had been invited by the British government to take a close look at elections in the UK and 'learn the procedures for organising (and winning) elections'.⁷⁶

The British diplomatic corps was glad of the socialist victory in the elections at the end of April 1975. In the British Ambassador's opinion, the results represented an encouraging sign for the establishment of a democratic system in Portugal. However, the US State Department did not share Britain's optimism. At an Anglo-American meeting held a few weeks later in Washington, Kissinger downplayed the importance of election figures, which he doubted would change the course of the revolution. At the end of June 1975, a report by British Military Intelligence warned that the distribution of political power in Portugal was still inversely proportional to the electoral results. In the following weeks, the PS, the centrist parties and the Western powers came to realise that the electoral victory upon which they had pinned their hopes was not sufficient to establish a pluralist system in Portugal.⁷⁷

In response to this situation, throughout the spring and summer of 1975 the Western allies pursued a diplomatic offensive to prevent Portugal from adopting State socialism. Nigel Trench received direct instructions from the FCO to increase diplomatic pressure on the Portuguese Prime Minister in order to reduce the increasing communist influence in the government and the state apparatus. During the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in August 1975, Wilson was 'brutally frank' in expressing to da Costa Gomes deep concerns about political trends in Portugal. Wilson discussed this issue in his audience with Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev, the success of whose policy of *détente* hinged upon that summit in Helsinki. The Labour leader expressed the West's concern over possible Soviet support of a communist coup in Portugal. He even alluded to a possible breakdown of the *détente* if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) backed the accession to power of Álvaro Cunhal's PCP.⁷⁸ When the CSCE drew to a close, Wilson and the leaders of seven other European Social Democratic parties travelled to Stockholm, where they founded the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy in Portugal.⁷⁹ In addition to offering economic aid, the members of this organisation committed themselves to making visits to Portugal in support of the socialists. They also planned to orchestrate solidarity campaigns and organise the celebration of Special Portugal Day.

According to the Ministry of Defence and British Military Intelligence, it was 'at the very least doubtful' whether the Russians were willing to support a new, costly Cuba in the Iberian Peninsula. Nor did it seem credible that Moscow should want to turn Cunhal into a new independent theorist in the style of Mao or Tito.⁸⁰ Although Moscow was more interested in intervening in the decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique than in influencing the process of democratisation in mainland Portugal, the country's internal drift towards a communist dictatorship rang alarm bells in the Western capitals. The need to ward off this threat led the Western powers to tactically support the counter-revolutionary agitation that spread throughout the north of the country in August 1975. This anti-communist mobilisation was one of the

primary strategic tools that tipped the balance in the political crisis in favour of the forces advocating western-style parliamentary democracy.⁸¹

The aim of this mobilisation, which saw the active participation of sectors of the PS, the landowning oligarchy, the Catholic Church and the extreme-right wing, was threefold. On the one hand, it was intended to restrain the growing political influence of the communists. On the other, it sought to turn the results of the elections into genuine political power. However, this mobilisation also aimed to reverse some of the more radical advances concerning democratisation of the state, regarded by the West as experiments that were unpredictable and dangerous in the international context of the mid-1970s. In this respect, the promise of the European model, which offered economic well-being and representative democracy in exchange for social order, was intended to be a substitute for greater redistribution of economic and political power in Portugal.⁸²

During August and September 1975, in the streets of Portugal, there was a genuine struggle for control of the revolution. The resulting confrontations brought the country to the brink of civil war during that *verao quente* of 1975. At the end of July, Soares asked the British government and the Socialist International for 'money and even weapons' in case civil war broke out.⁸³ Finally, the intense anti-communist mobilisation unleashed in the north of the country brought about the fall of the Fifth Provisional Government at the end of August 1975. This situation facilitated the setting up of a new government, for the first time made up primarily of social democrats and centrists. The governmental crisis of August 1975 therefore represented an important turning point in the course of the revolution.

According to *The Times* (10 September 1975), after that change of government, it seemed that Portugal had 'taken the first few steps on the road back to a pluralist democracy'. James Callaghan considered it essential to consolidate this political change through a quick show of support for the new moderate authorities. The act of offering bilateral economic aid to Portugal would be a 'demonstration of support for the Sixth Provisional Government which [would] help it to overcome its current problems'.⁸⁴ As a condition, the FCO demanded a halt to those experiments with 'direct democracy' that were incompatible with liberal tradition. The British ambassadors in the European capitals asked the EEC to provide continued assistance to Portugal. October 1975 saw the announcement of various multilateral and bilateral aid programmes that sought to reinforce the pro-Western line that had begun to emerge in Lisbon.⁸⁵ This political and economic support helped the moderate government to recover from the failed ultra-left-wing revolt of November 1975.

From that time onwards, the communists joined in the process of restraint agreed with the approval of the Western governments. This consensus culminated in the enactment of a new constitution in April 1976. Thus ended the complex, convulsive period of regime change in Portugal, one in which British intervention had played an important stabilising role. The UK and its partners in the EEC offered a safety net that facilitated the establishment of a Western-style democracy in Portugal. The trade-off was that the options for political participation were considerably restricted, the desire for social

transformation ignored and economic austerity imposed. From this perspective, the Portuguese transition might be said to be not only the origin of the Third Wave, but also the end of the ‘cycle of rebellion’, which had begun in Hungary in 1956 and whose political defeat paved the way for the neoliberal restoration of economic and social order that had been challenged by the spate of revolutions during the ‘long’ 1960s.

Conclusions

Pluralist democracy was neither the only possible alternative nor the inevitable outcome of the turbulent regime change in Portugal in 1974–76. Within an unpredictable context, the establishment of a pluralist system in the Iberian country would not have been possible without the intervention of a number of different international players. This result was closely linked to the specific historical and international context, which compounded the threat of social revolution, the loss of credibility of the ideological principles upon which the Cold War had been founded and the European integration agenda. The weakening of the political models of post-war reconstruction, the 1960s transnational cycle of social revolts and the crisis in trans-Atlantic relations had seriously eroded the disciplinary effectiveness of bipolar competition. An example of this is the fact that US policy in Portugal finally adopted the posture of its European allies, thereby implicitly accepting the ineffectiveness of Cold War solutions. These were replaced by the European model, which played an important role of political restraint in Portugal. Thus, dependence does not always equate to submission in the sphere of international relations. The links existing between UK and the USA did not give the superpower control over the British government’s policy towards Portugal.

British intervention in Portugal helped facilitate a stable outcome to that country’s acute political crisis. It also helped to tie Portugal to the Western world, halting the spread of neutralist stances within the country. The Wilson government deployed various initiatives in Portugal, involving economic aid, technical assistance and political pressure, that helped prevent the establishment of a communist dictatorship or the return to a right-wing one. London’s promises of modernisation assisted a moderate transition to a representative system, which would rein in the social democratic experiments carried out during 1974–75 and would also prevent the spread of the ‘revolutionary bug’ from Portugal to other countries in the region. Channelling the Portuguese revolution through the establishment of a parliamentary democracy brought to a close, the final chapter in the saga of rebellion that had spread throughout Europe during the previous two decades, and marked the beginning of the neoliberal restoration of the old order.

Notes

[1] See *Rezola, Os militares na revolução de Abril*.

[2] *Rosas, Portugal siglo XX (1890–1976)*, 133–134.

- [3] The concept *third wave democracy* was coined by this prominent political scientist in allusion to the ‘global democratic revolution’ which brought liberal government to over 30 countries between 1974 and 1990. The first wave developed from the early nineteenth century until Mussolini’s rise to power in Italy in 1922. The next wave of democracy took place during the two decades following the Second World War. See [Huntington](#), *Third Wave*.
- [4] [Grugel](#), *Democratization*, 12–32. In works such as [Varela](#), *Revolução ou Transição*; [Palacios](#), *O poder caiu na rua*; and [Manuel](#), *Uncertain Outcome*, mention has been made of the contingent nature of Portugal’s process of democratisation, and criticisms have been levelled at the teleological hypotheses upon which ‘transitology’ is founded. See [O’Donnell](#), [Schmitter](#), and [Whitehead](#), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*; and [Pridham](#), *Encouraging Democracy*.
- [5] In the weeks following the *captains’ coup*, the new British Ambassador in Lisbon sent one dispatch to London, entitled ‘The Coup d’Etat in Portugal: 1, The Happy Revolution’, National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), FCO, 9/2046.
- [6] [MacQueen and Oliveira](#), ‘*Grocer Meets Butcher*’, 36.
- [7] Soares was the Secretary-General of the PS Party, which had been set up in April 1973 under the auspices of Billy Brandt’s SPD. [Oliveira](#), ‘Generous Albion?’, 203.
- [8] To cite but a couple of examples, [Fonseca](#), ‘Federal Republic of Germany’; [Moreira](#), *Os Americanos*; [Opello](#), ‘Portugal: A Case Study’; and [Gaspar](#), ‘International Dimensions of the Portuguese Transition’.
- [9] See [Rollo](#), *Portugal e a reconstrução económica*.
- [10] See [Fonseca and Marcos](#), ‘Cold War Constraints’; [Fonseca](#), *Força das Armas*; and [Muñoz](#), ‘La socialdemocracia alemana’.
- [11] National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), ‘British wish to exchange policy assessment on Portugal’, 25 June 1974. Department of State (DOS) Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%133659&dt%2474&dl%1345>.
- [12] [MacQueen and Oliveira](#), ‘*Grocer Meets Butcher*’, 41–42; and [Oliveira](#), ‘United Kingdom and the Portuguese’.
- [13] On the close collaboration between the Nixon administration and the Portuguese regime, see [Antunes](#), *Nixon e Caetano*.
- [14] [Turner](#), *Britain and the World*, 178–180; and [Parr](#), *Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community*.
- [15] [Pine](#), *Harold Wilson and Europe*, 190.
- [16] [Varsori](#), ‘European Construction in the 1970s’, 34–37; and [Moeckli](#), *European Foreign Policy*.
- [17] See [Klimke and Scharloth](#), *1968 in Europe*, 4; and [Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki](#), *Crisis of Democracy*.
- [18] NARA, ‘The North Atlantic Alliance: Retrospect and Prospect’, February 5, 1975. DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%97499&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [19] [Di Nolfo](#), ‘Cold War and the Transformation’, 238; and [Pedaliu](#), ‘A Sea of Confusion’, 743.
- [20] Quoted in [Hamilton and Salmon](#), *Documents on British Policy*, 527; [Varsori](#), ‘Crisis and Stabilization,’ 7; [Castro](#), ‘CEE e o PREC’, 123–124; and [Costa Pinto and Teixeira](#), *Southern Europe and the Making*.
- [21] See [Rosas](#), *Salazar e o poder*. On the Portuguese accession to NATO, see [Teixeira](#), ‘Da neutralidade ao alinhamento’; and [Telo](#), *Portugal e a NATO*. A large proportion of this section is based on the final four chapters of [Oliveira](#), *Os Despojos da Aliança*.
- [22] See [Oliveira](#), ‘Harold MacMillan’; and [MacQueen](#), ‘Belated Decolonization and UN Politics’, 30–33.
- [23] [MacQueen](#), ‘Portugal’s First Domino’, 206; and [MacQueen](#), ‘Re-Defining the “African Vocation”’, 181–183.
- [24] [Stone](#), ‘Britain and Portuguese Africa’, 179–184; and [Coggins](#), ‘Wilson and Rhodesia’, 363–364. On the relations between Portugal and Rhodesia, see [Barroso](#), *Salazar, Caetano e o Reduto*

- Branco*. On the tense, relationship between Salazar and the 1960s American administrations, see *Schneidman*, *Engaging Africa*; *Rodrigues*, *Salazar-Kennedy: a Crise de uma Alianca*; and *Rodrigues*, 'About Face: the United States'.
- [25] Ultimately, the colonial conflict in which Portugal was entangled in Africa always remained 'a discrete war within the international scene'. *Costa Pinto*, *O Fim do Império Português*, 16.
- [26] *O'Hara and Parr*, 'Introduction: Fall and Rise', 297; and *Oliveira*, 'Live and Let Live', 200.
- [27] *Oliveira*, 'Live and Let Live', 201–202.
- [28] *MacQueen and Oliveira*, 'Grocer Meets Butcher', 31–32.
- [29] The same was true for other benevolent European governments towards authoritarian Portugal. For the case of Germany, see *Sanz*, 'La República Federal de Alemania', 759; and *Ferreira*, 'O 25 de Abril no contexto', 143–145.
- [30] 'Portugal: The New Situation', 31 May 1974. NAUK, British Council (BW) 52/26.
- [31] 'Coup d'état in Portugal: Possible Effects on Situation in Southern Africa', 26 April 1974, NAUK, Prime Minister's Office (PREM); 'Visit by Dr Mario Soares, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to UK', 24 May 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2073. Also see *Oliveira*, *Os Despojos da Aliança*; *MacQueen*, *Decolonization of Portuguese Africa*; and *Costa Pinto*, *O Fim do Império*.
- [32] 'Letter from Mr Trench to Mr Wiggin, 5 June 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2046.
- [33] *Brinca and Baia*, *Memórias da Revolução*.
- [34] *Maxwell*, 'Revolution of the Carnations', 146–147; *Hammond*, *Building Popular Power*, 82–88; *Ramos*, *Urban Social Movements*, 46–76; and *Varela*, *Historia do Povo*.
- [35] 'The Fall of Spínola', 2 October 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2059.
- [36] 'Possible Attempted Coup in Portugal and the Azores', 9 July 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2302.
- [37] *Oliveira*, 'O Flanco Sul', 68.
- [38] 'The Outlook for Portugal and its Relationships with the Western Alliance', 26 June 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2290; 'A Preliminary Assessment of the Military Consequences If Portugal Withdraws from NATO', 26 March 1975, NAUK, FCO, folder 9/2290.
- [39] 'Possible Attempted Coup in Portugal and the Azores', 9 July 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2302.
- [40] On the US position with regard to the Portuguese crisis, see *Moreira*, *Os Americanos na Revolução*; *Moreira and Gomes*, *Carlucci vs. Kissinger*; *Del Pero*, 'United States and the Crises', 306–307; *Suri*, *Power and Protest*; and *Lemus*, 'Ford ante el 25 de Abril'.
- [41] *Del Pero*, 'Which Chile, Allende?' 648–649.
- [42] 'Anglo-American Talks on Portugal and Portuguese Territories', 9 July 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2302.
- [43] 'Portugal: Training of Presidential Bodyguards', 16 October 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2078.
- [44] NARA, 'Portugal', 20 May 1975, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%229819&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [45] *Hamilton and Salmon*, *Documents on British Policy*, 417. Anglo-American differences regarding the south of Europe were not new. They had already become apparent during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. An additional example, almost contemporaneous to that of Portugal, is represented by the divergent UK and US approaches to the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. See *Hughes*, 'Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance', 3–33.
- [46] Minute from Mr Thomas to Sir John Killick, 24 October 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2047.
- [47] 'Aid and Technical Assistance from the United Kingdom to Portugal', 3 April 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2305.
- [48] 'Antunes Visit to UK', 29 June 1975, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%150882&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [49] 'Aid and Technical Assistance from the United Kingdom to Portugal', 3 April 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2305.
- [50] 'UK Aid Mission to Portugal, Summary Report', 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2302.
- [51] 'Memorandum of Conversation', 30 May 1975. Foreign Affairs and National Security, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 1-21. Gerald Ford Library.

- [52] 'Future Policy towards Portugal', 1 April 1975. NAUK, FCO 9/2293.
- [53] See, for instance, the cases of Vietnam and Greece, in Young, 'Britain and LBJ's War', 63–92; Vickers, 'Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party', 43–72; Maragkou, 'Wilson Government's Responses', 162–180; and Vickers, *Labour Party and the World*, 14–15.
- [54] NARA, 'Consultation on Portugal', 3 February 1975, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%96137&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [55] According to the US Embassy, Young also met with American officers to 'urge US financial assistance to "center" parties of Portugal to help them stem the "drift to the left"'. NARA, 'Conservative Party views on Portugal', 4 February 1975, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%101088&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [56] 'UK Aid Mission to Portugal. Summary Report', 16 June 1975, NAUK, FCO 09/2302; 'Visit of the CDS leaders from Portugal', 10 December 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2075; and Opello, 'Portugal: A Case Study', 90–91.
- [57] 'Visit of the CDS Leaders from Portugal', 10 December 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2075.
- [58] NARA, 'CDS Representative at Conservative Party Conference', 15 October 1975, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%291867&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [59] 'Developments in Portugal', 7 October 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2273.
- [60] NARA, 'British Assessment of Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares', 30 May 1974, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%107468&dt%2474&dl%1345>.
- [61] Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, 360; and Sablosky, *OPSEA transição para a democracia*.
- [62] 'Secretary of State's Visit to Portugal', 12 February 1975, NAUK, FCO, folder 9/2296.
- [63] NARA, 'The TUC Talks to the Foreign Secretary', 5 February 1975, DOS Telegrams, <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid%99601&dt%2476&dl%1345>.
- [64] 'Portugal: Training of Presidential Bodyguards', 16 October 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2078.
- [65] Favretto, *Wilson Governments*, 421–444.
- [66] Quoted in Hamilton and Salmon, *Documents on British Policy*, 398.
- [67] See Costa Pinto, 'Political Purges and State Crisis', 310–320.
- [68] 'Oral Answers', 6 August 1975, NAUK, FCO 26/1704.
- [69] 'PQ by Mr Winston Churchill for Answer Today, BBC External Services', 16 July 1975, NAUK, FCO 26/1704.
- [70] See Bermeo, *Revolution within the Revolution*, 36.
- [71] 'Portugal, Annual Review for 1975', 21 January 1976, NAUK, FCO 9/2416.
- [72] 'Message from the Secretary to Foreign Secretary Callaghan', 22 May 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2302; and Oliveira, 'United Kingdom and the Portuguese', 6.
- [73] Horn, *Spirit of '68*, 259.
- [74] 'Foreign Affairs, Portugal. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet', 25 March 1975. NAUK, CAB/128/56/6.
- [75] 'Relations between Portugal and UK', 23 March 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2293.
- [76] 'Portuguese Observers at the General election', 31 October 1974, NAUK, FCO 9/2078.
- [77] 'UN Special Session: Meeting with Dr Kissinger', 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2302; Mr Callaghan to Sir N. Henderson, 30 April 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2322.
- [78] Wilson, *Final Term*, 168–172.
- [79] The Committee's working sessions started shortly afterwards at a meeting in London backed by the British Labour government. 'Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal', 1975. NAUK, PREM, 16/1053.
- [80] Letter from Sir J. Killick to Mr Trench, 5 May 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2290.
- [81] Palacios, 'Confrontación, violencia política y democratización, Portugal 1975', 190.
- [82] Graham and Quiroga, 'After the Fear was Over?', 517–518; and Whitehead, 'International Politics of Democratization', 820.
- [83] Soares' quote in Hamilton and Salmon, *Documents on British Policy*, 425.

[84] 'Aid to Portugal', 22 September 1975, NAUK, FCO 59/1307.

[85] 'Relations between Portugal and ECC', 22 August 1975, NAUK, FCO 9/2307.

References

- Antunes, Jose Freire. *Nixon e Caetano: Promessas e Abandono* [Nixon and Caetano: Promises and Abandonment]. Lisboa: Difusao Cultural, 2012.
- Barroso, Luis. *Salazar, Caetano e o "Reduto Branco": A manobra politico-diplomática de Portugal na África Austral, 1952-1974* [Salazar, Caetano and the 'Reduto Branco'. A Political and Diplomatic Manoeuvre of Portugal in Southern Africa, 1952-1974]. Lisbon: Fronteira do Caos, 2012.
- Bermeo, Nancy. *The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers' Control in Rural Portugal*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Brinca, Pedro and Etelvina Baia. *Memórias da Revolução no distrito de Setúbal*. Setúbal: Setubal na Rede, 2000.
- Callaghan, James. *Time and Chance*. London: William Collins, 1987.
- Castro, Francisco. 'ACEE e o PREC' ['The EEC and Processo Revolucionario em Curso']. *Penópe* 26 (2002): 123-157.
- Coggins, Richard. 'Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa.' *Contemporary British History* 20 (2006): 363-381.
- Costa Pinto, António. *O Fim do Império Português. A cena internacional, a Guerra colonial e a descolonização* [The End of the Portuguese Empire. The International Scene, the Colonial War and the Decolonization]. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2001.
- Costa Pinto, António. 'Political Purges and State Crisis in Portugal's Transition to Democracy, 1975-1976.' *Journal of Contemporary History* 43 (2008): 305-322.
- Costa Pinto, António, and Nuno S. Teixeira, eds. *Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Crozier, Michel, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. *The Crisis of Democracy*. New York: New York University Press, 1975.
- Del Pero, Mario. 'Which Chile, Allende? Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese Revolution.' *Cold War History* 11 (2011): 625-657.
- Del Pero, Mario. 'The United States and the Crises in Southern Europe.' In *Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s. Entering a Different World*, edited by Antonio Varsori, and Guia Migani. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011.
- Di Nolfo, Ennio. 'The Cold War and the Transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960-1975.' In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Crisis and Détente*, edited by Melvin Leffler, and Odd A. Westad, 238-257. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Favretto, Ilaria. 'The Wilson Governments and the Italian Center-Left Coalitions: Between "Socialist" Diplomacy and Realpolitik, 1964-1970.' *European History Quarterly* 36 (2006): 421-444.
- Ferreira, José Medeiros. 'O 25 de Abril no contexto internacional' ['The 25 of April and the International Context']. *Relações Internacionais* 2 (2004): 143-158.
- Fonseca, Ana M. 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974-1976).' *Journal of European Integration History* 15 (2009): 35-56.
- Fonseca, Ana M. *A Força das Armas: o apoio da República Federal da Alemanha ao Estado Novo (1958-1968)* [Force of Arms: The Support of the German Federal Republic for the Portuguese Estado Novo Regime (1958-1968)]. Lisboa: Instituto Diplomático, 2007.
- Fonseca, Ana M., and Daniel Marcos. 'Cold War Constraints: France, Germany and the Portuguese Decolonization.' *Portuguese Studies* 29 (2013): 209-226.

- Gaspar, Carlos. 'International Dimensions of the Portuguese Transition.', Paper presented at the conference "The Transition in Spain, Portugal and Greece. Thirty Years After", Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, Athens, 2006, pp. 121–142, 2004.
- Graham, Helen, and Alejandro Quiroga. 'After the Fear was Over? What Came After Dictatorships in Spain, Greece, and Portugal.' In *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History*, edited by Dan Stone, 502–525. London: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Grugel, Jean. *Democratization. A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
- Hamilton, Keith, and Patrick Salmon. *Documents on British Policy Overseas. The Southern Flank in Crisis*. London: Whitehall History, 2006.
- Hammond, John. *Building Popular Power: Workers' and Neighborhood Movements in the Portuguese Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988.
- Horn, Gerd. *Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Hughes, Geraint. 'Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab–Israeli War of 1973.' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10 (2008): 3–33.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
- Klimke, Martin, and Joachim Scharloth. *1968 in Europe. A History of Protest and Activism, 1956–1977*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
- Lemus, Encarna. 'La reacción de la administración Ford ante el 25 de Abril' [The Ford Administration's Reaction to the 25 April Revolution]. In *El fin de las dictaduras ibéricas (1974–1978)*, edited by Encarna Lemus, Fernando Rosas, and Raquel Varela, 41–62. Seville: Ediciones Pluma, 2010.
- MacQueen, Norrie. *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa. Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*. London: Longman, 1997.
- MacQueen, Norrie. 'Belated Decolonization and UN Politics Against the Backdrop of the Cold War: Portugal, Britain, and Guinea-Bissau's Proclamation of Independence, 1973–1974.' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8 (2006): 29–56.
- MacQueen, Norrie. 'Portugal's First Domino: "Pluricontinentalism" and Colonial War in Guiné-Bissau, 1963–1974.' *Contemporary European History* 2 (1999): 209–230.
- MacQueen, Norrie. 'Re-Defining the "African Vocation": Portugal's Post-Colonial Identity Crisis.' *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 11 (2003): 181–199.
- MacQueen, Norrie, and Pedro Aires Oliveira. 'Grocer Meets Butcher: Marcello Caetano's London visit of 1973 and the last days of Portugal's Estado Novo.' *Cold War History* 10 (2010): 29–50.
- Manuel, Paul. *Uncertain Outcome. The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995.
- Maragkou, Konstantina. 'The Wilson Government's Responses to the "Rape of Greek Democracy"?' *Journal of Contemporary History* 45 (2010): 162–180.
- Maxwell, Kenneth. 'Portugal: "The Revolution of the Carnations", 1974–75.' In *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*, edited by Adam Roberts, and Timothy Garton Ash. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Moeckli, Daniel. *European Foreign Policy During the Cold War Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009.
- Moreira, Tiago. *Os Americanos na Revolução Portuguesa* [The Americans and the Portuguese Revolution]. Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, 2004.
- Moreira, Tiago, and Bernardino Gomes. *Carlucci vs. Kissinger. Os EUA e a Revolução Portuguesa* [Carlucci vs. Kissinger. The US and the Portuguese Revolution]. Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2008.
- Muñoz, Antonio. 'La socialdemocracia alemana y el Estado Novo (1961–1974)' [The German Social Democrats and the Estado Novo (1961–1974)]. *Portuguese Studies Review* 13 (2005): 447–503.

- O'Donnell, Guillermo, Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- O'Hara, Glen, and Helen Parr. 'Introduction: Fall and Rise of a Reputation.' *Contemporary British History* 20 (2006): 295–302.
- Oliveira, Pedro Aires. 'Generous Albion? Portuguese Anti-Salazarists in the United Kingdom, c. 1960–74.' *Portuguese Studies* 27 (2011): 175–207.
- Oliveira, Pedro Aires. 'Harold MacMillan, "Os Ventos de Mudança", e a crisi colonial portuguesa (1960–1961).' *Relações Internacionais* 30 (2011): 21–38.
- Oliveira, Pedro Aires. 'Live and Let Live: Britain and Portugal's Imperial Endgame (1945–75).' *Portuguese Studies* 29 (2013): 186–208.
- Oliveira, Pedro Aires. 'O Flanco Sul sob Tensão. A NATO e a Revolução Portuguesa, 1974–1975.' *Relações Internacionais* 21 (2009): 61–78.
- Oliveira, Pedro Aires. *Os Despojos da Aliança: A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa, 1945–1975* [Great Britain and the Portuguese Colonial Issue, 1945–1975]. Lisbon: Tinta-da-China, 2007.
- Oliveira, Pedro Aires. 'The United Kingdom and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy, 1974–75.' Paper presented at the research seminar "Southern European Democracies: Legacies of the Past and International Constraints", Institute of Social Sciences, October 16–17, 2008.
- Opello, Walter. 'Portugal: A case study of international determinants of regime transition.' In *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regimen Transition in Southern Europe*, edited by Geoffrey Pridham, 84–102. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991.
- Palacios, Diego. 'Confrontación, Violencia Política y Democratización. Portugal 1975' ['Contention, Political Violence and Democratization. Portugal 1975']. *Política y Sociedad* 40 (2003): 189–213.
- Palacios, Diego. *O poder caiu na rua. Crise de Estado e acções colectivas na revolução portuguesa* [Power in the Street: State Crisis and Collective Action during the Portuguese Revolution]. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2003.
- Parr, Helen. *Britain's Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain's World Role, 1964–67*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Pedaliu, Effie. 'A Sea of Confusion: The Mediterranean and Détente, 1969–1974.' *Diplomatic History* 33 (2009): 735–750.
- Pine, Melissa. *Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Britain's Membership of the European Community*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regimen Transition in Southern Europe*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991.
- Ramos, Pedro. 'Urban Social Movements and the Transition to Democracy in Portugal, 1974–1976.' *The Historical Journal* 51 (2008): 46–76.
- Rezola, Maria I. *Os militares na revolução de Abril: O conselho da revolução e a transição para a democracia em Portugal (1974–1976)*. Lisbon: Campo da Comunicação, 2006.
- Rodrigues, Luis Nuno. 'About Face: the United States and Portuguese Colonialism in 1961.' *E-Journal of Portuguese History* 2 (2004): 1–9.
- Rodrigues, Luis Nuno. *Salazar-Kennedy: a Crise de uma Aliança*. Lisbon: Editorial Noticias, 2002.
- Rollo, María F. *Portugal e a reconstrução económica do Pós-Guerra* [Portugal and the Postwar Economic Recovery]. Lisbon: Biblioteca Diplomática, 2007.
- Rosas, Fernando. *Portugal siglo XX (1890–1976). Pensamiento y acción política* [Portugal Twentieth Century (1890–1976). Thought and Political Action]. Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2004.
- Rosas, Fernando. *Salazar e o poder. A arte de saber durar* [Salazar and the Power. The Art of Endurance]. Lisbon: Tinta da china, 2012.

- Sablosky, Juliet Antunes. *O PS e a transição para a democracia. Relações com os partidos socialistas europeus* [The Portuguese Socialist Party and the Transition to Democracy. Relations with the European Socialist Parties]. Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2000.
- Sanz, Carlos. 'La República Federal de Alemania ante el fin de las dictaduras ibéricas (1974–1976): miradas entrecruzadas' [The Federal Republic of Germany and the End of the Iberian Dictatorships (1974–1976): Exchanged Views]. *Hispania* 242 (2012): 755–788.
- Schneidman, Witney. *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire*. Lanham: University Press of America, 2004.
- Stone, Glyn. 'Britain and Portuguese Africa, 1961–65.' *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28 (2000): 169–192.
- Suri, Jeremy. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Turner, Michael. *Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century: Ever Decreasing Circles*. London: Continuum International, 2010.
- Teixeira, Nuno S. 'Da neutralidade ao alinhamento. Portugal na fundação do Pacto do Atlântico' [From Neutrality to Isolation. Portugal and the Foundation of the Atlantic Pact]. *Análise Social* 120 (1993): 55–80.
- Telo, António. *Portugal e a NATO. O Reencontro da Tradição Atlântica* [Portugal and NATO. The Reunion of the Atlantic Tradition]. Lisbon: Cosmos, 1995.
- Varela, Raquel. *Historia do Povo na Revolução Portuguesa 1974–1975* [History of the Populace in the Portuguese Revolution 1974–1975]. Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 2012.
- Varela, Raquel. *Revolução ou Transição? História y Memória da Revolução dos Cravos* [Revolution or Transition? History and Memory of the Carnation Revolution]. Lisbon: Bertrand Editora, 2011.
- Varsori, Antonio. 'Crisis and Stabilization in Southern Europe During the 1970s: Western Strategies, European Instruments.' *Journal of European Integration History* 15 (2009): 3–15.
- Varsori, Antonio. 'The European Construction in the 1970s. The Great Divide.' In *Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s. Entering a Different World*, edited by Antonio Varsori, and Guia Migani, 27–41. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010.
- Vickers, Rhiannon. 'Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party and the War in Vietnam.' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10 (2008): 43–72.
- Vickers, Rhiannon. *Labour Party and the World: Labour's Foreign Policy Since 1951*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.
- Whitehead, Laurence. 'The International Politics of Democratization from Portugal (1974) to Iraq (2003).' In *The International Politics of Democratization. Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Nuno Teixeira, 8–25. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Wilson, Harold. *Final Term. The Labour Government, 1974–1976*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979.
- Young, J. 'Britain and LBJ's War, 1964–1968.' *Cold War History* 2 (2002): 63–92.