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Protocol Analysis with Time

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Protocol Analysis with Time

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Nombre: Aparicio-SanchezE ...
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dc.contributor.author Aparicio-Sánchez, Damián es_ES
dc.contributor.author Escobar Román, Santiago es_ES
dc.contributor.author Meadows, Catherine es_ES
dc.contributor.author Meseguer, José es_ES
dc.contributor.author Sapiña-Sanchis, Julia es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2022-01-18T08:11:15Z
dc.date.available 2022-01-18T08:11:15Z
dc.date.issued 2020-12-16 es_ES
dc.identifier.isbn 978-3-030-65276-0 es_ES
dc.identifier.issn 0302-9743 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10251/179781
dc.description.abstract [EN] We present a framework suited to the analysis of cryptographic protocols that make use of time in their execution. We provide a process algebra syntax that makes time information available to processes, and a transition semantics that takes account of fundamental properties of time. Additional properties can be added by the user if desirable. This timed protocol framework can be implemented either as a simulation tool or as a symbolic analysis tool in which time references are represented by logical variables, and in which the properties of time are implemented as constraints on those time logical variables. These constraints are carried along the symbolic execution of the protocol. The satisfiability of these constraints can be evaluated as the analysis proceeds, so attacks that violate the laws of physics can be rejected as impossible. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by using the Maude-NPA protocol analyzer together with an SMT solver that is used to evaluate the satisfiability of timing constraints. We provide a sound and complete protocol transformation from our timed process algebra to the Maude-NPA syntax and semantics, and we prove its soundness and completeness. We then use the tool to analyze Mafia fraud and distance hijacking attacks on a suite of distance-bounding protocols. es_ES
dc.description.sponsorship This paper was partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MCIU under grant RTI2018-094403-B-C32, by the Spanish Generalitat Valenciana under grant PROMETEO/2019/098 and APOSTD/2019/127, by the US Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0286, and by ONR Code 311. es_ES
dc.language Inglés es_ES
dc.publisher Springer es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2020: 21st International Conference on Cryptology in India, Bangalore, India, December 13¿16, 2020, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volumen 12578 es_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseries Lecture Notes in Computer Science;12578 es_ES
dc.rights Reserva de todos los derechos es_ES
dc.subject.classification LENGUAJES Y SISTEMAS INFORMATICOS es_ES
dc.title Protocol Analysis with Time es_ES
dc.type Comunicación en congreso es_ES
dc.type Artículo es_ES
dc.type Capítulo de libro es_ES
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_7 es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/RTI2018-094403-B-C32/ES/RAZONAMIENTO FORMAL PARA TECNOLOGIAS FACILITADORAS Y EMERGENTES/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ONR//Code 311/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ //FA9550-17-1-0266//Advanced symbolic methods for the cryptographic protocol analyzer Maude-NPA/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement///PROMETEO%2F2019%2F098//DEEPTRUST/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement///APOSTD%2F2019%2F127//CONTRATO POSDOCTORAL GVA-SAPIÑA SANCHIS. PROYECTO: METODOS SIMBOLICOS AVANZADOS PARA EL ANALISIS DE SEGURIDAD DE PROTOCOLOS/ es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights Abierto es_ES
dc.contributor.affiliation Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos y Computación - Departament de Sistemes Informàtics i Computació es_ES
dc.description.bibliographicCitation Aparicio-Sánchez, D.; Escobar Román, S.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J.; Sapiña-Sanchis, J. (2020). Protocol Analysis with Time. Springer. 128-150. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_7 es_ES
dc.description.accrualMethod S es_ES
dc.relation.conferencename 21st International Conference on Cryptology in India (INDOCRYPT 2020) es_ES
dc.relation.conferencedate Diciembre 13-16,2020 es_ES
dc.relation.conferenceplace Online es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_7 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpinicio 128 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpfin 150 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.relation.pasarela S\421625 es_ES
dc.contributor.funder Office of Naval Research es_ES
dc.contributor.funder European Regional Development Fund es_ES
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