Competition in Service Provision between Slice Operators in 5G Networks

Abstract

[EN] Network slicing is gaining an increasing importance as an effective way to introduce flexibility in the management of resources in 5G networks. We envision a scenario where a set of network operators outsource their respective networks to one Infrastructure Provider (InP), and use network slicing mechanisms to request the resources as needed for service provision. The InP is then responsible for the network operation and maintenance, while the network operators become Virtual Network Operators (VNOs). We model a setting where two VNOs compete for the users in terms of quality of service, by strategically distributing its share of the aggregated cells capacity managed by the InP among its subscribers. The results show that the rate is allocated among the subscribers at each cell in a way that mimics the overall share that each VNO is entitled to, and that this allocation is the Nash equilibrium of the strategic slicing game between the VNOs. We conclude that network sharing and slicing provide an attractive flexibility in the allocation of resources without the need to enforce a policy through the InP.