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An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

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An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

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dc.contributor.author Arshad, Muhammad es_ES
dc.contributor.author Khalid, Qazi Salam es_ES
dc.contributor.author Lloret, Jaime es_ES
dc.contributor.author León Fernández, Antonio es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2020-05-13T03:02:43Z
dc.date.available 2020-05-13T03:02:43Z
dc.date.issued 2018-10 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10251/143000
dc.description.abstract [EN] In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer's direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality. es_ES
dc.description.sponsorship This research was funded by Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de Espana grant number BIA2017-87573-C2-2-P. es_ES
dc.language Inglés es_ES
dc.publisher MDPI AG es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof Sustainability es_ES
dc.rights Reconocimiento (by) es_ES
dc.subject Dal channel es_ES
dc.subject Supply chain management es_ES
dc.subject Competitive advantage es_ES
dc.subject Game theory es_ES
dc.subject Price dependent demand es_ES
dc.subject.classification INGENIERIA TELEMATICA es_ES
dc.title An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management es_ES
dc.type Artículo es_ES
dc.identifier.doi 10.3390/su10103433 es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/BIA2017-87573-C2-2-P/ES/DESARROLLO Y APLICACION DE ENSAYOS NO DESTRUCTIVOS BASADOS EN ONDAS MECANICAS PARA LA EVALUACION Y MONITORIZACION DE REOLOGIA Y AUTOSANACION EN MATERIALES CEMENTANTES/ es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights Abierto es_ES
dc.contributor.affiliation Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Comunicaciones - Departament de Comunicacions es_ES
dc.description.bibliographicCitation Arshad, M.; Khalid, QS.; Lloret, J.; León Fernández, A. (2018). An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management. Sustainability. 10(10). https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103433 es_ES
dc.description.accrualMethod S es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103433 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.description.volume 10 es_ES
dc.description.issue 10 es_ES
dc.identifier.eissn 2071-1050 es_ES
dc.relation.pasarela S\377137 es_ES
dc.contributor.funder Agencia Estatal de Investigación es_ES


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