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Address Space Layout Randomization Next Generation

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Address Space Layout Randomization Next Generation

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Nombre: Marco-Gisbert;Rip ...
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dc.contributor.author Marco-Gisbert, Héctor es_ES
dc.contributor.author Ripoll-Ripoll, Ismael es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2020-06-02T05:37:08Z
dc.date.available 2020-06-02T05:37:08Z
dc.date.issued 2019-07-22 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10251/144813
dc.description.abstract [EN] Systems that are built using low-power computationally-weak devices, which force developers to favor performance over security; which jointly with its high connectivity, continuous and autonomous operation makes those devices specially appealing to attackers. ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) is one of the most effective mitigation techniques against remote code execution attacks, but when it is implemented in a practical system its effectiveness is jeopardized by multiple constraints: the size of the virtual memory space, the potential fragmentation problems, compatibility limitations, etc. As a result, most ASLR implementations (specially in 32-bits) fail to provide the necessary protection. In this paper we propose a taxonomy of all ASLR elements, which categorizes the entropy in three dimensions: (1) how, (2) when and (3) what; and includes novel forms of entropy. Based on this taxonomy we have created, ASLRA, an advanced statistical analysis tool to assess the effectiveness of any ASLR implementation. Our analysis show that all ASLR implementations suffer from several weaknesses, 32-bit systems provide a poor ASLR, and OS X has a broken ASLR in both 32- and 64-bit systems. This is jeopardizing not only servers and end users devices as smartphones but also the whole IoT ecosystem. To overcome all these issues, we present ASLR-NG, a novel ASLR that provides the maximum possible absolute entropy and removes all correlation attacks making ASLR-NG the best solution for both 32- and 64-bit systems. We implemented ASLR-NG in the Linux kernel 4.15. The comparative evaluation shows that ASLR-NG overcomes PaX, Linux and OS X implementations, providing strong protection to prevent attackers from abusing weak ASLRs. es_ES
dc.language Inglés es_ES
dc.publisher MDPI AG es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof Applied Sciences es_ES
dc.rights Reconocimiento (by) es_ES
dc.subject Security es_ES
dc.subject Internet of things address space layout randomisation es_ES
dc.subject Vulnerability analysis es_ES
dc.subject Protection techniques es_ES
dc.subject.classification ARQUITECTURA Y TECNOLOGIA DE COMPUTADORES es_ES
dc.title Address Space Layout Randomization Next Generation es_ES
dc.type Artículo es_ES
dc.identifier.doi 10.3390/app9142928 es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights Abierto es_ES
dc.contributor.affiliation Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Informática de Sistemas y Computadores - Departament d'Informàtica de Sistemes i Computadors es_ES
dc.description.bibliographicCitation Marco-Gisbert, H.; Ripoll-Ripoll, I. (2019). Address Space Layout Randomization Next Generation. Applied Sciences. 9(14):1-25. https://doi.org/10.3390/app9142928 es_ES
dc.description.accrualMethod S es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion https://doi.org/10.3390/app9142928 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpinicio 1 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpfin 25 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.description.volume 9 es_ES
dc.description.issue 14 es_ES
dc.identifier.eissn 2076-3417 es_ES
dc.relation.pasarela S\391737 es_ES
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