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Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions

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Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions

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dc.contributor.author Erbatur, Serdar es_ES
dc.contributor.author Escobar Román, Santiago es_ES
dc.contributor.author Kapur, Deepak es_ES
dc.contributor.author Liu, Zhiqiang es_ES
dc.contributor.author Lynch, Christopher es_ES
dc.contributor.author Meadows, Catherine es_ES
dc.contributor.author Meseguer, José es_ES
dc.contributor.author Narendran, Paliath es_ES
dc.contributor.author Santiago Pinazo, Sonia es_ES
dc.contributor.author Sasse, Ralf es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-14T12:03:09Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.isbn 978-3-642-33166-4
dc.identifier.issn 0302-9743
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10251/36519
dc.description.abstract We address a problem that arises in cryptographic protocol analysis when the equational properties of the cryptosystem are taken into account: in many situations it is necessary to guarantee that certain terms generated during a state exploration are in normal form with respect to the equational theory. We give a tool-independent methodology for state exploration, based on unification and narrowing, that generates states that obey these irreducibility constraints, called contextual symbolic reachability analysis, prove its soundness and completeness, and describe its implementation in the Maude-NPA protocol analysis tool. Contextual symbolic reachability analysis also introduces a new type of unification mechanism, which we call asymmetric unification, in which any solution must leave the right side of the solution irreducible. We also present experiments showing the effectiveness of our methodology. es_ES
dc.description.sponsorship S. Escobar and S. Santiago have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MEC/MICINN under grant TIN 2010-21062-C02-02, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. The following authors have been partially supported by NSF: S. Escobar, J. Meseguer and R. Sasse under grants CCF 09- 05584, CNS 09-04749, and CNS 09-05584; D. Kapur under grant CNS 09-05222; C. Lynch, Z. Liu, and C. Meadows under grant CNS 09-05378, and P. Narendran and S. Erbatur under grant CNS 09-05286.
dc.format.extent 18 es_ES
dc.language Inglés es_ES
dc.publisher Springer Verlag (Germany) es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof Computer Security - ESORICS 2012 es_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseries Lecture Notes in Computer Science;vol. 7459
dc.rights Reserva de todos los derechos es_ES
dc.subject Systems and data security es_ES
dc.subject Data encryption es_ES
dc.subject.classification LENGUAJES Y SISTEMAS INFORMATICOS es_ES
dc.title Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions es_ES
dc.type Capítulo de libro es_ES
dc.embargo.lift 10000-01-01
dc.embargo.terms forever es_ES
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//TIN2010-21062-C02-02/ES/SWEETLOGICS-UPV/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/NSF//0905584/US/TC: Medium: Collaborative Research: Rewriting Logic Foundations for Verification and Programming of Next-Generation Trustworthy Web-Based Systems/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/NSF//0905378/US/TC: Medium: Collaborative Research: Unification Laboratory: Increasing the Power of Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Tools/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/NSF//0905286/US/TC: Medium: Collaborative Research: Unification Laboratory: Increasing the Power of Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Tools/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/NSF//0905222/US/TC: Medium: Collaborative Research: Unification Laboratory: Increasing the Power of Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Tools/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/NSF//0904749/US/TC: Medium: Collaborative Research: Unification Laboratory: Increasing the Power of Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Tools/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/GVA//PROMETEO%2F2011%2F052/ES/LOGICEXTREME: TECNOLOGIA LOGICA Y SOFTWARE SEGURO/ es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights Abierto es_ES
dc.contributor.affiliation Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos y Computación - Departament de Sistemes Informàtics i Computació es_ES
dc.description.bibliographicCitation Erbatur, S.; Escobar Román, S.; Kapur, D.; Liu, Z.; Lynch, C.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J.... (2012). Effective symbolic protocol analysis via equational irreducibility conditions. En Computer Security - ESORICS 2012. Springer Verlag (Germany). 7459:73-90. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5 es_ES
dc.description.accrualMethod S es_ES
dc.relation.conferencename 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security 2012 es_ES
dc.relation.conferencedate September 10-12, 2012 es_ES
dc.relation.conferenceplace Pisa, Italy es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-33167-1_5 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpinicio 73 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpfin 90 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.description.volume 7459 es_ES
dc.relation.senia 241041
dc.contributor.funder European Regional Development Fund
dc.contributor.funder Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
dc.contributor.funder Generalitat Valenciana
dc.contributor.funder National Science Foundation, EEUU
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