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dc.contributor.author | Lapiedra-Alcami, Rosa | es_ES |
dc.contributor.author | Reig Fabado, Isabel | es_ES |
dc.contributor.author | Rueda Armengot, Carlos | es_ES |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-12T11:50:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-01-12T11:50:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-05 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0264-2069 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10251/59707 | |
dc.description.abstract | The franchisee is usually the most vulnerable part of the franchise relationship, and should therefore receive greater protection from the legal framework. In this regard, the franchisor's pre-contractual disclosure duty has evolved in its legal status. Whereas its original purpose was to ensure transparency in the market, it now serves to protect the franchisee. In this paper, we compare the franchisor's obligations established by the legal framework in Spain with those set out in the Model Law drawn up by The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. | es_ES |
dc.language | Inglés | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis | es_ES |
dc.relation.ispartof | Service Industries Journal | es_ES |
dc.rights | Reserva de todos los derechos | es_ES |
dc.subject | Franchising | es_ES |
dc.subject | Duty of disclosure | es_ES |
dc.subject | Franchisee protection | es_ES |
dc.subject.classification | ORGANIZACION DE EMPRESAS | es_ES |
dc.title | Franchisors' disclosure duty: market transparency and franchisee protection | es_ES |
dc.type | Artículo | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/02642069.2014.905917 | |
dc.rights.accessRights | Abierto | es_ES |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Organización de Empresas - Departament d'Organització d'Empreses | es_ES |
dc.description.bibliographicCitation | Lapiedra-Alcami, R.; Reig Fabado, I.; Rueda Armengot, C. (2014). Franchisors' disclosure duty: market transparency and franchisee protection. Service Industries Journal. 34(9-10):788-795. doi:10.1080/02642069.2014.905917 | es_ES |
dc.description.accrualMethod | S | es_ES |
dc.relation.publisherversion | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02642069.2014.905917 | es_ES |
dc.description.upvformatpinicio | 788 | es_ES |
dc.description.upvformatpfin | 795 | es_ES |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | es_ES |
dc.description.volume | 34 | es_ES |
dc.description.issue | 9-10 | es_ES |
dc.relation.senia | 275953 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1743-9507 | |
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