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Maximum-Profit Two-Sided Pricing in Service Platforms Based on Wireless Sensor Networks

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Maximum-Profit Two-Sided Pricing in Service Platforms Based on Wireless Sensor Networks

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Guijarro, L.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Naldi, M. (2016). Maximum-Profit Two-Sided Pricing in Service Platforms Based on Wireless Sensor Networks. IEEE Wireless Communications Letters. 5(1):8-11. doi:10.1109/LWC.2015.2487259

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Título: Maximum-Profit Two-Sided Pricing in Service Platforms Based on Wireless Sensor Networks
Autor:
Entidad UPV: Universitat Politècnica de València. Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros de Telecomunicación - Escola Tècnica Superior d'Enginyers de Telecomunicació
Fecha difusión:
Resumen:
A business model for Internet-of-Things-based services is proposed whereby a platform serves as an intermediary between human users and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts both the ...[+]
Palabras clave: Wireless sensor networks , Two-sided markets , Service provision
Derechos de uso: Reserva de todos los derechos
Fuente:
IEEE Wireless Communications Letters. (issn: 2162-2337 )
DOI: 10.1109/LWC.2015.2487259
Editorial:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LWC.2015.2487259
Descripción: (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.
Tipo: Artículo

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