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Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for the Internet of Things Based on Sensor Virtualization

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Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for the Internet of Things Based on Sensor Virtualization

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dc.contributor.author Guijarro, Luis es_ES
dc.contributor.author Pla, Vicent es_ES
dc.contributor.author Vidal Catalá, José Ramón es_ES
dc.contributor.author Naldi, Maurizio es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2018-03-18T05:19:52Z
dc.date.available 2018-03-18T05:19:52Z
dc.date.issued 2017 es_ES
dc.identifier.issn 0733-8716 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10251/99493
dc.description.abstract [EN] The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to bring major benefits to a wide range of areas. However, the successful deployment of the IoT calls for the existence of sustainable and well-understood business models. In this paper, we propose and analyze a business model for a likely scenario in the IoT, which is made up of WSNs, service providers and users. The service providers compete against each other in the intermediation between the virtualized WSNs and the users that benefit from enhanced services built on the sensed data. The service providers pay to the WSNs for the data and charge the users for the service. The model is analyzed by applying oligopoly theory and game theory, the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are established, and the equilibrium and the social optimum are obtained. Our results show that the business model is sustainable, provided that the users¿ sensitivity to the value-to-price ratio is not negligible and, in this situation, the number of active service providers is upper bounded by a value that depends on the sensitivity and the market size. Furthermore, the operation of such a market is shown to efficiently use the information provided by the WSNs, and, when compared to the social optimum, to produce an increase in users¿ and service providers¿ surpluses, but a reduction in WSNs¿ surplus. es_ES
dc.description.sponsorship This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under Project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R. en_EN
dc.language Inglés es_ES
dc.publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications es_ES
dc.rights Reserva de todos los derechos es_ES
dc.subject Game theory es_ES
dc.subject Service provision es_ES
dc.subject Wireless sensor networks es_ES
dc.subject Oligopoly es_ES
dc.subject Social welfare es_ES
dc.subject.classification INGENIERIA TELEMATICA es_ES
dc.title Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for the Internet of Things Based on Sensor Virtualization es_ES
dc.type Artículo es_ES
dc.identifier.doi 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672239 es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R/ES/PLATAFORMA DE SERVICIOS PARA CIUDADES INTELIGENTES CON REDES M2M DENSAS/ es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights Abierto es_ES
dc.contributor.affiliation Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Comunicaciones - Departament de Comunicacions es_ES
dc.description.bibliographicCitation Guijarro, L.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Naldi, M. (2017). Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for the Internet of Things Based on Sensor Virtualization. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 35(3):691-706. https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672239 es_ES
dc.description.accrualMethod S es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion http://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672239 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpinicio 691 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpfin 706 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.description.volume 35 es_ES
dc.description.issue 3 es_ES
dc.relation.pasarela S\324889 es_ES
dc.contributor.funder Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad es_ES


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