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A Better-response Strategy for Self-interested Planning Agents

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A Better-response Strategy for Self-interested Planning Agents

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Jordán, J.; Torreño Lerma, A.; De Weerdt, M.; Onaindia De La Rivaherrera, E. (2018). A Better-response Strategy for Self-interested Planning Agents. Applied Intelligence. 48(4):1020-1040. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-017-1046-5

Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10251/121362

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Title: A Better-response Strategy for Self-interested Planning Agents
Author: Jordán, Jaume Torreño Lerma, Alejandro de Weerdt, M. Onaindia De La Rivaherrera, Eva
UPV Unit: Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos y Computación - Departament de Sistemes Informàtics i Computació
Issued date:
Abstract:
[EN] When self-interested agents plan individually, interactions that prevent them from executing their actions as planned may arise. In these coordination problems, game-theoretic planning can be used to enhance the agents¿ ...[+]
Subjects: Planning , Game theory , Best-response , Better-response , Nash equilibrium
Copyrigths: Reserva de todos los derechos
Source:
Applied Intelligence. (issn: 0924-669X )
DOI: 10.1007/s10489-017-1046-5
Publisher:
Springer-Verlag
Publisher version: http://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-017-1046-5
Thanks:
This work is supported by the GLASS project TIN2014-55637-C2-2-R of the Spanish MINECO and the Prometeo project II/2013/019 funded by the Valencian Government.
Type: Artículo

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