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A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent Planning

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A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent Planning

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dc.contributor.author Jordán, Jaume es_ES
dc.contributor.author Torreño Lerma, Alejandro es_ES
dc.contributor.author de Weerdt, Mathijs es_ES
dc.contributor.author Onaindia De La Rivaherrera, Eva es_ES
dc.date.accessioned 2022-07-20T18:06:00Z
dc.date.available 2022-07-20T18:06:00Z
dc.date.issued 2021-02 es_ES
dc.identifier.issn 0926-2644 es_ES
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10251/184570
dc.description.abstract [EN] This paper presents FENOCOP, a game-theoretic approach for solving non-cooperative planning problems that involve a set of self-interested agents. Each agent wants to execute its own plan in a shared environment but the plans may be rendered infeasible by the appearance of potential conflicts; agents are willing to coordinate their plans in order to avoid conflicts during a joint execution. In order to attain a conflict-free combination of plans, agents must postpone the execution of some of their actions, which negatively affects their individual utilities. FENOCOP is a two-level game approach: the General Game selects a Nash equilibrium among several combinations of plans, and the Scheduling Game generates, for a combination of plans, an executable outcome by introducing delays in the agents¿ plans. For the Scheduling Game, we developed two algorithms that return a Pareto optimal and fair equilibrium from which no agent would be willing to deviate. es_ES
dc.description.sponsorship This work is supported by the Spanish MINECO project TIN2017-88476-C2-1-R. Jaume Jordan is funded by grant APOSTD/2018/010 of Generalitat Valenciana - Fondo Social Europeo and by UPV PAID-06-18 project. es_ES
dc.language Inglés es_ES
dc.publisher Springer-Verlag es_ES
dc.relation.ispartof Group Decision and Negotiation es_ES
dc.rights Reserva de todos los derechos es_ES
dc.subject Planning es_ES
dc.subject Multi-agent planning es_ES
dc.subject Game theory es_ES
dc.subject Nash equilibrium es_ES
dc.subject Pareto optimal es_ES
dc.subject Fairness es_ES
dc.subject.classification LENGUAJES Y SISTEMAS INFORMATICOS es_ES
dc.title A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent Planning es_ES
dc.type Artículo es_ES
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0 es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/TIN2017-88476-C2-1-R/ES/RECONOCIMIENTO DE ACTIVIDADES Y PLANIFICACION AUTOMATICA PARA EL DISEÑO DE ASISTENTES INTELIGENTES/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/UPV//PAID-06-18/ es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/GENERALITAT VALENCIANA//APOSTD%2F2018%2F010//CONTRATACION DE INVESTIGADOR POSTDOCTORAL GVA-JORDAN PRUNERA. PROYECTO: TECNOLOGIAS INTELIGENTES PARA OPTIMIZACION DE FLOTAS URBANAS DE VEHICULOS ELECTRICOS. / es_ES
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/UPV-VIN//SP20180184//Técnicas inteligentes para optimización de la localización de estaciones de recarga de vehículos eléctricos y mejora de la movilidad en ciudades/ es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights Abierto es_ES
dc.contributor.affiliation Universitat Politècnica de València. Departamento de Sistemas Informáticos y Computación - Departament de Sistemes Informàtics i Computació es_ES
dc.description.bibliographicCitation Jordán, J.; Torreño Lerma, A.; De Weerdt, M.; Onaindia De La Rivaherrera, E. (2021). A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent Planning. Group Decision and Negotiation. 30(1):7-41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0 es_ES
dc.description.accrualMethod S es_ES
dc.relation.publisherversion https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpinicio 7 es_ES
dc.description.upvformatpfin 41 es_ES
dc.type.version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion es_ES
dc.description.volume 30 es_ES
dc.description.issue 1 es_ES
dc.relation.pasarela S\418125 es_ES
dc.contributor.funder GENERALITAT VALENCIANA es_ES
dc.contributor.funder AGENCIA ESTATAL DE INVESTIGACION es_ES
dc.contributor.funder UNIVERSIDAD POLITECNICA DE VALENCIA es_ES
dc.contributor.funder Universitat Politècnica de València es_ES
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